Siege of Buda (1849)

The Siege of Buda was the siege of the Buda castle (called Festung Ofen in German), part of the twin capital cities of the Kingdom of Hungary, by the Hungarian revolutionary army led by General Artúr Görgei during the Hungarian War of Independence. Part of the Spring Campaign, the siege began on 4 May 1849 and ended with the Hungarian capture of the castle by assault on 21 May. Actually it was the only fortress in the whole war to be taken by storm by the besiegers on either side. All the rest only capitulated after agreements between besiegers and besieged. The siege of Buda was also the shortest siege of the war (18 days). The senseless bombardment of Pest by Major General Heinrich Hentzi, the Austrian commander, destroyed the classicist buildings on the shores of the Danube, but other parts of the capitals also suffered heavy damage because of the artillery duels between the two sides. The capture of Buda Castle completed the liberation of the Hungarian capital cities (Buda and Pest). Thanks to this, the second Hungarian revolutionary Government led by Bertalan Szemere together with Governor-President Lajos Kossuth returned from Debrecen, the interim capital of the Hungarian revolution, to the real capital of Hungary. On 21 May 1849, the same day as the capture of Buda, the two emperors Franz Joseph I of Austria and Tsar Nicholas I of Russia signed the final treaty which agreed on the intervention in Hungary of 200,000 Russian soldiers (and an 80,000-strong reserve force, in case they were needed), in order to help the Austrian Empire to crush the Hungarian revolution.

Siege of Buda
Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848
Painting by Mór Than
Date 4 May 1849 – 21 May 1849 Location Buda, Kingdom of Hungary Result Hungarian victory
Belligerents
Hungarian Revolutionary Army	Austrian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Artúr Görgei  József Nagysándor  Károly Knezić  Lajos Aulich  György Kmety	Heinrich Hentzi  †
Strength
Total: 34,277 men – I. corps: 9465 – II. corps: 7799 -III. corps: 9419 -VII. corps, 15. division: 4883 – 12. division: 2711 142 cannons	4,890 men 85 cannons
Casualties and losses
368/427 dead 700/691 injured	710 dead 4,204 captured[1] 248 cannons

Towards Vienna or to Buda?

After the relief of Komárom from the imperial siege, and the retreat of the Habsburg forces to the Hungarian border, the Hungarian army had two choices as to where to continue its advance.[2] One was to march on Pozsony and Vienna, in order to finally force the enemy to fight on his own ground; the other was to return eastwards and retake Buda Castle, which was held by a strong imperial garrison of 5,000 men under the command of Heinrich Hentzi.[2]

The first choice was supported mainly by the chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-Colonel József Bayer, and initially by Görgei; the second option's main proponent was General György Klapka, commanding I Corps.[3] The main reason for the first plan as supported initially by Görgei was the threat of Russian intervention. The Hungarian commander thought that his army had more chance of success if it could destroy the Austrian imperial army before the Tzar's troops arrived.[3]

Artúr Görgei

However, Görgei was quickly convinced by those who wanted to liberate the castle of Buda first. So he changed his mind and supported the second choice.[3] The reason was that although the first seemed very attractive, it would have been nearly impossible for it to succeed. While the Hungarian army gathered before Komárom had fewer than 27,000 men,[2] the imperial army awaiting them around Pozsony and Vienna had 75,633, of which its effective combat strength was 54,443 with 237 guns, so it was twice the size of Görgei's force.[4] Furthermore, the Hungarian army was short of ammunition. On the other hand, capturing the Buda castle seemed more achievable at that moment, Klapka arguing that it was not suited to withstand a siege, and could be taken quickly with a surprise attack,[5] and besides it was also very important in many other respects. It could be achieved with the available Hungarian forces; a strong imperial garrison in the middle of the country could represent a major threat if the main Hungarian army wanted to move towards Vienna, because attacks from the castle could cut the Hungarian lines of communication, so it would need to be blockaded by a significant force in order to prevent such sorties. Also the fact that the only permanent bridge on the Hungarian part of the Danube (temporary pontoon bridges existed in many places), the Chain Bridge, was under the control of the imperial garrison in Buda Castle made it impossible to transport supplies to the Hungarian armies fighting in the West. Thus this real strategical importance underlined the need to take the castle as soon as possible[6] Furthermore, the presence of Josip Jelačić's corps in Southern Hungary made the Hungarian commanders think that the Croatian ban could advance towards Buda at any moment to relieve it, cutting Hungary in two.[2] So the Hungarian staff understood that without taking the Buda Castle, the main army could not campaign towards Vienna without putting the country in grave danger, and that at that moment it was impossible to achieve victory against the numerically and technologically superior imperials gathered on the Western border of Hungary. This indicates that the arguments of those historians who wrote that Görgei made a mistake by not continuing the attack towards Vienna, because he had a great chance to take the Austrian capital and win the war before the Russian intervention[7][8] are wrong, and at that moment (before the arrival of the Hungarian reinforcements from the south) the only place which could bring a victory was the Castle of Buda.

Beside the military arguments in favor of the siege of Buda, there were political ones too. After the declaration of the independence of Hungary, the Hungarian parliament wanted to convince foreign states to acknowledge Hungary's independence, and knew that there was more chance of achieving this after the total liberation of their capital city Buda-Pest. And the capital city also included the Buda castle.[2] So the council of war held on 29 April 1849 decided to besiege and take Buda Castle, and then, after the arrival of reinforcements from southern Hungary, move to attack Vienna in order to force the empire to sue for peace and recognize the independence of Hungary.[2]

The castle before the siege

Plan of Buda Castle

The Turkish occupation of Buda ended on 2 September 1686, after a bloody siege by the Austrians. After that, the castle was the property of the Hungarian king (who was at the same time Holy Roman Emperor until 1804, and after that Austrian Emperor), and was defended by foreign (not Hungarian nationality) soldiers led by a foreign officer.[9] After the Hungarian revolution succeeded and the Batthyány Government was formed, the castle was still defended by foreign soldiers who had to recognize the Hungarian Government's authority. Because he did not want to do so, the commander of the garrison, Lieutenant General Karl Kress resigned and left on 11 May 1848.[9] So too did those foreign units stationed in the castle who were against the Hungarian revolution, like the Italian 23rd infantry regiment, who clashed with the newly conscripted Hungarian soldiers on 11 June 1848, resulting in many deaths. After this conflict, on the orders of the Hungarian War Ministry, the Italian 23rd infantry regiment was withdrawn from Hungary.[10]

Franz Joseph Sandman Buda and Pest in the 1840s. Seen from the Gellért Hill

Following the Imperial campaign against Hungary led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz that began in mid-December 1848, the ensuing retreat of the Hungarian armies, and the Hungarian defeat in the Battle of Mór, the Habsburg troops entered the Hungarian capitals on 5 January 1849.[11] The free Hungarian parliament, the National Defense Committee (interim government of Hungary), and a long convoy of civilians with all their possessions fled through the cold and snowy winter east to the Tisza river, installing the interim capital at Debrecen.[12] The first thing Windisch-Grätz ordered after entering Buda was the occupation of the castle and the Gellért Hill.[11] Windisch-Grätz named Lieutenant General Ladislas Wrbna as the commander of the Buda Military District, in other words the military commander of the imperial troops in the capitals. But at the end of February, when the commander-in-chief prepared to attack the Hungarian army, he took Wrbna with him on the campaign, leaving Major General Heinrich Hentzi, commander of the imperial garrison of the Castle of Buda, to take over command of the troops in Buda and Pest.[13]

Castle of Buda on a Guild letter 1816

The people of Pest welcoming the first Hungarian Hussars who entered in Pest on 24th April 1849

During April 1849 the main imperial force led by Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz suffered one defeat after another and retreated towards the western border of Hungary. The Hungarian victory of Nagysalló on 19 April had decisive results for the imperial occupation forces stationed in Hungary.[14] It opened the way towards Komárom, bringing its relief to within just a couple of days’ march.[14] At the same time it put the imperials in the situation of being incapable of stretching their troops across the very large front which this Hungarian victory created, so instead of concentrating their troops around Pest and Buda as they had planned, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden, Windisch-Grätz's replacement as the Imperial commander-in-chief in Hungary, had to order the retreat from Pest to avoid being caught by the Hungarian pincers.[14] When he learned about the defeat at Nagysalló on the morning of 20 April, he wrote to Lieutenant General Balthasar Simunich, the commander of the force besieging Komárom, and to Prince Felix of Schwarzenberg, the Minister-President of the Austrian Empire, that in order to secure Vienna and Pozsony, from Hungarian attack he was forced to retreat from Pest and even from Komárom.[15] He also wrote that the morale of the imperial troops was very low, and because of this they could not fight another battle for a while without suffering another defeat.[16] So the next day he ordered the evacuation of Pest, leaving an important garrison in the fortress of Buda to defend it against Hungarian attack. He ordered Jelačić to remain in Pest for a while, and then to retreat towards Eszék in Bácska where the Serbian insurgents allied with the Austrians were in a grave situation after the victories of the Hungarian armies led by Mór Perczel and Józef Bem.[17]

On 24 April the last imperial soldiers left Pest. That same morning at 7 o'clock seven hussars, from the Hungarian II Corps entered the city, welcomed by the cheers of happy crowds of citizens who had been waiting so long to be liberated.[18] In Buda next day, Hentzi convened two meetings with his officers and declared that he would defend the Castle of Buda until his last breath.[19]

Preparations for the defense of Buda

The Castle of Buda, or as it is also known, the Upper Town of Buda (budai felsőváros) lies on a hill 167 meters above sea level, and 70 meters above the Danube which flows beneath it.[20] This so-called Castle Hill (Várhegy) has an oblong irregular shape of a sharp triangle with its tip towards the south and its base towards the north. Its length is 660 meters, and concerning its two edges, it is as it follows: on its northern, wider side with the Royal Palace is 156 meters high, while in its southern edge is 163 m high and 150 m wide.[20] The castle hill is surrounded by suburbs, with the Danube to the east 260-meter-wide (850 ft), Gellért Hill to the south 235-meter-high (771 ft) Naphegy 158-meter-high (518 ft) and Little Gellért Hill (Kis-Gellérthegy) 168-meter-high (551 ft) to the southwest, Kissváb Hill (Kissvábhegy) 249-meter-high (817 ft) to the west, and Rókus Hill (Rókushegy or Rézmál) 249-meter-high (817 ft) to the northwest; also to the northwest are Ferenc Hill (Ferenchegy or Vérhalom) 265-meter-high (869 ft) and Kálvária Hill (Kálvária-hegy) 161-meter-high (528 ft), and József Hill (Józsefhegy or Szemlőhegy) 232-meter-high (761 ft) and Rózsa Hill (Rózsadomb) 195-meter-high (640 ft) to the north.[20] Across the Danube to the east there are no heights near the castle. The height of the walls surrounding the castle was not uniform. They were punctuated by old circular bastions, called rondellas, and newer, polygonal bastions, close enough together to enable them to bring fire to bear on enemy attacking the walls between them.[21] The fact that there were no moats, beneath the walls, and that the hill was surrounded by houses and gardens except for around the four castle gates, made the besiegers’ job easier.[21] The castle's defenses were of 16th century standard, because the fortification modernization of later periods had almost no effect on this castle without exterior walls and defenses and consisting only of a "core fort".[21] The most important defenses of the castle were its walls surrounding the edges of the Castle Hill. This wall was built in different periods, and was repaired in various ways in the 163 years between the sieges of 1686 and 1849. Because of this it was of different widths, without embrasures, protective structures, etc., and lacking the most elementary elements of modern siege technology.[21] The gates were mostly vestiges of the past rather than real castle gates, lacking trenches or drawbridges.[21] Comparing it with Hungarian castles like Arad, Temesvár, Komárom, Gyulafehérvár, Pétervárad or Eszék, it can be said that it was centuries behind these, and because of this the intention to defend it came as a surprise to many. But the imperials understood the importance of holding the Castle of Buda as long as they could, both for political and symbolic reasons as well because of having accumulated a huge store of military equipment there, and they did not want to give all of these up so easily.[21]

The Hungarian capitals Pest and Buda in 1850 (in German language).
Districts of Buda (in German Ofen):
– Festung (The Buda Castle),
– Wasser-Stadt = Vízváros (Watertown),
– Christina-Stadt = Krisztinaváros (Christinatown),
– Land-Strasse = Országút (Main Road),
– Raitzen-Stadt = Rácváros (Serbian Town).
Hills:
– St. Gerhards Block = Gellérthegy (Gellért Hill),
– Sonnen Spiess = Naphegy (Sun Hill).
The Gates of the Buda Castle: – Wasser Tor = Vízikapu (Water Gate),
– Burg Tor = Várkapu (Castle Gate),
– Weissbrg Tor = Fehérvári kapu (Székesfehérvár Gate),
– Wiener Tor = Bécsi kapu (Vienna Gate),
Other important locations during the siege:
– Kettenbrücke = Lánchíd (Chain Bridge),
– Köngl. Schloss = Budavári palota (Kings castle),
– Georgi Platz = Szent György tér (St. George Square),
– Fischer B. = Halászbástya (Fishermans Bastion),
– Zeughaus = Fegyvertár (Arsenal),
– Margarethen Insel = Margitsziget (Margaret Island)

The strengthening of the castle of Buda in post-revolution Hungary started after Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić 's Croatian army entered Hungary to overthrow Lajos Batthyány's national Hungarian government and was advancing on the Hungarian capitals. But the first plans for this were drawn up after Jelačić had been defeated at Pákozd on 29 September 1848 and retreated from Hungary.[22] Although the enemy retreated, the fear he had caused made the Hungarians think about strengthening Buda and Pest. They carved out arms stores in the rock of the Gellért Hill.[23] At the beginning of October 1848, Artillery Lieutenant József Mack published a detailed plan to defend the capitals in the newspaper Kossuth Hírlapja (Kossuth's Gazette).[24] In this work Mack wrote that it was not true that the castle could not be defended, saying that with the 50 cannon in the castle any enemy could easily be kept at a distance. He claimed that enemy artillery could only threaten the castle from Gellért Hill, and that with just six 24-pdr cannon he could prevent anyone from installing their batteries there.[25] He also said that the cannon could prevent enemy rocket batteries from burning down the city. As for the forces necessary to hold the castle, Mack stated that 2,500 soldiers and 300 artillerymen would be enough.[25] In the autumn of 1848 the Hungarian patriotic militiamen formed an artillery corps, and received a battery of 6-pdr guns.[25] He also wrote that the cannons can prevent also the enemy rocket batteries to burn down the city. About the necessary forces to hold the castle Mack wrote that 2500 soldiers and 300 artillerymen are enough.[25] In the Autumn of 1848 the Hungarian patriotic militiamen formed an artillery corp, and received a battery made of guns of 6 pounds.[26] In December 9 cannon and 2 howitzers arrived which, according to an inscription on one of them, were made in 1559. Some of these cannon would be actually used in the defense of the castle in May 1849.[26]

The Chain Bridge in Buda 1847 with the castle in the background, by Sámuel Lehnhardt

When the victorious Hungarian Spring Campaign began, especially after their defeat in the Battle of Isaszeg, the imperial commanders started to be more and more concerned about the defense of the capitals and of Buda Castle. Hentzi prepared a plan for the defence of the capitals, and after this was criticized because it did not include Buda Castle, he quickly made another one.[27] But this plan was also criticized by Colonel Trattnern, the director of imperial military engineering, criticisms which were later proved to be justified.[28] Hentzi thought that the cannon in the 1st to 4th rondellas (the circular bastions) needed almost no protective entrenchments; that the gates were well protected by the artillery which could easily prevent enemy artillery positioning itself before them; that the curtain wall of the castle was so strong that 12-pdr cannon could not damage it, so it was unnecessary to make earth revetments around it; that an enemy attack on the Chain Bridge could easily be stopped with gunfire; that there was no need for shell-proof shelters because the Hungarians had no mortars; that Svábhegy was too far from the castle to be dangerous, contrary to the side of the Royal Palace, which is close to the Little Gellért Hill.[29]

In mid-April, there were some indications that the imperials would retreat from Pest, such as the return of cotton sandbags to the inhabitants which had previously been commandeered in order to build defenses around the town.[30] On the other hand, Welden wrote a letter to Hentzi in which he ordered him to defend the Danube line, or at least Buda castle for as long as "the condition of the defensive features of the castle [walls, bastions] and of your food supply makes it possible".[31] The commander-in-chief noted that Hentzi should respond to attacks and gun fire coming from the direction of Pest with bullets and grapeshot only, so as to spare the splendid buildings of the city, giving him permission to use roundshot and shell only if the population of Pest behaved in an unacceptable manner towards the imperials.[31] But Hentzi did not respect this order, and bombarded Pest, destroying the Classicist styled buildings on the shores of the Danube, and others in Pest, despite the fact that the inhabitants did nothing to provoke him, and despite a personal request from Görgei in this regard.[32] Welden's letter informs Hentzi that the food supply of the castle is enough for 6 weeks and there is enough ammunition for the defense. It also states that any cannon to be found in Buda and Pest must be brought into the castle, the waterworks which enabled the defenders to be supplied with water from the Danube must be strengthened with firing platforms for cannon, and the palisades on the left bank of the Danube must be removed because they could be advantageous for the enemy.[33]

Heinrich Hentzi, captain of the castle's defending army

Major General Heinrich Hentzi (1785–1849) was an experienced officer with deep knowledge of engineering, so he was qualified to lead the technical and logistical preparations for the defense of the castle.[34] He actually started these preparations in January 1849, after he was appointed to lead the repair of its fortifications, having presented himself to Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz when he occupied the capitals.[34] In the winter of 1849 Hentzi carried out the construction of the works protecting the ends of the Chain Bridge and the palisade from the left end of the Chain Bridge and the Újépület (New Building).[34] But after finishing those, the work stopped because the money ran out.[34]

On 24 April, when Jelačić's corps left the capitals for southern Hungary, Hentzi burned the pontoon bridge across the Danube. He then ordered the people who lived in the castle to store enough food and water for two months; those who could not do so had to leave.[34] Over the next few days, until 3 May, Hentzi gathered beef cattle and other food for his soldiers, made enough ammunition for the infantry and artillery, and strengthened the fortifications of the castle.[34] Under his command the engineering captains Pollini and Gorini supervised the work of 200 soldiers and of many laborers from the capitals and from the Swabian villages around them to strengthen the weak points of the fortifications, paying them a salary. They also made parapets and overhead cover for the cannon. Hentzi also ordered the manufacture of ammunition.[34]

Hentzi decreed that the Waterworks of Buda which supplied the castle with water from Danube should be fortified with palisades both north and south, to be defended by his soldiers, and a defensive work in what is now Clark Ádám Place, in which they could take cover.[35] He named a chevau-léger captain to be the leader of the firemen, and in order so far as possible to prevent fire breaking out during the siege, he ordered residents of the castle to remove all flammable material from their attics.[35] He designated a detachment of pioneers to be ready to remove any grenade or bombs that might land on houses, to prevent greater damage.[35]

The northern fortification of the waterworks was around the pumping station allowing observation of the Chain Bridge to prevent an attack from there. Hentzi ordered that the planks which enabled crossing the unfinished bridges should be removed.[36] He also ordered that 4 so-called Rambart boxes, filled with 400 kg of gunpowder, should be put on the iron beams which led to the piers of the bridge. These 4 boxes were linked by wooden tubes in which was put tinder. In order to make the explosion of the chests more destructive, big stones were put in them.[36] The southern fortification of the waterworks ensured the defense of the aqueduct which supplied the Royal Palace with water.[36]

Hentzi positioned his troops in the castle and outside, around the Waterworks and the end of the Chain Bridge, in the following way:

– 3rd Battalion, 5th Border Guard Infantry Regiment: the defense line linking the barricade covering Víziváros (Water City), the Waterworks Fortress, and the promenade known as Ellipszis.
– 3rd Battalion, 12th (Archduke Wilhelm) Infantry Regiment: the defensive work at the Buda end of the Chain Bridge, the barricade at the Vízikapu (Watergate), the houses numbered 80–85 used in the defense of the Waterworks Fortress, the Royal Palace, the stairs leading to the Castle from the lower barricade, and the lower part of the Palace Garden.
– 3rd Battalion, 10th (Ban's) Infantry Regiment: Vienna Gate; Bastions I, II., V. and VII; circular bastion I. with a grenade thrower sentry post, and the sentry post below the Royal Palace, on the curtain wall, looking towards Krisztinaváros.
– 1st Battalion, 23rd (Ceccopieri) Infantry Regiment: the Palace Gate, before the barricade at the gate at Vízikapu, by the grenade throwing sentry post between circular bastions I. and II., and also small detachments at the Nádor-barrack, at the so-called Country House (országház), at the military depot, at the town hall and at the meat factory.
– 1st (Lieutenant-Colonel's) Squadron, 1st (Archduke John) dragoon regiment: one troop stationed in a shed down to the left of the Palace gate, the other in the Gróf Sándor house.[37]

The two battalions from the Waterworks Fortress, together with one of the troops of dragoons, were used as pickets outside Buda, towards Óbuda and the vineyards of the Buda hills.[38]

Before the siege, Hentzi had 85 guns altogether: the 57 he received from Welden, and another 28 which he retrieved and repaired.[38] He placed these strategically as follow:

– Rondella I: two 6-pdr, two 12-pdr, and one 19-pdr cannon; one 10-pdr howitzer,
– Rondella II: three 12-pdr cannon,
– Rondella III: one 3-pdr, two 12-pdr cannon,
– Rondella IV: one 3-pdr, three 12-pdr cannon,
– Bastion V:one 10-pdr howitzer,
– Rondella VI: one 6-pdr, one 12-pdr, and one 18-pdr cannon,
– Vienna Gate: one 6-pdr cannon,
– Bastion VII: one 18-pdr and two 24-pdr cannon; three 10-pdr mortars,
– Bastion VIII: two 12-pdr, one 18-pdr cannon; two 10-pdr howitzers,
– Bastion IX, or Fisherman's Bastion (Halászbástya): four 60-pdr mortars,
– Watergate: one 3-pdr cannon
– Bastion X: two 12-pdr cannon; three 60-pdr mortars,
– front facade of the Military Depot (Hadiszertár): three 30-pdr, three 60-pdr mortars,
– Bastion XI: two 12-pdr cannon,
– Upper terrace: two 24-pdr cannon; two 10-pdr howitzers; two 10-pdr mortars, four 60-pdr mortars,
– Middle terrace: one 10-pdr howitzer,
– Lower terrace: three 12-pdr, two 18-pdr cannon,
– Main guardroom: two 3-pdr cannon,
– Northern Waterworks Fortress: three 6-pdr cannon; one 7-pdr howitzer,
– Southern Waterworks Fortress: four 6-pdr cannon; one 7-pdr howitzer,
– Ellipsz: twelve wall guns.[39]

Four 3-pdr, three 12-pdr and one 18-pdr cannon and a destroyer battery were kept in reserve.[40]

The Hungarian march to Buda and preparations for the siege

After the relief of Komárom on 26 April, and the Hungarian commanders’ council of war's decision of 29 April to besiege Buda, I. Corps departed from Komárom towards Buda next day. Formerly led by General János Damjanich, it was now commanded by General József Nagysándor, who took his excellent predecessor's place, because of an accident to the latter which rendered him unable to serve.[41] This departure was in accordance with the orders issued the same day by the High Command of the Hungarian army, requiring all the designated troops to do so.[42] Over the next few days, of the Hungarian forces stationed at Komárom, III. Corps also marched to Buda, while VII. Corps moved west to Győr, to observe the movements of the imperial armies on the western border of Hungary.[43] General Lajos Aulich ’s II. Corps, whose troops were mainly on the eastern banks of the Danube, also received the order to cross to the other bank to participate in the encirclement of Buda castle, as did György Kmety's division at Esztergom.[43] Although the main Hungarian force moved towards Buda, they brought no heavy siege artillery with them, only field artillery, which unfortunately was not very effective in sieges. It seems that Görgei and the other Hungarian commanders thought Hentzi had not yet finished fortifying the castle for the siege, and that it could easily be occupied with a surprise attack if they arrived there quickly.[3]So the Hungarian army corps hurried to Buda, not wanting to be slowed down by the heavy artillery. This mistake by Görgei prolonged the siege for many days, which could have been used for preparations for the offensive on the western front,[44] because Hentzi strengthened the castle in time which made it impossible to take it without heavy siege artillery. This does not make sense. If Gorgei was already hurrying, how could he ever have got there before Hentzi finished fortifying it? Could he have got the siege artillery there any quicker? What preparations could he have made if he had not hurried?]. The Hungarian main body reached Buda on 4 May and gathered on the western bank of the river, surrounding the castle. Only Szekulits's division of II. Corps remained on the eastern side.[43] The Hungarian units deployed as follows:

– Kmety's division northeast of the castle, next to the Danube in the Víziváros quarter of Buda,
– On Kmety's right, northwest of the castle was General Károly Knezić’s III. Corps, in the sector between Kálvária Hill and Kissváb Hill,
– General József Nagysándor's I. Corps was deployed between Kissváb Hill and Little Gellért Hill,
– The sector between Little Gellért Hill and the Danube was occupied by II. Corps under General Lajos Aulich,[45]

The Hungarians started to deploy their field artillery on the heights surrounding the castle: the Gellért Hill (one 6/12 pounds battery of 7 cannons. The map shows “six 6-pdr cannon, one 7-pdr howitzer”), on Naphegy (half a rocket battery: 4 rocket stands), Kissváb Hill (one 12 pounds battery of 7 cannons. The map shows “two 7-pdr and two 10-pdr howitzers, three 12-pdr cannon”), Kálvária Hill and Kis-Rókus Hill (one battery of eleven 7-pdr howitzers spread across the two).[4][46] The battery closest to the castle was the one on Naphegy, 600–700 meters away.[47] Altogether 5 batteries of artillery were deployed on the hills near the castle (25 cannons and 4 rocket stands).[47][4]

On 4 May Görgei sent a captured Austrian officer as a messenger to ask Hentzi to surrender, proposing him a fair captivity.[47] He argued that the castle was not suited to withstand a siege.[48] Görgei also promised not to attack the castle from the side facing Pest, but that if Hentzi fired his artillery at Pest he would show no mercy and would have all prisoners executed after capturing the castle.[49] Additionally, Görgei appealed to Hentzi's supposed Magyar sympathies (Hentzi having been born in Debrecen), but Hentzi replied that his loyalty was to the Kaiser.[50] In the same reply, Hentzi also argued that the castle could be defended,[49] and threatened Görgei, demanding that Görgei not attack the castle with artillery from any direction, or else Hentzi would destroy the city of Pest with a huge bombardment.[47]

Siege

György Kmety by Károly Brocky

Attack against the water defenses

After receiving this negative response from Hentzi, Görgei ordered his artillery to start bombarding the castle. But the defenders responded to this bombardment with even heavier fire, forcing the Hungarian batteries to change position in order not to be destroyed.[51] This showed that for the moment the Hungarian field artillery was too weak against the imperial cannon. Another problem was that the Hungarian artillery did not have enough ammunition.[51] On 6 May General József Nagysándor wrote in his report that the ammunition had run out, and he was forced to cease bombarding the castle. He also wrote that if he did not receive the rockets and shells he requested, he would not be able to attack the aqueduct.[51] In reality these weapons were already in Pest, having been sent via Szolnok by rail, but they were mislaid in Pest, and were only found a week later.[51]

Buda may 4

On 4 May Görgey sent Colonel György Kmety to attack the water defenses between Castle Hill and the Danube, being the only place outside the castle still occupied by the imperials, because if those fell into the hands of the Hungarians, that would have threatened the Austrian defenders’ water supply.[47] Kmety's order was to burn the Waterworks, which was surrounded by ramparts made of log piles. The Hungarian colonel led two battle-hardened battalions, the 10th and the 33rd, supported by two 6-pdr cannon.[47] When they approached the imperial defenses, Kmety's troops came under heavy artillery fire from the side, from the Austrian units positioned on the Fisherman's Bastion and on the Joseph Bastion, and in front from the defenders of the Watergate, the entrance to the Waterworks.[47] Despite this, the 10th battalion reached the rampart, but there the defenders unleashed grapeshot and an intense fusillade upon them, which forced them to retreat.[47] Furthermore, Kmety and many of his soldiers were injured in this assault.[47] During the retreat the battalion disintegrated, and the soldiers sought refuge in the houses nearby. Supported by rockets and 6-pdr cannon fire,[4] Kmety repeated the attack with the 33rd battalion too, but again without success.[47] The Hungarian losses were heavy. The attacking troops lost around 100 men,[52] among which the 10th battalion alone lost 1/3 of its men: 37 jägers, 5 warrant officers and 3 officers were dead or injured.[4] After this Kmety reported to Görgey that it was impossible to take the Waterworks, because the imperial cannon in the castle dominated the road to it, causing heavy losses to the attackers and preventing any chance of success.[47]

During the attack on the Waterworks Görgei ordered a cannonade against the castle from the surrounding hills, but the fire of the imperial artillery from the castle silenced the Hungarian batteries on Kis-Rókus Hill and Naphegy Hill.[4]

Before the arrival of the siege artillery

The failure of the attack on the Waterworks showed that the castle could not be taken by escalade, because of the great firepower of the imperial artillery and infantry, but only by breaching the walls of the castle with heavy siege artillery. This failure also made clear to Görgei that the conquest of the castle would not be an easy task, but would necessitate a long siege, conducted with heavy siege weapons which the besieging troops lacked (they only had light field artillery).[47] So he wrote to Richard Guyon, the commander of the fortress of Komárom, and ordered him to send siege guns from there.[47] On 6 May General Guyon sent 5 cannon capable of breaching the walls (four 24-pdrs, one 18-pdr),[47] which arrived on 9 to 10 May, but without almost no ammunition.[53]

The shore of the Danube by Pest in 1837 1 before its destruction in 1849. By Carl Vasquez-Pinas von Löwenthal

The shore of the Danube by Pest in 1837, before its destruction in 1849, 2. By Carl Vasquez-Pinas von Löwenthal

Buda may 5–16

In spite of all Görgei's solicitations, Guyon was reluctant to send the other siege guns to Buda, arguing that this would leave Komárom defenseless, despite the fact that these weapons were not actually part of the fortress's arsenal, because they were just captured from the imperials a few days earlier (26 April) in the Battle of Komárom.[54] The English-born general only sent the rest of the siege cannons towards Buda after he was asked to do so by Governor Lajos Kossuth.[55] While they waited for the arrival of the siege cannon from Komárom, Görgei ordered the construction of firing positions for a breaching battery and a field gun battery on Nap Hegy ("Sun Hill"), one of the hills in Buda, because he considered that the I. (Fehérvár) rondella, facing in that direction, was the weakest point of the castle.[52] The field gun battery was to cover the siege battery against fire from the castle. The batteries were more or less completed by 14 May, and the guns deployed in the early hours of the 16th.[47]

During the wait for the siege artillery, Görgei ordered feint night attacks against the castle to keep the enemy busy and to divert Hentzi's attention from his plans.[55] Each army corps had to use four battalions, and the Kmety division two, for these attacks.[4] The days of 5–7 The days of 5–7 May passed with desultory artillery fire by both sides.[55]

The besieging army was by no means inactive in the period between 5 and 16 May. In the early hours of 5 May, Kmety's forces again approached the water defenses, whereupon Hentzi started to bombard the Water City (Víziváros), showing again that he had no concern for the lives of the civilian inhabitants, and the Hungarians withdrew.[56] On the 10th, an epidemic of cholera and typhus broke out among the defenders.[53]

On the night of 10–11 May, Hentzi ordered a sortie to rescue the wounded and sick Austrians from the Víziváros hospitals. A border guard company and a sapper detachment took part.[53] The first attempt was beaten back, but when the imperial troops led by Captain Schröder tried again in greater force at 7 am, they were successful, liberating 300 sick Austrian soldiers, and causing heavy losses to Kmety's troops stationed there.[53][56]

On 12 May the action continued with minor skirmishes, and on the 13th with an artillery duel.[53]

At first, Hentzi paid no attention to the construction of the siege batteries by the Hungarians, and put all of his effort into fulfilling his pledge to fire on Pest.[47] His rage against the buildings and the population of Pest was not tempered even by a delegation of the people of Buda, who begged him to stop the destruction of Pest, saying that if he did not accept this they would leave the castle. Hentzi replied that they could leave the castle if they wished, but threatened that he would bombard Pest with explosive and incendiary projectiles if the Hungarian army did not stop the siege. Next day around 300 citizens left the castle of Buda.[53] Unfortunately Hentzi kept his promise and firing went on nearly every day from 4 May onwards, and became particularly intense on 9 and 13 May, resulting in the burning and destruction of the beautiful neoclassical buildings of the Al-Dunasor (Lower Danube Row).[57] The population of Pest fled from the bombardment to outside the city.[53] Hentzi's attack on the civilian buildings and the population was contrary to the rules of war, and was condemned by the Hungarian commanders. On the 13th Görgei wrote a letter to Governor Kossuth about the destruction caused by Hentzi's senseless bombardment of Pest:

Rudolf von Alt – Lower Danube Row in Pest 1847, before its destruction in May 1849 by the cannons of Hentzi

Last night commander Hentzi fulfilled his promise gruesomely. With well-aimed shots he managed to set the splendid Danube Row on fire in several places. Helped by the strong wind, the fire spread rapidly, and reduced the most beautiful part of Pest to ashes. – It was a terrible sight! The whole city was covered by a sea of flames, and the burning bombshells showered like a rain of stars, thundering grimly in the swirling smoke, onto the poor town. It is impossible to describe this sight accurately; but in this whole phenomenon I saw the burning of the torch lit for the funeral feast of the dying Austrian dynasty, because for those in this country who had the smallest consideration for this perfidious dynasty, yesterday's events obliterated it forever. This is why although I mourn the destruction of the capital city with all my heart, this outrageous act of the enemy, which I was powerless to prevent and which I did nothing to provoke, will make me try with all my power to avenge it by making even greater efforts to besiege the castle, and I feel it my most sacred duty to liberate the capital as soon as possible from this monstrous enemy.[58]

Bombardment of Pest 1849

The 17-year-old Hungarian soldier Emil Büttner wrote in his letter about the "beauty" of the gruesome spectacle of the nocturnal artillery and rocket duel which caused such huge destruction to Pest and Buda:

This offers us a gruesomely beautiful spectacle, when every night the shellfire begins, the whole area is on fire, the mortars firing their bombs flash here and there, followed each time by a hollow murmur. The sparkling bomb whizzes through the sky like a fiery dragon, often you can see as many as 8–10 of them in the air at the same time, and every one of them is followed by a howling 24-pounder [bomb]. Many of those that were poorly targeted explode in the air, and the flames pour out of their ripped orbs like squeezed lightning, followed every time by a horrible crack, their fragments whirr with different noises, dispersing in every direction, smashing and crushing whatever stands in their way. What kind of roaring and growling causes the constant howling of the cannon, the bursting shells and bombs of the enemy, and the unceasing salvoes from our guns from every direction? You can imagine they are a bit like the thunder heard sometimes in great thunderstorms.

Büttner writes the following thoughts about the sight of the rockets used by the two armies, which were a relatively recent military innovation:

The damages caused by the bombardment of Pest by the imperials: Lower Danube Row

I never saw anything more beautiful. The many rockets slashed crackling through the air like fiery snakes, blistering and sparkling on their way, and if they fell through a window or roof, they lit up the surroundings in the most beautiful way, then after they burst they set fire to everything that was flammable.[4]

Görgei wanted to retaliate to the Austrian bombardment of Pest and avenge this destructive attack. He ordered the three huge telescopes from the observatory from the Gellért Hill to be brought to his headquarters, and posted his officers to observe through them. If Hentzi appeared on the walls of the castle, then one of his officers who had a very loud voice used a huge tin megaphone to tell the artillery officers on Kis-Svábhegy Hill where to fire their cannon. Although they did not manage to kill the Austrian commander, they came close many times, forcing Hentzi and his officers to run down from the walls. After that Hentzi showed himself as rarely as possible on the castle's defensive walls and bastions, and when he did so, he did not stand still for long, finishing his inspections very quickly.[4] In the night of 14 May, Hentzi tried to destroy the pontoon bridge from the Csepel Island by floating 5 fireships and two vessels loaded with stones down the river, but because of the lack of sappers charged with this task, only one vessel was lit before they released them into the stream.[59] But these ships did not float down the middle of the river current as expected but close to the shore, where they were spotted by the Hungarian sappers at the Rudas Baths, who then approached them by boat and towed them to the shore.[59]

The real siege begins

After the arrival of the heavy siege artillery, the Hungarian army could finally win superiority over the defenders’ artillery, and on 16 May the real bombardment of the castle began. After the installation of the siege cannon, the Hungarian artillery deployed for an effective siege in the following way:

– In Pest at the Ullmann tobacco warehouse: half a 6-pdr battery,
– On Margaret Island half a 6-pdr battery,
– At the port for steamboats from Óbuda: half a 6-pdr battery. This was tasked with preventing any activity by the Nádor steamboat, which was in Austrian hands,
– Bomba Square: one 6-pr and one 7-pdr howitzer,
– In the first Kálvária Hill position: one 6-pdr battery,

Buda may 16–20

– In the second Kálvária (Calvary) Hill position: some 12-pdr cannon and six 10-pdr howitzers,
– At the Vienna Gate brick factory: two 60-pdr mortars,
– Kissváb Hill: a battery of 12-pdr and 18-pdr cannon, with a furnace to heat the cannonballs,
– On the left side of Naphegy Hill: one breaching battery of 24-pdr cannon,
– On the right side of Naphegy Hill: some 12-pdr and 18-pdr cannon in 16 platforms behind a trench,
– Along the Calvary stations on the road to Gellért Hill: four 18-pdr cannon,
– On the crest of Gellért Hill: two 24-pdr cannon and a furnace to heat the cannonballs,
– On the slope of Gellért Hill towards Rácváros: four 18-pdr and two 60-pdr mortars,
– On Gellért Hill on the road to the Calvary: one 10-pdr howitzer,
– On Gellért Hill, 200 paces down, near a vineyard: one 10-pdr howitzer,
– To the left of that: one 12-pdr battery,
– In a dug-out near the highest Calvary station: two 60-pdr bomb mortars,
– Behind parapets near the Danube, level with the Rudas Baths: one 12-pdr cannon and a 10-pdr howitzer,
– In Rácváros, at the Zizer house: one 24-pdr cannon.[60]

With these cannon, together with those the army had before, at last the Hungarians could shoot cannonballs inside the castle, constantly disturbing the defenders’ rest and their troop movements.[61] The siege artillery finally started its work on 16 May, shooting at the walls but also at buildings within the castle reported by spies to be the depots and barracks of the enemy troops. Continuous firing began at 4 o'clock in the morning and went on until 6 o'clock in the afternoon.[61] By next day had the section of wall south of the Fehérvár Rondella had been breached.[56]

16 May was when Hentzi sensed that the siege was reaching a critical stage. He realized that the main Hungarian attack would not come from the east against the Waterworks, but from the west, against the breach created by the Hungarian artillery at the Fehérvár rondella.[62] In his council of war that night, he proposed continuing to bombard of Pest, but engineering captain Philipp Pollini objected, arguing that it would be better to fire on the Hungarian artillery, in order to try to destroy them. The council accepted Pollini's plan, so at 18:30 all the cannon which had been withdrawn earlier to protect them from the Hungarian artillery were sent back to the walls to duel with the Hungarian cannon.[63]

Firing continued into the evening, and one round set fire to the roof of the palace. In revenge, Hentzi fired on Pest again next day.[56]

Transporting of the wounded at the siege of Buda

This so enraged Görgey that he ordered his forces to carry out a reconnaissance in force in the early hours of 18 May, and if the action was sufficiently successful it would be converted into a full assault.[56] I. Corps was to attack the breach in the Fehérvár Rondella, III. Corps to scale the IV. rondella with ladders, and Kmety's division was to make a demonstration attack against the Waterworks.[61] The attack failed. Firstly, the approach to the walls was hindered by a system of obstacles put in place by the castle garrison. Secondly, the breach was not large enough to be climbed, and the ladders brought by the soldiers were too short.[56] In the dark, the soldiers of I. Corps lost their way towards the breach, and when they finally found it, it was already dawn, so they were spotted by the defenders, targeted by grapeshot and a hail of bullets, and forced to retreat.[4] III. corps attacked from the north and climbed the walls with their ladders, but the defenders repelled the attack, causing 34 dead and the loss of 21 ladders. Also the house which was the 65th battalion's base was set on fire by the enemy artillery, so the Hungarian soldiers could not retreat into it but had to run away across open ground under fire from the defenders. The 9th battalion had orders to fire on the defenders from the windows and roofs of the houses in Attila Street. The other battalions of III. corps gathered in the nearby houses and tried to climb the walls on ladders, but because the ladders were too short, this attack too was unsuccessful. The soldiers of the 9th battalion were so busy firing on the enemy that they did not hear their comrades retreat, so they were trapped in the houses when dawn arrived, and could not retreat next day because the defenders immediately fired on any who tried to come out of the houses.[4] II. corps attacked the Waterworks with the bayonet, but was repelled. Kmety's troops also attacked the Waterworks, reaching the Watergate, but here they were halted and forced to engage in a futile firefight with the enemy.[4]

Bombardment and assault of the Castle of Buda 1849, by Károly Klette

The causes of the failure were many: the troops were not coordinated enough, they did not receive clear instructions about when to turn the demonstration attack into a real one, or about the length of the ladders.[4] In his memoirs Görgei acknowledges that the failure is mainly his fault, because he did not check beforehand whether the breach was large enough to be passable. He wrote that he ordered the attack rashly because he was angry about Hentzi's bombardment of Pest, and wanted to punish him by taking the castle as quick as possible.[61] The shortness of the siege ladders also contributed to the failure. The Hungarians lost around 200 men in this abortive attack.[62] After the attack Görgei asked for more ladders, which arrived from Pest a day later, on 19 May.[62]

On 18 May Hentzi tried to fill the breach created by the Hungarian artillery near the Fehérvár rondella, but a downpour during the night washed away the whole barrier.[56] A battery was set up on the Fehérvár Rondella, which succeeded in temporarily silencing two Hungarian guns on 19 May, but the breach grew ever wider,[56] to 30m/90ft wide, becoming unfillable.[63] That night, another attempt was made to block the gap, but heavy artillery fire and musketry from the Hungarian side prevented the imperial engineers from doing an effective job.[56] A sapper unit of Hungarian II. Corps managed to break into the Várkert (Castle Garden, next to the southern tip of the Castle walls and the Waterworks) through a house which had a wall in common with the Castle Garden, and a Hungarian Honvéd company sneaked in, and despite all the efforts of the defenders, could not be forced to retreat.[4]

On 20 May Hentzi again ordered that the breach by the Fehérvár rondella be filled, but although the sappers made a 1.7-metre-wide (5.6 ft) improvised parapet on top of the breach, the gap itself could not be filled, because the Hungarian artillery kept it under heavy fire. However, an eventual attack against the breach was not an easy task, because the imperial artillery on the I. rondella could bring fire to bear on the entrance to the breach and the area around it. During these actions engineering captain Philipp Pollini, who led the vain efforts to barricade the gap, was killed by Hungarian fire.[63]

Seeing the intensification of the Hungarian siege, and the effectiveness of the Hungarian artillery, the defenders’ morale fell. An Austrian deserter told the Hungarians that: ... the soldiers in the castle are depressed, wanting to escape from the siege.[63]

After the failure of the assault on the night of 17–18 May, Görgey ordered a detachment of a few companies to harass the defenders every night until 2 am.[56] At 2 o'clock all the firing stopped. Görgei's plan was to make the defenders believe that after 2 am they would be safe and could rest until morning.[64] Then, on 20 May, he issued the order to storm the castle.[56] On the night of 20 to 21 May, the Hungarian artillery bombarded the castle until 2 o'clock in morning as usual, then stopped.[65]

Final assault

The decisive assault was to start at 3 am on 21 May after every piece of ordnance had fired on the castle from every direction. Before the assault Görgei tried to raise the soldiers’ morale by promising a reward to whichever soldier took Hentzi prisoner.[4]

After the sudden bombardment of the imperial defenders, who thought at 2 o'clock that there would be no more fighting until the morning, the Hungarian attack began as follows:

II. Corps, led by General Lajos Aulich, assaulted from the south.[66] Three battalions attacked the southern Palace Gardens (Palotakert), while two stormed the Waterworks. The other units of the corps remained in reserve.[65] The soldiers of II Corps soon penetrated the castle via the large garden at the west wall. Not having ladders, they climbed the walls on each other's shoulders. The attackers entered by ladders at the Ferdinand Gate and over the rubble of the destroyed wall on the east side facing the Danube. Here, the imperial soldiers were soon surrounded and laid down their weapons.[67]

Kmety's division had the task of capturing the Waterworks from the north, sending three battalions and a jäger company to carry out the initial assault.[56]

August von Pettenkofen – Siege of Buda

But the main events occurred on the northern and western sides of the castle where the Hungarian I. and III. Corps attacked.

Siege of Buda: Attack against the gap, by Károly Jakobey

It was two battalions of I. Corps two battalions of I Corps led by General József Nagysándor in person that started the attack on the northern side, charging into the breach, while four battalions attacked the terraces on the southwest side of Castle Hill. The rest of I. Corps remained in reserve.[65] The 28th, 44th and 47th Battalions led by Nagysándor advanced undetected right up to the breach, where they were spotted by the surprised defenders, who however resisted fiercely, stopping the Hungarians for a while, with the help of concentrated fire from front and flanks from the Austrian soldiers on the walls and bastions nearby. Then Nagysándor ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 39th (Don Miguel) Infantry Regiment, and part of the 17th Battalion as well, to come up from reserve and join the attack.[4] The covering fire of the Hungarian artillery caused the defenders huge losses, and thanks to this and the determination of the attackers, Col. János Máriássy, one of the I. Corps divisional commanders, managed to lead two battalions through the castle gardens against the flank of the Austrians holding the breach, and thus enabled the main assault to get through.[68] During the charge the Hungarian soldiers lived through infernal scenes: It was horrible to watch, at the foot of the bastion, how the grapeshot swept away 3 or 4 [soldiers] at once, how the enemy cannonballs, fired from the other side, swept away entire ranks, how the bursting shells ripped out their intestines, tore off the hands, legs and heads from many of them. You could see here legs, hands, fragments of skull lying on the ground, dead men's intestines hanging down, blood and marrow dripping down from many of the ladders around the walls, many of them [the Hungarian soldiers] were struck dead by pieces of blown-up ladders, others by grenades with burning fuzes dropped or thrown down and then bouncing [in every direction] from the walls onto the crowd below, and others by pieces of stone and bricks smashed off the walls by cannonballs.[4] At this point Col. Máriássy fell down for a couple of minutes because a blast hit him, and a cannonball smashed three ladders, which made his troops retreat.

The siege of Buda,
by Anton Strassgschwandtner

But the 400 Hungarians who were already on the walls started to yell and wave Hungarian flags, urging them to continue the attack and not leave them to fall into the hands of the enemy. Then Máriássy regained consciousness, rallied his men and led them, supported also by the 6th Battalion, against the enemy who were already starting to topple the ladders. When they started to climb the ladders, the enemy soldiers (who were of Italian origin) decided to surrender, and reached out their hands in order to help them climb up.[4] The Hungarian losses in the assault were heavy: among many others, Major Burdina fell, the commander of the Don Miguel regiment.[4]

Siege of Buda: Attack against the gap

Other Italian soldiers among the imperial troops also preferred not to fight against the Hungarian soldiers, sympathizing with them because they understood the Hungarian cause, as their country was in revolt against the Austrian Empire as well. Because of this they were the first enemy troops to surrender when they saw the Hungarian soldiers approaching. For example, in the southwestern sector where the Palatine stables were, the soldiers of the 26th Battalion which scaled the walls on ladders and on bayonets stuck in between the bricks were welcomed by Italian soldiers shouting: "Evviva Ungheria!" (Long live Hungary!).[4] After they entered the castle, the advancing Hungarians found around 30 imperial soldiers shot dead in a courtyard. One who was still alive told them that they had been shot by the Croatian soldiers. This probably happened because the imperial command or the Croatian soldiers themselves noticed that the Italians were reluctant to fight against the Hungarians.[4]

Thus the Hungarian troops entered through the breach.[65] The first Hungarian flag was raised on the wall of Buda castle by Grácián Püspöky, the young standard-bearer of the 47th Honvéd Battalion.[4] The first units to break into the castle through the gap were the 44th and 47th. Honvéd Battalions led by Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Driquet, and the "Don Miguel" infantry, supported by the fire of their comrades from the 34th and 17th Battalions, who climbed the wall east of the rondella, and by the 4th Battalion who fired down from behind them,[65] and drove the defenders deeper and deeper into the streets of Buda castle.[56] The Hungarians who entered the castle faced enemy infantry and artillery units at strategic points, who fired volleys and grapeshot at them, but they continued the assault, overwhelming, killing or capturing the imperial soldiers.[4]

During these events one battalion charged south,[69] Although the 6th Battalion under Captain Gergely Szalkay was supposed to protect the siege guns, when they saw the first assault repulsed they charged toward the castle. When they entered, at first they were pinned down around the stables by enemy fire. Szalkay ordered a charge which overcame the enemy opposition, occupying the arsenals and the Sándor Palace, then sent some of his troops onto the wall above the Waterworks to help Kmety's assault by firing on the enemy from the rear, and others to the armory south of Saint George Square to fire on the imperials who were in the Palatine Gardens defending the southern wall against II. Corps's attack. Szalkay then occupied the Palatine (Royal) Palace with the rest.[4]

Buda may 21

Siege of Buda 1849: Attack against the Vienna Gate

The 63rd Battalion attacked the walls from Krisztinaváros. During the attack, the soldiers raising the ladders were wounded by the defenders’ fire, but when their comrades started to climb, the shots from above became fewer and fewer as the defenders abandoned the walls, seeing the Hungarians pouring into the castle through the breach, and retreated into the streets of Buda. Because they entered the castle after the main body had got in through the breach, the 63rd did not encounter serious resistance when they advanced towards Saint George Square (Szent György Tér).[4]

While I. and II. Corps were involved in this on the southern and western sides of the Castle, III. Corps attacked the wider northern side. The designated units of III. Corps (3rd and 42nd Honvéd Battalions, the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Infantry Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Infantry Regiment),[4] led by General Károly Knezić, mounted an assault on the northern castle wall, the Vienna Gate and the Esztergom Rondella, supported by the 9th Battalion firing from houses in Attila street, while III. Corps's reserves waited between the Városmajor and the brick factory.[4] The attackers tried to scale the Vienna Gate and the neighboring stretch of wall, and 30 Hungarian soldiers fell in this fight.[68] The men of the 42nd Battalion were the first to climb the walls and enter, while the 3rd Battalion broke into the castle at the Vienna Gate.[65] Then after the first troops had entered the castle, the 9th Battalion joined them, climbing the ladders near the Vienna Gate, and then manned the captured enemy guns near the 4th rondella, turning them against the retreating imperial soldiers.[4]

Siege of Buda: The wounding of Gen. Hentzi

The attackers then started to advance along Úri Street and Országház Street towards the Fehérvár Gate and the Szent György Square to help I. Corps. The defenders therefore found themselves under fire from two sides, from I. and III. Corps.[65][67] At 4 a.m., the Italian soldiers of the Ceccopieri regiment, who were fighting on the western walls of the southern end of the Castle Hill, by the Palace, in the region of the Riding Hall (Lovarda) and the Stables, surrendered. Thanks to this, around 500 Hungarian soldiers got into Saint George Square (Szent György tér).[69] At 5 am, Gen. József Nagysándor was pleased to report to Görgey that there were nine battalions in the castle.[67]

Attempt of blowing up the Chainbridge by Col. Alois Alnoch on May 21, 1849

It was at this critical point that Hentzi, hearing what was happening in Szent György Square, rushed there with two companies of border guards and another two from the Wilhelm regiment, and stood at the head of the defenders trying to repel the Hungarians. He soon received a fatal bullet wound in his stomach, the bullet leaving his body through the back of his chest.[70][71] Along with him, Captain Gorini commanding the Wilhelm companies and Captain Schröder were also mortally wounded.[69] The castle commander being disabled effectively meant the castle had fallen to the Hungarian army. The rest of the defenders in Szent György Square under Lieutenant Kristin surrendered.[69] However Hentzi did not die; after being wounded, he was carried to the hospital on Iskola (School) Square, and laid on a bed in the office of chief medical officer Moritz Bartl.[71]

Mór Than – A Hungarian sentinel on the bastion after the liberation of the Castle of Buda

Hentzi had previously ordered the evacuation of the water defences, and the troops from there were redeployed in the castle.[70] Kmety's troops thus secured the water defenses too. Imperial Col. Alois Alnoch von Edelstadt in charge of the water defenses saw that the situation was hopeless. Seeing Szekulics's brigade on the Pest side, and thinking that they were preparing to cross the Chain Bridge towards Buda,[72] he tried to blow up the Chain Bridge by throwing his cigar on the fuse leading to the 4 chests of explosives put there before the siege.[4] However, he succeeded only in blowing himself up, while the bridge suffered only minor damage.[70] In fact Szekulics had no order or intention to cross the bridge.[4] Alnoch had tried to demolish the Chain Bridge in spite of Görgei's express request to spare "this majestic masterpiece".[4]

The last imperial troops to surrender were those in the palace,[70] so by 7 o'clock the whole Castle of Buda was liberated.[69]

Buda Castle after the Siege

Although before the attack Görgei had ordered his soldiers not to take any prisoners because of his anger at the damage caused by the defenders’ cannon to the city of Pest, the Hungarian soldiers mostly spared the lives of the surrendering enemy troops. Even Hentzi, on his death bed, supposedly said about the magnanimity of the Hungarian soldiers towards the defenders: "Indeed, the Hungarians are a chivalrous nation"[4]

General Görgei used 19 infantry battalions, 4 jäger companies and sapper units in the final attack.[65] He kept his troops on constant alert against possible attempts by the imperial cavalry to break out from the castle.[65]

The imperials lost 30 officers and 680 men, of which 4 officers and 174 men died from the epidemics which broke out in the castle during the siege. 113 officers and 4,091 men surrendered and became prisoners of the Hungarians.[72] 248 cannon of various types, 8,221 projectiles, 931 q (quintal) gunpowder, 5,383 q saltpetre, 894 q sulfur, 276 horses, and 55,766 cash Forints.[72]

According to László Pusztaszeri the Hungarians lost 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 15 sergeants, 20 corporals and 630 men,[72] while Róbert Hermann says either 368 dead and 700 wounded of all ranks (József Bayer's report), or 427 dead and 692 wounded (Lajos Asbóth's report).[67]

As a result of the fighting and of the senseless imperial bombardment of Pest, 40 buildings burned down in Pest and 98 in Buda, while 61 buildings suffered heavy damage in Pest and 537 in Buda. The most affected were the neoclassical buildings on the Lower Danube Row, which were lost forever, and the Royal Palace of Buda.[72]

Aftermath

After the castle was taken, the Hungarian Lieutenant János Rónay found the wounded Hentzi in the hospital to which he had been taken and made the Austrian commander prisoner.[71] Chief medical officer Moritz Bartl told the Hungarian officer that Hentzi was mortally wounded and could not be saved. Rónay treated him gently, but when Hentzi asked to shake hands, he refused, saying he respected him as an excellent general but would not shake his hand because of the bombardment of Pest.

Görgei, in reality Lieutenant János Rónay, defending Hentzi from the angered mob

Hentzi replied that his guns could have totally destroyed but did not, and that he only fired on those buildings which he had orders to do.[71] As we showed above, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden's orders to Hentzi contained nothing about destroying Pest; he gave permission only to bombard the city on the eastern bank of the Danube in exceptional situations, if the civilians behaved towards the castle in an unacceptable manner, which they did not.

The damages caused by the bombardment of Pest by the imperials: The German Theater

Lieutenant Rónay then transported Hentzi to the Hungarian headquarters, but on the way there, in Dísz Square, the people recognized Hentzi and wanted to hurt him because of what he had done to Pest. Only Lieutenant Rónay's forceful intervention saved the wounded general from being lynched.[73] Around this event the legend was born of Artúr Görgei defending Hentzi's dead body from the enraged mob, which was depicted in many contemporary illustrations. When Hentzi reached the Hungarian HQ, many Hungarian officers (Gen. József Nagysándor, Col. Lajos Asbóth, and finally Görgei himself) visited Hentzi and behaved kindly towards him, but when they asked what his wishes were, he replied that he wanted to die. When asked why he wanted this, he replied that he knew that if he recovered, Görgei would hang him, remembering that in his letter demanding the surrender of the castle the Hungarian general had threatened to do so if Hentzi bombarded Pest or blew up the Chain Bridge. Görgei indeed had not forgotten his promise of 4 May, and declared to Lieutenant-Colonel Bódog Bátori Sulcz that he would hang Hentzi the next day if he recovered, saying that the Austrian general did not deserve to be called a hero.[73] In the evening Hentzi's condition became critical, and Rónay sent for a priest, but apparently none could be found, perhaps because no priest wanted to give him the extreme unction. Hentzi died at 1 o'clock in the morning on 22 May.[73] His and Col. Alnoch's bodies were put in two unpainted coffins and sent to the graveyard escorted by a squad of Huszárs to protect the bodies from the people's anger. In 1852 Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria ordered a monument dedicated to Heinrich Hentzi, who did not deserve this because of the senseless damage he caused to the capital cities, and in October 1918 it was finally dismantled.[74]

Hentzi Monument Buda

The chivalry of the Hungarian officers was not shared by all of their soldiers. Görgei wrote in his order of the day nr. 755/v that after the capture of Buda Castle, some Hungarian soldiers had robbed castle residents’ houses, stealing valuable objects from them as well as from the state properties and archives. He therefore ordered all stolen items to be returned within 24 hours, and that those who did not obey this order would be court-martialled.[75]

The damages caused by the bombardment of Pest by the imperials: Lloyd-building

Although General Mór Perczel accused Artúr Görgei of intentionally delaying the occupation of the Buda Castle to give the Austrian troops from around Vienna and Pozsony time to recover, because Perczel wanted to persuade the Hungarian government in Debrecen to bring Görgei before a court-martial, the liberation of the castle created huge satisfaction among the Hungarians which convinced Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere to award Görgei the First Class Military Order of Merit and the rank of lieutenant general.[76] But when he was visited by a Government delegation to invest him with the order and his promotion, Görgei refused. He said that he did not deserve these and did not approve of the greed of many soldiers and officers for rank and decorations, which was not compatible with Prime Minister Szemere's Republican political program, and that by refusing these distinctions he wanted to set an example for his subordinates. The leaders of the delegation, Senator Zsigmond Bernáth and Deputy Gábor Kazinczy saluted Görgei's decision.[77] In his meeting with the two politicians, Görgei told them that after the capture of Buda he was planning to stage a coup d'état, to use his army to force the retraction of the Declaration of the Hungarian Independence, as he thought that this political act by the Hungarian Parliament made any kind of compromise with the emperor and the imperial Government in Vienna impossible, and because he thought that as the threat of Russian intervention became more and more clear, the only hope for Hungary to save at least part of its autonomy and the achievements of the Hungarian revolution of 15 March 1848 was an agreement with the emperor. But when Bernáth and Kazinczy told him they shared his views and that there was a party in the Hungarian parliament called the Peace Party (Békepárt) which wanted to reach an agreement with Emperor Franz Joseph I., he renounced his planned coup, and declared that he hoped for a political, "constitutional" solution to the problem.[78]

Kossuth and his family being welcomed by the population in the liberated Buda and Pest

After receiving the news of the capture of Buda, on 22 May, Governor Lajos Kossuth and Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere published Görgei's report of the victory with a postscript, in which they wrote: "You have crowned the campaign you have conducted so far with the capture of the ancient Castle of Buda. You have given the Motherland its capital back, and the National Assembly and the Government their seat. Furthermore, through this victory, you have urged or rather made possible, that our national independence be recognized by Europe"[4] On 23 May Kázmér Batthyány, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, wrote a letter to Ferenc Pulszky, the Szemere government's emissary to London, that after the liberation of Buda he was sure that the European nations, who hitherto had been reluctant to accept Hungary's declaration of independence as a "fait accompli", would open diplomatic relations with Hungary.[4] Thus the Hungarian politicians believed that the conquest of Buda would prevent Russia from intervening in the conflict between Hungary and the Austrian Empire, because the European powers would accept Hungary as an independent state. But later events showed that these hopes were groundless, and the European nations looked away when 200,000 Russian soldiers crossed the Hungarian border in June to crush Hungarian independence.

The damages caused by the bombardment of Pest by the imperials: the Vigadó

On the other hand, after the mood of April and May 1849 during the Hungarian Revolutionary Army's victorious Spring Campaign, the imperial commanders and politicians had a constant fear of a Hungarian attack against Vienna, feeling that they could not repulse such an attack if the Russian intervention did not begin in time. The imperial intelligence had no clear information about Görgei's plans, but the political and military leaders’ correspondence shows they thought that if the Hungarian army were to cross the Austrian border, they would have no chance of repelling it without Russian help.[79] The imperial reports show a constant concern, lasting several weeks, about a Hungarian attack against Austria which would be helped by revolutionary forces in Vienna and the Austrian provinces.

The damages caused by the bombardment of Pest by the imperials: the House of Representatives

For example, a letter from Prince Felix of Schwarzenberg, Minister-President of the Austrian Empire, shows that the people of Vienna were again in revolutionary mood. When Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz, the former high commander of the imperial forces in Hungary returned to Prague, after being dismissed because of his defeats on the Hungarian front, the people gathered in front of him and shouted: "Long live Kossuth!"[80] This constant fear on the part the imperial commanders and politicians also show the talent of General Ernő Poeltenberg commanding the 12,000 men of Hungarian VII. Corps, whose demonstration maneuvers not only kept at bay far more imperial troops (over 50,000, in fact), but also made them believe his force was capable of a successful advance into the Austrian Hereditary Provinces.[81] Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden, high commander of the imperial forces in Hungary, wrote to Schwarzenberg urging Russian intervention, saying the revolutions in Italy and Germany could reignite if Hungarian military successes continued, and that the Hungarian Revolution would not be suppressed quickly.[82] On 1 May Schwarzenberg wrote that the first 85,000 Russian troops had already entered the Austrian province of Galicia and taken position near the Hungarian border, awaiting further orders.[83] But in any case, as shown above (Towards Vienna or to Buda?), before and during the Siege of Buda the Hungarian army was so numerically inferior towards the imperial forces gathered around Pozsony and Vienna that the Habsburg commanders’ fears were groundless.

The storming of Buda castle was the zenith of the Honvéd army's glory.[70] It was not a simple victory, but one of the greatest Hungarian victories in the Independence War of 1848–1849, causing the loss of 5,000 elite soldiers of the Austrian Empire, and huge booty in artillery, muskets, ammunition, horses, etc., which were used in the following months in the struggle against the combined forces of two empires: The Habsburg and the Russian.[4] In terms of the number of the prisoners and spoils, this victory was surpassed only by the Victory of Ozora, on 7 October 1848, in which 7,553 enemy soldiers were forced to capitulate to the same general, Artúr Görgei,[84] but those troops were among the units with the lowest fighting value in the Habsburg army, while those commanded by Hentzi were among its best.[4] It also yielded a substantial quantity of arms and materiel, providing a solid foundation for the subsequent military operations. They were indeed soon to be necessary, because Welden was preparing for another attack when he heard of the fall of Buda, whereupon he abandoned his plans.[70] It was now clear that Austria alone would be unable to put down the Hungarian struggle for independence. It is telling that the very day Buda was captured, Francis Joseph I finalised an agreement by which Tsar Michael I of Russia would send 200,000 soldiers to crush the Hungarian Revolution. The Emperor marked his gratitude for this friendly assistance by kissing the hand of the Tsar.[70]

The Capture of Buda is regarded as the conclusion of the victorious Spring Campaign of the Hungarian army, which resulted in the liberation of almost all Hungary from the Habsburg troops and their Russian, Serbian, Croatian and Romanian allies.[85] After this, the Summer Campaign saw the intervention in June of a quarter of the troops of the Russian Empire,[86] together with the reorganized numerically superior Habsburg army. In the face of these, the numerically and technologically desperately inferior Hungarian army, despite its admirable bearing which earned the respect of the enemy commanders, could only put up a heroic but hopeless resistance before it was defeated and forced to lay down its arms at Nagyszőlős on 13 August 1849 and in Komárom on 2 October 1849.[87]

Legacy

The famous Hungarian Romantic novelist Mór Jókai made the Hungarian Revolution and Independence War the subject of his popular novel A kőszívű ember fiai (literally: The Sons of the Man with a Stone Heart, translated into English under the title: The Baron's sons). In chapter XXIII., the Siege of Buda is vividly presented as one of the main plot events of the novel, in which several of his main characters appear fighting in the ranks of both the Hungarian and the Austrian army.[88] In 1965 this novel was also adapted as a movie of the same title (A kőszívű ember fiai), including the Siege of Buda as one of its most important scenes.[89]

Since 1992, the Hungarian Government is celebrating the day of the capture of the Castle of Buda, 21 May, as National Defence Day (Hungarian: a honvédség napja).[90]

Notes

1. Hermann 2013, pp. 32–33.
2. Hermann 2013, pp. 27.
3. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 338 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
4. Hermann Róbert, Buda bevétele, 1849. május 21, Budapesti Negyed 29–30. (2000/3-4)
5. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 340 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
6. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 341 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
7. Bánlaky József: A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI, Buda visszavétele (1849. május elejétől végéig). Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001
8. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 382 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
9. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 110 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
10. Hermann 1996, pp. 96–97.
11. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 113 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
12. Hermann 1996, pp. 243–244.
13. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 116 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
14. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
15. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 300–301 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
16. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 301 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
17. Hermann 2001, pp. 291.
18. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 124 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
19. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 128 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
20. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 131 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
21. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 132 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
22. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 110–111 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
23. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 111, 177. footnote harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
24. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 111 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
25. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 111, 178. footnote harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
26. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 112 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
27. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 118 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
28. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 119 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
29. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 119, 202. footnote harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
30. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 120 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
31. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 121, 210 footnote harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
32. Hermann 2004, pp. 256.
33. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 122, 210 footnote harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
34. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 134 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
35. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 135 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
36. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 136 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
37. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 136–137 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
38. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 137 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
39. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 138–141 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
40. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 141 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
41. Bóna 1987, pp. 131 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBóna1987 (help).
42. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 142–143 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
43. Hermann 2013, pp. 29.
44. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 338–339 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
45. Hermann 2013, pp. 29–30.
46. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 352 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
47. Hermann 2013, pp. 30.
48. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 352–353 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
49. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 353 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
50. Deak, I (1998). "An Army Divided: The Loyalty Crisis of the Habsburg Officer Corps in 1848–1849". In Karsten, P. (ed.). The Military and Society: A Collection of Essays. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. p. 211.
51. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 367 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
52. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 368 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
53. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 370 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
54. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 368–369 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
55. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 369 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
56. Hermann 2013, pp. 31.
57. Hermann 2013, pp. 30–31.
58. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 370–371 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
59. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 278 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
60. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 275–276 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
61. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 372 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
62. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 373 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
63. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 374 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
64. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 374–375 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
65. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 375 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
66. Aggházy I. 2001, pp. 317 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAggházy_I.2001 (help).
67. Hermann 2013, pp. 33.
68. Hermann 2013, pp. 31–33.
69. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 376 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
70. Hermann 2013, pp. 34.
71. Hermann Róbert, Heinrich Hentzi, a budavári Leonidász, Aetas, p. 57
72. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 377 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
73. Hermann Róbert, Heinrich Hentzi, a budavári Leonidász, Aetas, p. 58
74. Hermann Róbert, Heinrich Hentzi, a budavári Leonidász, Aetas, p. 59
75. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 378 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
76. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 379 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
77. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 379–380 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
78. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 380 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
79. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 389 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
80. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 389–390 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
81. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 390 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
82. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 383 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
83. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 384 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPusztaszeri1984 (help).
84. Hermann 2004, pp. 94–98.
85. Hermann 2001, pp. 314.
86. Hermann 2001, pp. 316.
87. Hermann 2001, pp. 383–399.
88. Jókai 1900, pp. 192–201.
89. Men and Banners, Internet Movie Database
90. "Jeles Napok – Május 21. A magyar honvédelem napja ("Important Days – Hungarian Defence Day")". jelesnapok.oszk.hu (in Hungarian). National Széchényi Library. Retrieved 18 July 2010.

Sources

• Aggházy, Kamil (2001), Budavár bevétele 1849-ben I-II ("The capture of the Castle of Buda in 1849") (in Hungarian), Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára, ISBN 963-7323-27-9
• Bánlaky, József (2001). A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme ("The Military History of the Hungarian Nation) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Arcanum Adatbázis.
• Hermann, Róbert (2001), 1848-1849 a szabadságharc hadtörténete ("Military History of 1848-1849") (in Hungarian), Budapest: Korona, ISBN 963-9376-21-3
• Hermann, Róbert (2004). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc nagy csatái ("Great battles of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi. p. 408. ISBN 963-327-367-6.
• Hermann, Róbert (1996). Az 1848–1849 évi forradalom és szabadságharc története ("The history of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Videopont. p. 464. ISBN 963-8218-20-7.
• Hermann, Róbert. "Buda bevétele, 1849. május 21" (in Hungarian). Archived from the original on February 16, 2009.
• Hermann, Róbert (February 2013), "Heinrich Hentzi, a budavári Leonidász" (PDF), Aetas
• "Buda visszavívása". Múlt-kor történelmi portál (in Hungarian). 20 May 2004. Retrieved 27 January 2009.
• "Várharcok az 1848-49-es szabadságharcban" (in Hungarian). Archived from the original on October 6, 2008.
• "Buda bevétele, 1849. május 21". Retrieved 18 July 2010.
• Jókai, Maurus (1900). The Baron's Sons. London: The Walter Scott Publishing CO. LD. p. 378.
• Kapronczay, Károly (1998). "A szabadságharc egészségügye". Valóság ("Reality") (in Hungarian) (3): 15–23. Archived from the original on January 18, 2005. Retrieved 27 January 2009.
• Zakar, Péter (1999). A magyar hadsereg tábori lelkészei 1848-49-ben (in Hungarian). Budapest: METEM könyvek. Retrieved 27 January 2009.