Robert H. McDowell

Robert Harbold McDowell (1894—1980) was an American historian and intelligence officer who worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. McDowell, an expert on the Near East, was a professor of Balkan history at the University of Michigan. During World War II he was an OSS desk officer in Cairo and between August and November 1944 a member of an American mission Ranger, to the Chetniks, where he participated in negotiations with Germans to surrender their troops to Chetniks and Americans, and in Operation Halyard, to organize transport of the Allied pilots rescued by Chetniks. In some works he has been described as a man of "violently pro-Chetnik prejudices".

Robert Harbold McDowell
McDowell, first on the left, with other members of his team with Mihailovic, 6 September 1944
Born(1894-05-23)May 23, 1894
Ottoman Empire
DiedJune 2, 1980(1980-06-02) (aged 86)
Pinellas County, Florida, United States
NationalityArmenian, American
Occupationhistorian and intelligence officer
Known forhead of American mission with Chetniks during World War II
Notable work
The Key Role in Southeastern Europe during World War Two of the Serbs and Their Commander General Draza Mihailovich despite Their Abandonment by Churchill and Roosevelt.

Early life

McDowell was a professor of Balkan history at the University of Michigan.[1] McDowell was also an expert on the Near East.[2]

During the World War II

Arrival to Mihailović's Chetniks

The American president Theodore Roosevelt personally directed all important steps of the operations of the Office of Strategic Services related to Mihailović's Chetniks because they were an instrument of US policy to avoid Partisan dominated Yugoslavia.[3] McDowell, who had been an OSS desk officer in Cairo,[4] arrived in the German-occupied territory of Serbia with six members of the "Ranger" team in late August 1944 to organize transport of the Allied pilots rescued by Chetniks during Operation Halyard.[5] On 22 August 1944, Mihailovic was informed by members of his headquarters that George Musulin informed them about McDowell's direct access to Roosevelt.[6]

At that time the Chetniks had already ordered a general mobilization aimed against Axis forces, so McDowell personally witnessed positioning of mobilized Chetnik troops to follow this aim and their resistance to German and Bulgarian forces to the final limits of people and equipment, capturing substantial number of prisoners and quantity of ammunition.[7] Mihailovic informed McDowell that he had mobilized about 100,000 men with arms and 500,000 men without arms by 1 September 1944.[6]

Negotiations for the surrender of German forces in Yugoslavia

Based on the instructions of the United States High Command, McDowell organized surrender conferences with representatives of German forces.[8] In his later statements, approved by the War and State Departments, McDowell emphasized that Mihailovic did not attend the conferences about the surrender of German forces in Yugoslavia in August 1944.[2]

In September 1944, the German command at Belgrade contacted McDowell and held two meetings with him at Mihailović's headquarters, declaring that German forces in Yugoslavia were willing to surrender to the Americans and Chetniks but not to communist forces of the Soviet Union and Josip Broz Tito's Partisans.[9] McDowell reported this to Allied headquarters which immediately ordered him to break off his contacts with the Germans.[10]

When the Partisans were informed that McDowell was negotiating the surrender of German troops in Yugoslavia they became infuriated.[11] In September, the Partisans began a major offensive against the Chetniks preventing McDowell's team from using an already prepared landing site for the evacuation of American airmen.[12] Tito's associates condemned McDowell, demanding his withdrawal because they believed that he was giving political prestige to the Chetniks who did not deserve it.[13] Churchill again personally intervened through Roosevelt, and McDowell was ordered to leave Mihailovic in September 1944.[14]

Leaving Mihailović's headquarters

Despite his order to leave Chetnik headquarters, McDowell remained in Mihailovic's headquarters because American planes could not land on Chetnik controlled territory due to the weather conditions and increased armed conflict in the area.[9] In October 1944, Tito personally engaged himself in connection with McDowell's negotiated surrender of German troops and warned Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean, the chief of the British mission to the Partisans, that the presence of McDowell and his team would certainly damage relations between the Partisans, Britain and the United States, claiming that McDowell had promised American support to Mihailovic.[15]

Some consider it possible that the Partisans forged a "captured" leaflet and showed it to Huntington at Tito's headquarters to provoke the recall of McDowell.[16]

The British mission with Mihailović was recalled in December 1943.[17] After McDowell left the Chetnik headquarters by plane on 23 November 1944 they remained without direct contact with the Allies during their retreat before the Partisan forces.[18] Two members of the American mission (Lalic and Jibilian) actually remained with the Chetnik headquarters after McDowell left it, and after unremitting efforts to sever even this last tie between Chetniks and Allies, they were ordered to retreat through Partisan-controlled territory.[19] The last member of McDowell's team left the Chetniks on 11 December 1944.[9]

After World War II

In some works McDowell was described as a man of "violently pro-Chetnik prejudices".[20]

In answer to congressional questions raised during a debate, about how much damage the Chetniks inflicted on the German war effort, McDowell claimed that all available evidence shows that German troops concentrated more on Chetniks rather than on Partisan-held territories because they held greater animosity and fear toward Mihailović than Tito. He also claimed that Chetniks had performed the most important sabotages against transport infrastructure of the Axis.[21] Based on the official reports of other officers regarding the civil war in Yugoslavia and based on his own observations, McDowel concluded that "the principal concern of the Partisan leadership has been, not to destroy Germans, but Nationalists and Nationalism in Yugoslavia and the Balkans."[22]

Bibliography

After World War II, McDowell wrote a book titled The Key Role in Southeastern Europe during World War Two of the Serbs and Their Commander General Draza Mihailovich despite Their Abandonment by Churchill and Roosevelt. In 2015, this book was submitted to the court in Serbia as evidence during the process for rehabilitation of Mihailović.[23]

References
  1. (Milazzo 1975, p. 174): "..... Robert H. McDowell, a former professor of Balkan history at the University of Michigan, arrived at Chetnik headquarters."
  2. General Mihailovich: The World's Verdict : a Selection of Articles on the First Resistance Leader in Europe Published in the World Press. John Bellows. 1947. p. 37.
  3. (Buchanan 2014, p. 249):"Washington's pursuit of contact with Mihailovic ....U.S. policy was not accidental, however, and while doubtless driven in part by General Donovan's desire to make the OSS an indispensable instrument of U.S. policy, Roosevelt himself sanctioned every critical step in the process. This policy is therefore best understood as an effort to utilize whatever levers might be available to fashion a policy capable of avoiding a Partisan-dominated Yugoslavia."
  4. (Smith 2005, p. 137): "...McDowell, an OSS desk officer from Cairo...."
  5. (O'Donnell 2014, p. 97): "Officially McDowell was rescuing fliers, but unofficially he was there to continue OSS intelligence operations with the Chetniks. McDowell surveyed Chetnik and Axis forces and witnessed firsthand the Partisans' systematic efforts to destroy the Chetniks"
  6. (Chalou 1995, p. 203)
  7. Roberts, Walter (18 December 2013). "Четници уз - Стаљина!". Večernje Novosti (in Serbian). Večernje Novosti. Retrieved 5 July 2019. Када је долепотписани стигао да Михаиловићевог штаба августа месеца 1944, општа национална мобилизација је већ ступила на снагу. Долепотписаном су показани планови и наређења издата за свеопшти напад на силе Осовине, и, заједно са осталим америчким официрима, лично је присуствовао размештању трупа које је било у сврху тог напада. Докази су непорециви да је генерал Михаиловић равномерно распоредио своје снаге за главни напад против немачких гарнизона, депоа и линија комуникације, али је радећи ово био у обавези да своју позадину и лево крило остави изложено делу главних партизанских снага које су недавно кренуле у напад против националиста. У то време, мала група америчких официра је била у могућности да покрије фронт и има нека опажања да су током септембра националне снаге успеле да се супротставе немачким и бугарским снагама, до крајњих граница својих могућности у опреми и људству. Кретања Осовине су битно ометана, а освојена је знатна количина муниције и заробљеника.
  8. General Mihailovich: The World's Verdict : a Selection of Articles on the First Resistance Leader in Europe Published in the World Press. John Bellows. 1947. p. 37. McDowell, an expert in Near Eastern affairs and a former professor of modern Balkans history at the University of Michigan, said that he had attended the conferences with Nazi agents on instructions from the United States High Command.
  9. (Smith 2005, p. 138)
  10. (Smith 2005, p. 137): " These discussions were duly reported to Allied headquarters, which quickly ordered that the contact with the Germans be broken off."
  11. (Smith 2005, p. 138):"When the Partisans learned of the McDowell negotiations, they were in-furiated ///"
  12. (Leary 1995): "September also marked the beginning of a major Partisan offensive against the Cetniks. This forced the Air Crew Rescue Unit to locate a new landing site to evacuate airmen who continued to fall into the hands of Mihailović's hard-pressed followers.
  13. (Smith 2005, p. 138):"When the Partisans learned of the McDowell negotiations, they were in-furiated ... Tito's aides condemned McDowell ...They "continued to demand McDowell's withdrawal on the ground that he was giving the Chetniks politi-cal prestige they didn't deserve?"
  14. (Smith 2005, p. 138):" McDowell and his men had in fact been ordered to leave Serbia in September, again as a result of Churchill's personal intervention. "
  15. (Smith 2005, p. 138):"In October, Tito took up the issue person-ally with Brigadier MacLean. He warned that the McDowell team's presence "was certain to react unfavorably on Partisan relations with the United States and Great Britain." Tito claimed McDowell was encouraging Mihailovic with promises of future American support."
  16. (Lindsay & Galbraith 1995, p. 270): "In view of short time between the arrival of McDowell and the "captured" leaflet shown to Huntington at Tito's headquarters, some thought it could have been written by the Partisans in order to provoke McDowell's recall"
  17. Zalar, Charles (1961). Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 112. ST. SAVA CONGRESS The British military mission was recalled from General Mihailovic's headquarters in December 1943.
  18. (Redžić 2002, p. 518): "Није им саопштио да су четници издани од стране савезника. ... Пре покрета црногорских четника и народа тамо, контакти са савезницима су били потпуно прекинути. Амерички пуковник и универзитетски професор МекДауел је 23.11.1944. године одлетео авионом."
  19. (Ford 1992, p. 131)
  20. (Buchanan 2014, p. 249): "A man of “violently pro-Četnik prejudices,” McDowell arrived at Mihailović's headquarters in September 1944, just as a renewed Partisan offensive against"
  21. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1971. p. 37609. The question of how much damage cetnici did to the German war machine was answered by Colonel McDowell thus: “On the basis of all evidence available, it is to my judgement that the Germans held greater hatred and fear of Mihailovic than of Tito and concentrated proportionally more Axis troops in Chetnik than in Partisan territory.... The most important acts of sabotages against Axis communications were performed by Chetniks
  22. (Ford 1992, p. 131)
  23. Derikonjic, Miroslava (29 April 2015). "Okončan dokazni postupak za rehabilitaciju Draže Mihailovića". Politika. Retrieved 7 July 2019.

Sources

Further reading
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