Mirza Aslam Beg

General Mirza Aslam Beg (Urdu: مرزا اسلم بیگ; born 2 August 1931) LOM, NI(M), HI(M)), SBt, TeJ, also known as M. A. Beg, is a retired four-star rank army general in the Pakistan Army, who served as its Chief of Army Staff from 1988 until his retirement in 1991. His appointment as chief of army staff came when his predecessor, President General Zia-ul-Haq, died in an air crash on 17 August 1988.

Mirza Aslam Baig
Gen. Aslam Beg in 1991.
Chief of Army Staff
In office
17 August 1988 – 16 August 1991
Preceded byGeneral Zia-ul-Haq
Succeeded byGeneral Asif Nawaz Janjua
Personal details
Born
Mirza Aslam Beg

(1931-08-02) 2 August 1931
Azamgarh, United Provinces, British India
Awards Legion of Merit
Nishan-i-Imtiaz (military)
Hilal-i-Imtiaz (military)
Sitara-e-Basalat
Tamgha-e-Jamhuriat
Tong-il Medal
Military service
Nickname(s)General Baig
Allegiance Pakistan
Branch/service Pakistan Army
Years of service1950–1991
Rank General
Unit Baloch Regiment
CommandsChief of Army Staff
Vice Chief of Army Staff
Adjutant General at Army GHQ
Chief of General Staff (CGS)
XI Corps in Peshawar
Chief Instructor (CI) at NDU
14th Infantry Division, Okara
Battles/warsIndo-Pakistani wars and conflicts

Gulf War

Afghan Civil War (1989–1992)


Beg's tenure witnessed Benazir Bhutto as being elected Prime Minister in November 1988, and the restoration of democracy and the civilian control of the military in the country. Controversial accusations were leveled against him of financing the Islamic Democracy Alliance (IDA), the conservative and right-wing opposition alliance against left-wing PPP, and rigging subsequent general elections in 1990.[1] As a result of general elections, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister in 1990, but fell out with Beg when the latter recommended support for Iraq during the Gulf War.[2] Beg was denied an extension from President Ghulam Ishaq Khan soon after in 1991, and replaced by General Asif Nawaz as chief of army staff.[3] Apart from his military career, Beg briefly tenured as professor of security studies at the National Defence University (NDU) and regularly writes columns in The Nation.[4]

Beg's post-retirement has been characterized by controversies: first, Beg was accused of playing an internal role in the airplane crash that killed President Zia,[5][6] and, second, he was summoned to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2012 for his alleged role in releasing the financial funding to the conservative politicians as opposed to the Pakistan Peoples Party's politicians during the general elections held in 1990.[7][8]

Biography

Early life in India and education
See also: Mughal Empire, Mughal Royal Family, British Indian Empire, and Partition of India

Mirza Aslam Baig was born in the small village, Muslimpatti,[9] in Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh in British India, to the Urdu-speaking family that was well known for its Mughal nobility, on 2 August 1931.[10][11]

His father, Mirza Murtaza Baig, was an advocate and practicing lawyer who had hold a well known prestige and respected name in the law circles of the Allahabad High Court.[12] The Baig's family had traced a long ancestral roots of the Mughal Royal family who once were emperors of India from the early 15th century to the early 18th century.[13]

He was educated at the Azamgarh where he graduated from a local high school and enrolled at the Shibli National College for his undergraduate studies, in 1945.[14] Subsequently, he earned Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in Liberal Arts from Shibli National College in 1949.[14]

During his college years, Mirza played collegiate field hockey and was vital member of his hockey team which consisted mainly Muslims.[14] According to his memories, Beg sought revenge on a Hindu politician belonging to Congress Party after the politician had beaten up a member of his hockey team.[14] Egged on by a mob of students, Beg used his hockey stick to beat up the politician at a public meeting.[14] This incident came after his graduation from college in 1949, and Beg's family decided to move to Pakistan in 1949 after the Indian partition in 1947.[14]

Career in the military
MI's Map of East Pakistan in 1971. Beg, then-Lt-Col., had been very critical of Eastern Command's interference in the Govt. of East Pakistan.

The Beg family set sailed for Karachi from Mumbai via Pakistan Navy ship in 1949. His elder brother was already a commissioned officer in the Pakistan Army and encouraged young Beg to follow his path to seek a career in the army.[14] Beg recalled his memoirs to his Indian interviewer and called Pakistan as "my dream country".[14] In 1950, Beg was accepted at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Kakul, graduating from a class of 6th PMA Long Course in 1952.[15]

In 1952, he gained commissioned as 2Lt. in the 6 Baloch Regiment of Pakistan Army and initially assisting the command of an infantry platoon.[11] From 1952–1958, he progressed well towards the military ranks, having been promoted to army lieutenant in 1956; and army captain in 1958.[11] He received recommendations from his field commanding officer for the selection by the special branch to join the special forces, and departed to the United States in 1958 to complete the special forces training with the U.S. Army Special Forces in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[11]

In 1960, Major Beg returned to Pakistan, and joined the elite Army Special Service Group (SSG), initially commanding a company that specialized in military infiltration.[15] Major Beg was deployed in Western Pakistan, in areas adjacent to Afghanistan, where his first combat experience took place when he led his company in removing the Nawab of Dir in Chitral in North-West Frontier Province.[15] In 1965, Major Beg served well in the second war with India and led the Special Forces team against the Indian Army/[11]

Academia and professorship

In 1967, Major Beg was promoted as Lieutenant-Colonel, eventually sent to attend the National Defence University (NDU) to continue his higher education, alongside then-Lieutenant-Colonel Zahid Ali Akbar, an engineering officer from the Corps of Engineers.[16]

After attending the Armed Forces War College and graduated with MSc in Strategic studies in 1971, Lt.Col. Beg was stationed in East-Pakistan to serve as a military adviser to the Eastern Command led by its GOC-in-C, Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi.[17] Upon arriving and observing the military deployments and actions, Lt.Col. Beg became very critical of Gen. Niazi's strategy and eventually became involved in acrimonious argument with his Gen. Niazi's staff in Dacca, having been very critical of armed forces interference in the political events in East.[17] His open mindedness and arguments with his senior officer eventually led his transfer back to Pakistan and was threatened with facing the court martial.[17]

In 1971, he commanded an infantry regiment in third war with India but was sent back to attend the National Defence University where he became even more involved with his studies.[17] In 1971–72, he earned his MSc in War Studies, defending and publishing his thesis, entitled: "A journey of pain and fear" which provide critical analysis of state sponsored terrorism and its effects on geo-military positions of the countries.[18] Lt. Col. Beg left the special forces, and accepted the professorship on war studies at the NDU in 1975.[19] Brig. Beg tenured as the professor on the war studies and remained Chief Instructor of Armed Forces War College at the then National Defence University until January 1978.[19]

About the 1971 war, Beg maintained that Pakistan Armed Forces "learned a valuable strategic lesson", and that quoted that the government also learned that "there is no point in going to war unless you are absolutely certain you have the capability to win".[20]

From 1994–99, Beg continued his teaching at NDU and published his two books on national security, nuclear weapons development, defence diplomacy and international relations.[21][22]

War and Command appointments

In 1978, Brig. Beg left the professorship at the university and was promoted into the two-star command appointment in the army.[23] Major-General Beg was appointed as the GOC of the 14th Army Division, stationed at the Okara Military District of Punjab Province in Pakistan.[23]

On March 1979, chief of army staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, directed the II Strike Corps' "to ascertain the likely reaction of the Pakistan Armed Forces officers if Bhutto was hanged", in accordance to the Supreme Court's verdict.[23] During this meeting, Major-General Beg objected to the hanging of Bhutto and maintained to his senior commanders that: "The hanging of Bhutto would be an unwise act, as it could cause very serious "political aberrations" that will be difficult to correct."[23] In 1979, Major-General Beg was moved at Army GHQ, taking over the staff appointment as an Adjutant-General, which he served until 1980.[23] He was later elevated as the Chief of General Staff (CGS), remained in charge of operational planning of the counter-offensive to the Indian invasion of Siachen marking the beginnings of the ongoing Siachen conflict in 1984.[24]

In 1985, Major-General Beg was elevated to three-star promotion and was appointed as Corp's Commander of the XI Corps, that stationed in Peshawar, which had role in the indirect war with Soviet Army in Afghanistan, since 1980.[25]

According to the military authors and Pakistani historians' accounts, Lieutenant-General Beg was extremely distrusted by President Zia-ul-Haq, mainly due to his open-mindedness and his pro-democracy views, at one point, advising President Zia to "rendezvous with the nation's history and democratize the country."[17]

In 1987, Lieutenant-General Beg was in the race for the promotion of four-star appointment, along with Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar, but was overlooked by President Zia who wanted to Lt.Gen. Akbar for the four-star appointment as chief of army staff.[17] Prime Minister M.K. Junejo eventually used his pejorative to appointed Lieutenant-General Mirza Aslam Beg as vice-army chief on merit, despite President Zia wanting Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar who was sent to DESTO.:73[17]

Chief of Army Staff
Gen. Beg, COAS, visiting Pakistan Army formation in 1990.

In March 1987, Prime Minister Mohammad Junejo announced in the news media of appointing Lieutenant-General Beg as a Vice-Chief of Army Staff, promoting him as the four-star rank general in the army.:278[26]

Though, General Beg did not supersede anyone and was the most senior, the promotion was notable due to the opposition shown by President Zia-ul-Haq who wanted Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar, an engineer, as vice army chief.:278[26][20]

Despite his four-star command assignment, General Beg had to report his duties and decisions to President Zia who had been army chief since 1976.[27] Eventually, General Beg succeeded President Zia as the new army chief and the command of the army when the latter died in an accidental plane crash on 17 August 1988.[28] American military authors regarded Beg as "mild but bookish general" keen to drive the country towards the tracks of democracy.[29]

The United States military regarded Beg as "Unpredictable General"[28] could not be counted on to continue close military cooperation with the United States as Zia did in the 1980s.[28] The Pentagon had commented on Beg as "a professional soldier" with no political ambitions, but independent-minded and unpredictable.[28] In 1988, one Pentagon military official added that "Beg is hard to figure out and difficult to read his mindset unlike other Pakistan army generals, he hasn't been particularly friendly with the US."[28]

Against the popular perception to take over, Beg endorsed Ghulam Ishaq Khan as President and ultimately called for new general elections which resulted in a peaceful democratic transfer of government to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) with Benazir Bhutto as the Prime minister.[30][31] Beg did not consult any of his corps commanders or principal staff officers (PSOs) and called on the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey, and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah, to discuss the matter briefly and within three hours of General Ziaul Haq's death, restored the Constitution and handed over power to Ghulam Ishaq Khan.[32] It was an unprecedented decision in favour of democracy and the rule of law.[32]

Mirza Aslam Beg was endorsed by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who confirmed his four-star appointment as chief of army staff until 1991, when he was replaced by General Asif Nawaz.[31] Unlike General Zia, Beg initiated a massive re-evaluation and education training program for the inter-services officers.[33] In 1988, Beg's personal initiatives led to sending of hundreds of inter-services officers to Western universities for advanced degrees.[33] By 1991, several of the inter-services officers had gained post-graduate degree in operational and technical training.[33]

In 1988, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto conferred Beg with specially designated civil award for Mirza Aslam Beg for restoring the democracy, Tamgha-e-Jamhuriat (lit. Medal of Democracy).[34] In fact, Beg is the only in Pakistan, and yet the only four-star army general to have been decorated with such honor.[34] Although Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was criticized for decorating a four-star general with a civilian award, she used to justify her decision, saying that Beg deserved this honour because he refrained from indulging in yet another military adventure like Zia and instead helped Pakistan to a peaceful transition of power through general elections.[34]

On 16 August 1991, General Beg retired from his military serving, completing 41 years of service, and handing over the command to General Asif Nawaz.[3] As an army chief, General Beg is credited by an Australian Army expert for encouraging "wider thinking about tactics" within the Pakistan Army, particularly for establishing a much improved logistics chain and "contributed immensely to the army’s warfighting capabilities."[3]

Soviet withdrawal and Afghan war
Main articles: Civil war in Afghanistan (1989–1992), Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Pakistan-Soviet Union relations

As chief of army staff, Beg determinately remained military's control over the policies regarding the national security, and dictated Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's role in formulating the national security policies.[29] Beg testified that the "real causes behind the "Pressler amendment" was significant as long as Pakistan was considered an important entity of weakening Soviet Union's influence in South Asia."[35] Various writers greatly questioned his idea of "Strategic depth", which aim to transfer of Pakistan's military science command in dense Afghanistan, against the war with India.[36]

Beg endorsed the role of his deputy, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul in Afghanistan war who masterminded the Jalalabad operation which failed brutally; Gul was deposed by Prime Minister Bhutto soon after this action.[37] Beg's role remained vital during and after the Soviet Union's troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and showed no intention to coordinate joint efforts with the U.S. to end the war in the country.[38] In late 1989, Pakistan and U.S. propagated the message of departing of communist government in order to bring the clerical government instead.[38] Authors and media reporters maintained that Beg controversially proposed an intelligence contingency plan between the agencies of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran that would grow into the "core of the Muslim world."[38] Such idea was met with hostility in the government and Foreign Minister Yacob Khan and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto were the ones who objected and opposed to this idea.[38]

Gulf war in Iraq
Main article: Gulf war
Contingency map of Iraq War in 1990. Gen. Mirza was instrument in deploying and leading the Pakistan Army against Iraq as part of the U.N. Coalition.

In 1989, Beg drafted a contingency plan and organized a massive military exercise, Exercise Zarb-e-Momin, to prove the military solidarity contentions. One of the notable events as a stint as a chief of army staff during the end of Cold war took place in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait amidst political tensions between two Arab countries. Beg fully endorsed the United States-led military campaign against Iraq. In a briefing given to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Beg maintained the assessment that once the ground battle with Iraqi Army was joined, the Iraqi Army would comprehensively defeat and repel the American Army.[39]

Ironically, Beg accused the Western countries for encouraging Iraq to invade Kuwait, though he kept his armed forces fighting against Iraq in support to Saudi Arabia.[40][41] In 1990, he held state dinner for United States Central Command (SCENTCOM) commander General Norman Schwarzkopf where, together with Chairman Joint Chiefs Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey, brief the USCENTCOM on Pakistan Armed Forces battle preparations and military operational capabilities of Pakistan armed forces in Saudi contingent.[42]

The Iraq war with Kuwait was a polarizing political issue in Pakistan and Beg carefully commanded and deployed the Pakistan Armed Forces' contingent forces during the Operation Desert Storm in 1991.[41][43] Beg calculated that the popular opinion would be in favor of Iraq, as the anti-American sentiment in the Middle East began to grow at that time.[39]

But, neither did Beg's strategic prediction come true nor did he get an extension.[39] Soon after the end of Gulf war, Beg proceeded towards the retirement on 18 August 1991.[39]

Controversies

Funding of conservative politicians
Main articles: Mehran Bank scandal, First Sharif administration, and Islamic Democratic Alliance

Soon after retiring from his military service in 1991, Beg earned the public criticism when the Pakistan Peoples Party's politicians went on aired on several news channels of being charged on personally authorizing the intelligence funds to be released to the conservative politicians.[1] A lawsuit was filed by Asghar Khan at the Supreme Court of Pakistan against him, the former Director ISI Asad Durrani, and Younis Habib, the accountant with the Ministry of Defence in 1992, and official court inquiries began when the local Pakistani newspaper, alleging that the conservatives had received as much as ₨. 140 million to win over the "for-sale" leftists politicians.[1]

In 1994, the official government investigations pursued further when Interior minister Naseerullah Babar in Benazir administration disclosed this matter at the Parliament while maintaining that "it was the ISI that had disbursed funds to purchase the loyalty of conservative mass and nationalist public figures to manipulate the general elections held in 1990 and to bring the conservatives in race to compete with left-wing politicians in the country."[1] It was reported that Gen. Beg had the Younis Habib released and deposited around ₨. 140 million in the Survey Section 202 account of Military Intelligence (MI), with ₨. 6 million were channeled to accounts of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan including the bureaucracts: Refaqat Hussain, Roedad Khan, and Ijlal Zaidi.[44] In 2017, the second lawsuit filed against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has connected him when Just. Gulzar, in his final verdict, reads:

"[Late] Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then-President of Pakistan, General Aslam Beg and General Asad Durrani acted in violation of the Constitution by facilitating a group of politicians and political parties, etc., to ensure their success against the rival candidates in the general election of 1990, for which they secured funds from Mr. Yunus Habib. Their acts have brought a bad name to Pakistan and professionality of the Armed Forces as well as intelligence agencies in the eyes of the nation, therefore, notwithstanding that they may have retired from service, the [Federal] Government shall take necessary steps under the Constitution and Law against them."[45]

Nuclear proliferation controversy

Internationally, Beg was widely criticised for his alleged involvement with the nuclear program of Iran. A report in The Friday Times contends that after taking over as Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg began lobbying about "such cooperation with Iran" on nuclear technology as a part of his "strategy of defiance" of the United States. As chief of army staff, Beg had initiated lectureship programs on physics, chemistry, mathematics and engineering for inter-services officers, by the Pakistani scientists serving their professors, to have better understanding on nuclear policy matters and policy development.[33]

Earlier, Beg had calculated that such cooperation with Iran was popular and that, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Arabs were less popular as American clients in the region.[46] General Beg had encouraged dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan to proliferate technology to Iran and North Korea.[46]

The speed with which he maintained the "new nuclear policy" leads one to speculate whether he simply wanted the "obstacle" of General Zia to disappear from the scene.[46] General Zia did not know or received any payments of such agreement; in fact, Zia did not know if Beg was in act with Iran.[46] Zia was deeply committed to the Arabs, especially to Saudi Arabia, to create a restraint to contain the Iranian influence.[46] According to Ahmad, Prime minister Nawaz Sharif was shocked that Beg had signed a secret nuclear deal with Iran without telling him; therefore, the Prime minister abrogated the cooperation and tightened the security watch on A.Q. Khan.[46] However, in 2004 interview to PBS, Beg clearly denied of his involvement with Iranian program and quoted:

"If [Benazir] government wasn't aware, how was I aware? I was army chief from 1988 to 1991. If we were never told what was happening beneath the surface when the Americans knew, when the British agencies knew, when they have claimed they have penetrated the entire system including Pakistan— so are they not guilty?"

— Mirza Aslam Beg, 2004, source[47]

In 2005 interview to NBC, Beg defended his and A.Q. Khan's ground and maintained to the NBC that "Nuclear Proliferators can't be stopped." Beg added that the Americans and Europeans have been engaged in nuclear proliferation as part of a concept, called "outsourcing nuclear capability," to friendly countries as a measure of defense against nuclear strike.[48] Beg pointed out that the "nuclear non-proliferation regime, therefore, is dying its natural death at the hands of those who are the exponents of the nuclear non-proliferation regime."[48] Beg also theorized that "nuclear deterrent is what holds the strategic balance between the two or more belligerents".[48]

Accusation of role in Zia's death
Main article: Death of Zia-ul-Haq

According to an article in the Express Tribune, Beg was in contact with senior scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, about bringing Iran into the fold of "nuclear prowess" much to the annoyance of his superior and senior officer, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.[46] At this point, without a green signal from President Zia-ul-Haq, Beg got acquainted with Dr. A.Q. Khan to secretly proliferate the technology crucial to master the nuclear fuel.[49]

On 1 December 2012, President Zia's son Ijaz-ul-Haq maintained that it was Beg who was conspired behind the death of his father.[46] Earlier in 1988, the Shafiur Rehman Commission that was to establish the cause of the crash of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's plane concluded that because of Army's obstruction in the investigation, the real perpetrators behind the attack cannot be brought forward.[50]

Post-military career

After failing to persuade the government for his extension, Beg's later political ambitions forced president Ghulam Ishaq Khan to nominate General Asif Nawaz as the designated chief of army staff three months prior to his retirement.[1] After his retirement he continued the professorship at National Defence University in Islamabad, and remained active in country's political and military affairs.[51]

Political activism

Upon returning to civilian life, General Beg founded and established a policy think-tank institute in Islamabad, known as Foundation for Research on International Environment National Development and Security (Friends).[52] He is the current founding chairman of the Friends think-tank since its foundations.[52] Beg later founded the nationalist political party, the Awami Qaiyadat Party (lit. National Leadership Party) which continued to be a part of right-wing sphere.[53] Though, his party gained no political prominence and failed to compete in national general elections; his party remains registered in Election Commission with Gun as its election symbol.[53]

Criticism on President Musharraf

General Beg was one of many professor under whom Musharraf had studied at National Defence University.[11] Musharraf had high regards for Beg as one of his "significant professor" in his university years, but after September 11, 2001, they became estranged.[11] Beg was labelled as one of many professors at NDU who were called "pseudo-intellectuals", by Musharraf.[11][54]

Honors and awards
RibbonDescriptionNotes
Legion of Merit[55]Military; accompanied by a ribbon bar for wear on military service uniform
Nishan-e-ImtiazMilitary; accompanied by a ribbon bar for wear on military service uniform
Hilal-e-ImtiazMilitary; accompanied by a ribbon bar for wear on military service
Sitara-e-BasalatNon-combatant, civil award
Tamgha-e-JamhuriatCivilian; Beg is the only military and Pakistani figure to have awarded this specially designed civil by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1988
Order of National Security MeritMilitary; accompanied by a ribbon bar for wear on military service uniform

Literature

Books authored by Beg
  • Beg, Mirzā Aslam (1999). 1st (ed.). National security : diplomacy and defence. Rawalpindi: FRIENDS Publication. p. 93. ISBN 969-8199-13-6. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  • Beg, Mirza Aslam (1994). Development and security : thoughts and reflections. Rawalpindi, Pakistan: Foundation for Research and National Development and Security, FRIENDS. p. 252. ISBN 969-8199-01-2.

Articles and works by Beg

References
  1. Editorial (1 February 2008). "What the generals must apologise for". The Daily Times, Pakistan. Archived from the original on 6 February 2012. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
  2. "U.S. Library of Congress: Pakistan and the Middle East". Archived from the original on 15 October 2012. Retrieved 14 April 2013.
  3. Ahmad Faruqui. "The army today" Archived 2009-12-03 at the Wayback Machine Dawn, 12 October 2009
  4. The Nation. "The columns of Mirza Aslam Beg". The Nation. Archived from the original on 20 March 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  5. Dunya News- Gen Beg responsible for Bahawalpur crash: Ijaz
  6. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2 January 2014. Retrieved 28 October 2012.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  7. "Khaled Ahmed, 'Closing in on Aslam Beg', The Friday Times". Archived from the original on 30 October 2013. Retrieved 14 April 2013.
  8. "Givers and takers of money both responsible: Chief Justice – The News – March 10 2012". Archived from the original on 28 April 2012. Retrieved 14 April 2013.
  9. Indian Muslim Press. "A milestone for girls in Azamgarh village". Twocicles.net. Twocicles.net. Archived from the original on 1 February 2014. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  10. Chellaney, edited by Brahma (1999). Securing India's future in the new millennium. New Delhi: Orient Longman. ISBN 81-250-1721-6.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
  11. Staff reports. "Details of Gen Mirza Aslam Beg". Pakistan Herald Megazine. Pakistan Herald Megazine. Archived from the original on 2 January 2010. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  12. Profile. "Mirza Aslam Baig". One Pakistan. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  13. Coll, Steve (2009). On the grand trunk road a journey into South Asia ([New] ed.). New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books. ISBN 9781101029138.
  14. Baig, General (retired) Mirza Aslam. "My life fifty years ago". Mirza Aslam Baig memoirs. Outlook India. Archived from the original on 13 June 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  15. Amin, A.H. (February 2002). "Remembering Our Warriors: Brig. Shamim Yasin Manto". www.defencejournal.com. Karachi: Defence Journal Shamim. Archived from the original on 3 May 2013. Retrieved 19 September 2017.
  16. NDU. "1971 AFWC alumni". National Defence University (NDU); Armed Forces War College. Archived from the original on 7 March 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  17. Kiessling, Hein (2016). "§Domestic Politics: General Beg". Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan (google books). London, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9781849048637. Retrieved 19 September 2017.
  18. Beg, Mirza Aslam (1971). "A journey of pain and fear". Criterion Quarterly. 1 (1). Archived from the original on 5 November 2018. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  19. "Chief Instructor's Gallery" Archived 2011-02-17 at the Wayback Machine National Defence University, Islamabad accessed 6 October 2009
  20. Ahmad Faruiqi; Brian Cloughley; his work on armed forces was done in his book: History of the Pakistan Army" (12 October 2009). "The army today". Dawn News, 2009. Retrieved 21 March 2013.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  21. Beg, Mirzā Aslam (1999). 1st (ed.). National security: diplomacy and defence. Rawalpindi: FRIENDS Publication. p. 93. ISBN 969-8199-13-6.
  22. Beg, Mirza Aslam (1994). Development and security : thoughts and reflections. Rawalpindi, Pakistan: Foundation for Research and National Development and Security, FRIENDS. p. 252. ISBN 969-8199-01-2. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
  23. Mirza, Beg (22 July 2012). "Political aberrations". The Nation, 1978. Archived from the original on 26 March 2013. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  24. Maj Gen (r) Shafiq Ahmed. "Army's inquiry commissions" Archived 2017-08-12 at the Wayback Machine The Nation, 5 August 2004
  25. Rahimullah Yusufzai. "Change of Guard at Peshawar's 11th Corps" Archived 2012-02-12 at the Wayback Machine The News, 10 May 2001
  26. Akhtar, Haq Nawaz (2007). If truth be told: an alternative history of Pakistan. Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan: Sang-i Meel Publications. p. 368. Retrieved 22 September 2017.
  27. Hussain, Rizwan (2005). Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-4434-0.
  28. Sciolino, Elaine (22 August 1988). "Pakistan After Zia; Washington Regrets Death of a Solid Ally But Holds Out Hope for Democratic Change". Special to the New York Times. Archived from the original on 5 March 2014. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
  29. Coll, Steve (2005). Ghost wars : the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 ([Updated ed.]. ed.). London: Penguin Books. p. 179. ISBN 978-0-14-3034-66-7. Retrieved 31 October 2016. soviet war and Mirza Aslam Beg.
  30. Adle, president: Chahryar (2005). Towards the contemporary period : from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. Paris: UNESCO Publ. p. 435. ISBN 92-3-10-3985-7.
  31. Blood, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Ed. by Peter R. (1995). Pakistan : a country study (6. ed., 1. print. ed.). Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov. Print. Off. ISBN 0-8444-0834-4.
  32. Beg, Mirza (19 June 2011). "Waiting for the command decision". The Nation, 19 June 2011. Archived from the original on 17 February 2013. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  33. Khan, Feroz Hassan (2012). Eating grass : the making of the Pakistani bomb. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 474. ISBN 978-0804776011. Archived from the original on 27 June 2014. Retrieved 31 October 2016.
  34. Mir, Amir (21 October 2012). "Gen Beg may be stripped of Democracy Medal given by BB". The News International. Archived from the original on 2 November 2012. Retrieved 22 March 2013.
  35. Sayeed, Khalid Bin (1995). Western dominance and political Islam : challenge and response. Albany, N.Y.: State Univ. of New York Press. p. 105. ISBN 0-7914-2265-8. soviet war and Mirza Aslam Beg.
  36. Qassem, Ahmad Shayeq (2009). Afghanistan's political stability : a dream unrealised ([Online-Ausg.]. ed.). Farnham, Surrey: Burlington, VT. ISBN 978-0-7546-7940-0.
  37. Satti, Jehangir. The Ruling Enemy. Archived from the original on 19 June 2018. Retrieved 31 October 2016.
  38. Tomsen, Peter (2011). The Wars of Afghanistan Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (1st ed.). New York: PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-58648-781-2. Archived from the original on 9 December 2014. Retrieved 31 October 2016.
  39. Singh, R.S.N. (2008). "Nawaz Sharif and Military". The military factor in Pakistan. New Delhi: Frankfort, IL. pp. 84–85. ISBN 978-0-9815378-9-4. Archived from the original on 28 June 2014. Retrieved 31 October 2016.
  40. Hiro, Dilip (2003). Desert shield to desert storm : the second Gulf war. New York: Authors Choice Press. ISBN 0-595-26904-4.
  41. Ghareeb, Majid Khadduri, Edmund (2001). War in the Gulf, 1990–91: the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and its implications. Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, Ghareeb. ISBN 0-19-514979-3.
  42. Petre, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, written by Peter (1993). It doesn't take a hero : the autobiography (Bantam paperback ed.). New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 0-553-56338-6.
  43. Crossette, Barbara (14 August 1990). "Confrontation in the Gulf – Pakistanis Agree to Join Defense of Saudi Arabia". New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 May 2013. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
  44. Cowasjee, Ardeshir We never learn from history Archived 2010-10-24 at the Wayback Machine Dawn Newspaper, 19 August 2007
  45. "Full text of Panama case verdict". www.thenews.com.pk. Archived from the original on 20 April 2017. Retrieved 20 April 2017.
  46. Ahmed, Khaled (7 December 2012). "Who killed General Zia?". The Express Tribune, 2012. Archived from the original on 23 February 2013. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  47. PBS (March 2004). "General Mirza Aslam Beg: Former Army Foe of Musharraf". PBS Frontline. Archived from the original on 10 November 2012. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  48. Beg, Mirza (7 March 2005). "Outside View: Nuke Proliferators Can't Be Stopped". spacewar. Archived from the original on 28 December 2013. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  49. Corera, Gordon (2006). Shopping for bombs : nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and the rise and fall of A.Q. Khan network ([Online-Ausg.] ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 59–60. ISBN 0-19-530495-0.
  50. Khaled Ahmed. "The Death of Zia-ul-Haq" Criterion Quarterly, April–June 2007 Issue — Vol. 2 No. 2
  51. Strick van Linschoten, Alex; Kuehn, Felix (2012). "Biographies". An enemy we created: the myth of the Taliban-al Qaeda merger in Afghanistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 454. ISBN 978-0-19-992731-9.
  52. Beg, Mirza. "Foundation for Research on International Environment National Development and Security". Friends NGO. Archived from the original on 29 July 2014. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
  53. Election Commission of Pakistan. "Awami Qiadat Party". Election Commission of Pakistan. Election Commission of Pakistan. Archived from the original on 7 April 2013. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
  54. Retired generals, officers of other ranks urge Musharraf to step down Archived 2008-02-06 at the Wayback Machine Dawn Newspaper, 23 January 2008
  55. "Recipients of Legion of Merit" (PDF). www.apd.army.mil. The Pentagon: Department of the Army. 30 March 1990. p. 1. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 September 2017. Retrieved 26 September 2017.

Bibliography
  • Zahid Hussain. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Military offices
Preceded by
Sirdar Farooq Shaukat Khan Lodi		 Chief of General Staff
1980–1985		 Succeeded by
Muhammad Safdar
Preceded by
Khalid Mahmud Arif		 Vice Chief of Army Staff
1987–1988		 Succeeded by
post abolished
Preceded by
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq		 Chief of Army Staff
1988–1991		 Succeeded by
Asif Nawaz
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.