Min Yuen

The Min Yuen (Chinese: 民運; pinyin: Mín yùn; Malay: Gerakan rakyat) was an undercover communist organization that existed during the Malayan Emergency. It was composed of ordinary Malayan citizens of which the overwhelming majority were ethnically Chinese. The Min Yuen was under the direct control of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and actively supported the communist revolutionaries with food, information, and medical supplies.[1] Members of the Min Yuen were primarily located on jungle fringes and in villages and towns.[1]

Since the beginning of the Emergency, the British Government recognized the Min Yuen to be especially problematic. As the Min Yuen was made up of ordinary civilians, its members were indistinguishable from the rest of the population, making it impossible for security forces to instantly recognize and arrest communist them. Hence, the British Government found it imperative to isolate the Min Yuen as far as possible from the communist terrorists based in the jungle. This was achieved under the Briggs Plan with the implementation of New Villages starting in 1950.

Names

The term Min Yuen began appearing following the declaration of the Emergency in June 1948. It is the Romanization of the two-character abbreviated form of the Chinese term Minzhong Yuendong (Chinese: 民眾運動; pinyin: Mín zhòng yùn dòng) which literally translates into “People’s Movement”.[1][2]

History

Membership Figures

In May 1948, at a security conference in Kuala Lumpur, Lieutenant Colonel John Dalley estimated that there were 5,000 members of the MNLA who had already taken up arms against the British government and 250,000 members of the Min Yuen and other MCP-affiliated organizations.[3] In the early years of the Emergency from 1948 to 1951, the MNLA frequently attracted recruits from the Min Yuen to join their guerilla army. Many opposed colonial British rule and were inspired by the success of the Chinese Communist Party in defeating the Kuomintang in 1949.[4]

During the peak of the Emergency from late 1951 to early 1952, there were roughly 50,000 members of the Min Yuen.[5] However, with the mass resettlement of nearly 500,000 Chinese squatters into New Villages by 1952, the Min Yuen were greatly hampered in their ability to meet with communist terrorists.[6] The New Villages were located away from the jungle, had perimeter fencing, and guarded by Special Constables (and later the Home Guard).[7] This made it difficult for communist sympathizers to freely meet and supply communist terrorists with food and information as well as for communist terrorists to terrorize and pressure the local community into providing them with support.

By 1953, the full effects of Briggs’ resettlement program had begun to be felt and the overall situation had improved drastically, and several mass arrests of Min Yuen members occurred.[8]

Nature of Min Yuen Membership

Throughout the Emergency, the MCP failed to gain widespread support. Their only popular base was Malaya’s large yet unassimilated Chinese minority who accounted for 38% of the total population in 1947.[9] Within the Chinese minority, Min Yuen membership can be categorized into two types: those who supported the MCP voluntarily and those who did so out of fear.

Those who supported the MCP of their own volition tended to be members of the rural Chinese community. As a result of World War 2, there was severe economic dislocation in Malaya and many rural Chinese had lost their jobs. Many of them moved to fringes of the jungle, became squatters, and engaged in subsistence farming, while others took up jobs as tin miners or rubber tappers.[10] Additionally, the MCP also enjoyed support from supporters of the MPAJA whom the MCP fought alongside with during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.

Those who supported the MCP out of fear were the greater population-at-large, but especially the general Malayan Chinese community. For example, between June 1950 and April 1951 in a town where the MCP was heavily active, the Special Branch reported that many Chinese traders, lorry owners, bus company owners, and rubber estate owners had been extorted into paying protection money to the MCP, many times in fear of their own personal safety.[11] Many members of the Min Yuen who were forced into supporting the MCP felt guilty for their actions. However, they reported that it was necessary and the lesser of two evils: if they were found out by authorities, the worst thing that could happen would be detainment. However, should they refuse to pay protection money to the communists, they risked the lives of themselves and their loved ones.[11]

The MCP also had a negative reputation for violence and terrorism. Between October 1945 and December 1947, communist terrorists performed 191 murders and abductions, and in the first six months of 1948 alone, there were 107.[12] In the first week of June 1948, the month in which the Emergency was declared, there were 17 casualties in a riot involving 200 people.[12] Perhaps the most notable act of communist terror would be the murder of British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney on October 6, 1951 where he was killed by chance in a routine ambush by communist terrorists.[13] In doing so, the MCP created a sense of fear and aversion among the greater populace, greatly reducing their chances of recruiting new sympathizers to join the Min Yuen and achieving the popular revolution they had hoped for.[14]

The Infiltration of Min Yuen by the Special Branch

Under the Briggs’ Plan, the Special Branch was tasked with penetrating the Min Yuen and destroying the MCP from within. While the Special Branch did not manage to penetrate the upper ranks of the MNLA and MCP leadership hierarchy, they were successful in inserting undercover agents in the Min Yuen.[15]

In some scenarios, once the Special Branch had gathered sufficient information on known Min Yuen members, they would threaten to arrest and punish them under Emergency Regulations unless they agreed to cooperate.[16] In other situations, the Special Branch would plant misinformation in the Min Yuen knowing that it would be passed on to communist terrorists as genuine, thereby destroying the credibility of the Min Yuen as a reliable source of intelligence.[17]

See also

References
  1. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 22. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  2. Hack, Karl (March 1999). ""Iron Claws on Malaya": The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 30 (1): 102. doi:10.1017/S0022463400008043. ISSN 0022-4634.
  3. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 45. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  4. Komer, Robert, 1922-2000. (1972). The Malayan emergency in retrospect : organization of a successful counterinsurgency effort. Rand. p. 7. OCLC 741277.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 69. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  6. Tilman, Robert O. (1966-08-01). "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency". Asian Survey. 6 (8): 416. doi:10.2307/2642468. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 2642468.
  7. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 149. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  8. Hack, Karl (March 1999). ""Iron Claws on Malaya": The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 30 (1): 115. doi:10.1017/S0022463400008043. ISSN 0022-4634.
  9. Hirschman, Charles (March 1980). "Demographic Trends in Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-75". Population and Development Review. 6 (1): 111. doi:10.2307/1972660. ISSN 0098-7921. JSTOR 1972660.
  10. Tilman, Robert O. (1966-08-01). "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency". Asian Survey. 6 (8): 418. doi:10.2307/2642468. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 2642468.
  11. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 145. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  12. Komer, Robert, 1922-2000. (1972). The Malayan emergency in retrospect : organization of a successful counterinsurgency effort. Rand. p. 5. OCLC 741277.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  13. Chin, Peng (1924-2013). (September 2003). Alias Ching Peng: My Side Of History. Media Masters. p. 288. ISBN 981-04-8693-6. OCLC 494159538.
  14. Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2001). 'Transmogrifying' Malaya: the impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952-54). p. 81. OCLC 772986174.
  15. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 79. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  16. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 81. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
  17. Comber, Leon (2008-12-31). Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore. p. 160. doi:10.1355/9789812308306. ISBN 978-981-230-830-6.
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