Internal conflict in Myanmar

The internal conflict in Myanmar is a series of insurgencies in Myanmar that began shortly after the country, then known as Burma, gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. The conflict has largely been ethnic-based, with several ethnic armed groups fighting Myanmar's armed forces, the Tatmadaw, for self-determination. Despite numerous ceasefires and the creation of autonomous self-administered zones in 2008, many groups continue to call for independence, increased autonomy, or the federalisation of the country. The conflict is also the world's longest ongoing civil war, having spanned more than seven decades.[51][52][53]

Internal conflict in Myanmar

Map of armed conflict zones in Myanmar (Burma). States and regions affected by fighting during and after 1995 are highlighted in yellow.
Date2 April 1948[1] – present
(72 years, 10 months and 1 day)
Location
Myanmar (Burma)
Status

Ongoing

Belligerents

 Myanmar

Allied groups:
UWSP/UWSA

Northern Alliance

Federal Union Army

Commanders and leaders
Units involved

Tatmadaw
Strength

492,000[lower-alpha 6]

20,000[33]–25,000[34]

NA-B: 21,500–26,500+

~10,000

Unknown numbers of various other groups

Casualties and losses
130,000[48]–250,000[49] killed
600,000–1,000,000 civilians displaced[50]

Background

Before Myanmar (Burma) gained independence from the United Kingdom, several anti-colonial groups protested against British rule of the country. These groups became especially influential during World War II, when the Empire of Japan promised an "independent Burmese state" (though it would be de facto controlled by Japan as a puppet state) and appointed Ba Maw as its head of state.[54] During this period, left-wing groups such as the Communist Party of Burma (also known as the Burma Communist Party) and armed ethnic groups began to emerge in opposition to both the British and Japanese.[55] In 1947, the Panglong Agreement was reached between Aung San and ethnic leaders, in an attempt to quell hostilities; however, the agreement was not honoured by the post-independence government following Aung San's assassination, leading to further ethnic tensions.[56]

On 4 January 1948, Myanmar gained independence from the United Kingdom. The communists and ethnic minorities in the country were dissatisfied with the newly formed government, believing that they were being unfairly excluded from governing the country.[20][54] Three months after independence, the communists began an armed insurgency against the government. Similarly, Karen insurgent groups began to fight for independence.[57]

In the early 1960s, the government refused to adopt a federal system, to the dismay of insurgent groups such as the CPB, who proposed adopting the system during peace talks. By the early 1980s, politically motivated armed insurgencies had largely disappeared, while ethnic-based insurgencies continued.[58]

Several insurgent groups have negotiated ceasefires and peace agreements with successive governments, which until political reforms between 2011 and 2015 had largely fallen apart.[59] The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was a landmark agreement signed between the government of Myanmar and eight insurgent groups on 15 October 2015;[60] two other insurgent groups later joined on 13 February 2018.[61][62][63][64]

Timeline

The conflict is generally divided into three parts: Insurgencies during the post-independence period under parliamentary rule (1948–1962), insurgencies during the post-1962 coup socialist government under the rule of General Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962–1988), and insurgencies during the modern post Cold War era; first under the military administration of the State Peace and Development Council (1988–2011) and now under the newly elected civilian government.

Post-independence conflict (1948–1962)
Main articles: Communist insurgency in Myanmar and Karen conflict

Following independence from the United Kingdom, the two largest opposition groups in Burma (Myanmar) were the communists, led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Karen nationalists, led by the Karen National Union's predecessor. The former had fought the British colonial government prior to independence; however, during the final days of the Japanese occupation of Burma in World War II, both groups helped the British against the Imperial Japanese Army.[54] Initially there was calm during the transitional period after independence, but on 2 April 1948, the CPB fired the first shots of the conflict in Paukkongyi, Pegu Region (present-day Bago Region).[1]

During the post-independence period, the KNU favoured an independent state, administered by the Karen people. The proposed state would have encompassed the territories of Karen State and Karenni State (present-day Kayin State and Kayah State), in Lower Burma (Outer Myanmar). The KNU has since shifted their focus from full independence to regional autonomy, under a federal system with fair Karen representation in the government.[65]

Post-coup conflict (1962–1988)
"They have gone back": Insurgents of the Communist Party of Burma walk back to their bases after failed peace talks. (c. November 1963)

After three successive parliamentary governments governed Myanmar, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces), led by General Ne Win, enacted a coup d'état in 1962, which ousted the parliamentary government and replaced it with a military junta. Accusations of severe human rights abuses and violations followed afterwards, and the cabinet of the parliamentary government and political leaders of ethnic minority groups were arrested and detained without trial.[45] Around this period, other ethnic minority groups began forming larger rebel factions, such as the Kachin Independence Army, in response to the new government's refusal to adopt a federal government structure.

In 1967, following China's initiation of the Cultural Revolution, violence broke out between local Bamars and overseas Chinese in Myanmar, culminating in anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon (present-day Yangon) and other cities. The riots left many overseas Chinese dead and prompted China to begin openly supporting the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).[66]

Both immediately after the coup and again in 1972, General Ne Win held peace talks with opposition forces, but both times they fell apart, partly due to General Ne Win's refusal to adopt a multi-party system. After negotiations failed, defectors from the Tatmadaw and ethnic insurgents walked back to their bases, with headlines across Myanmar famously reading "They have gone back" (သူတို့ပြန်ကြလေပြီ). Private property was confiscated by the government, and the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was founded in 1974 to govern the country under a one-party system. Under General Ne Win's 26 year dictatorship, Myanmar became an isolated hermit kingdom and one of the least developed countries in the world. In 1988, nationwide student protests resulted in the BSPP and General Ne Win being ousted and replaced with a new military regime, the State Peace and Development Council.[46]

8888 Uprising
Main article: 8888 Uprising

On 8 August 1988, students began demonstrating in Rangoon (Yangon) against General Ne Win's rule and the disastrous Burmese Way to Socialism system. The protests spread across the country,[67] The uprising ended on 18 September 1988, after a military coup was enacted by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the BSPP government was overthrown.[68]

Authorities in Myanmar claimed that around 350 people were killed,[69][70] whilst anti-government groups claimed thousands died in the protests, with a high number of deaths attributed to the military.[71][72][73] According to The Economist, over 3,000 people were killed in the public uprising.[74] As a result of the uprising, the new government agreed to sign separate peace treaties with certain insurgent groups. Because the 1988 uprising was mostly politically motivated, ethnic insurgent groups did not receive much support from political movements in Myanmar. In the 1990s, the Tatmadaw severely weakened ethnic insurgent groups, destroying most of their bases and strongholds.[75]

Post-Cold War conflict (1988–present)

In 2006, the Tatmadaw conducted a large military offensive against the Karen National Union (KNU) in Kayin State, which resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. One estimate claimed that approximately half a million people were displaced due to fighting between government forces and the KNU, and the forcible relocation of villages by the government.[76][77]

In 2011, Tatmadaw launched a military offensive named Operation Perseverance (ဇွဲမန်ဟိန်း) against insurgents in Shan State in 2011.[78] During the offensive, the Tatmadaw captured territory from the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Shan State Army - North (SSA-N), with the latter being involved in most of the fighting.[79][80] The operation was officially a response to the groups' rejections of the junta's "One Nation, One Army" policy;[81][82][83][84] however, researchers have linked it to the military's interests in the jade trade.[85][86]

Government forces attacked the Kachin Independence Army's headquarters near the city of Laiza on 19 November 2014, killing at least 22 KIA insurgents, according to the government.[87]

Between February and May 2015, government forces launched a series of military operations in Kokang, in northern Shan State,[88] after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) attempted to retake territory it had lost in 2009.[89]

Insurgents of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked Burmese border posts along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border on 9 October 2016, killing nine border officers.[90] Armed clashes continued and on 11 October 2016, four Tatmadaw soldiers were killed by insurgents with recently looted weapons.[91] On 25 August 2017, ARSA launched a second large-scale attack against 24 police posts and the 552nd Light Infantry Battalion army base in northern Rakhine State. A total of 71 people were reportedly killed in the armed clashes.[92][93][94]

Main fronts

Kachin State
Main article: Kachin conflict
Cadets from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) preparing for military drills at the group's headquarters in Laiza.

The Kachin people are a major ethnic minority in Myanmar who mainly inhabit the mountainous northern regions of the Kachin Hills in Kachin State. Kachin regular soldiers previously formed a significant part of the Myanmar military; however, after General Ne Win's regime seized power in 1962, many Kachin soldiers defected from the military and reorganized with already active Kachin insurgents to form the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), under the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). Religious tensions have also been a source of conflict, as Kachin people have historically been predominantly Christian, while the majority Bamar people have been predominantly Buddhist.[95]

In 2012 alone, fighting between the KIA and the government resulted in around 2,500 casualties (both civilian and military); 211 of whom were government soldiers. The violence resulted in the displacement of nearly 100,000 civilians and the complete or partial abandonment of 364 villages.[96][97][98][99]

Ceasefire agreements have been signed between the KIA and the government several times; most notably a ceasefire signed in 1994, that lasted for 17 years until June 2011, when government forces attacked KIA positions along the Taping River, east of Bhamo, Kachin State.[100] As a result of the ceasefire breakdown, Kachin State has faced waves of internal displacement, with over 90,000 internally displaced people spread across over 150 camps or camp-like settings as of April 2017. Many IDP camps are located in non-government controlled areas with severely restricted access.[101] The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that in April and May 2018, over 14,000 people were displaced from fighting between the KIO/KIA and the Tatmadaw.[102]

Kayah State

The largest insurgent group in Kayah State (formerly Karenni State) is the Karenni Army, whose goal for the past few decades has been to obtain independence and self-determination for the Karenni people.[103]

The group has claimed that their grievances towards the government include: the (government's) exploitation and rapid depletion of the natural resources in the region, the forced sale of farmer's agricultural products for low prices, extortion and corruption within local authorities, forced labour, forced relocation of whole villages and farms, destruction of houses, planting of mines in civilian areas, torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, burning of villages, expropriation of food supplies and livestock, arrests without charge and exploitation of the poor. The Karenni Army is currently led by General Bee Htoo,[103] and consists of roughly between 500[40] and 1,500 soldiers.[41]

Kayin State
Main article: Karen conflict
A KNLA medic treats IDPs in Hpapun District, Kayin State.

The Karen people of Kayin State (formerly Karen State) in eastern Myanmar are the third largest ethnic group in Myanmar, consisting of roughly 7% of the country's total population. Karen insurgent groups have fought for independence and self-determination since 1949. In 1949, the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw General Smith Dun, an ethnic Karen, was fired because of the rise of Karen opposition groups, which furthered ethnic tensions. He was replaced by Ne Win, a Bamar nationalist who would go on to become the dictator of Myanmar.[104]

The government of Myanmar has been accused of using "scorched earth" tactics against Karen civilians in the past, including (but not limited to) burning down entire villages, planting land mines, using civilians as slave labour, using civilians as minesweepers and the rape and murder of Karen women.[105] According to a report by legal firm DLA Piper, whose report was presented to the United Nations Security Council, these tactics against the Karen can be identified as ethnic cleansing. The government had however, denied these claims.[106]

The initial aim of the largest Karen opposition group, the Karen National Union (KNU), and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), was to obtain independence for the Karen people. However, since 1976 they have instead called for a federal union with fair Karen representation and the self-determination of the Karen people.[65] Nearly all of their demands and requests have been ignored or denied by successive governments, a contributing factor to several failed peace talks.

In 1995, the main headquarters and operating bases of the KNU had mostly been destroyed or captured by the government, forcing the KNLA (the armed wing of the KNU) to instead operate in the jungles of Kayin State. Up until that year, the Thai government had been supporting insurgents across its border, but soon stopped its support due to a new major economic deal with Myanmar.[20]

The KNU signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government of Myanmar on 15 October 2015, along with seven other insurgent groups.[60] However, in March 2018, the government of Myanmar violated the agreement by sending 400 Tatmadaw soldiers into KNU-held territory to build a road connecting two military bases.[107] Armed clashes erupted between the KNU and the Myanmar Army in the Ler Mu Plaw area of Hpapun District, resulting in the displacement of 2,000 people.[108] On 17 May 2018, the Tatmadaw agreed to "temporarily postpone" their road project and to withdraw troops from the area.[109]

Rakhine State
Further information: Northern Rakhine State clashes, Rohingya conflict, and Rohingya genocide
A Rohingya mujahid surrenders his weapon to Brigadier-General Aung Gyi, 4 July 1961.

Insurgent groups of the Rakhine (formerly Arakanese),[110] Chin,[111] and Rohingya[112] ethnic minorities have fought against the government for self-determination in Rakhine State since the early 1950s.

Ethnic Rakhine insurgent groups, such as the Arakan Army and Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), continue to have hostilities towards the government, though major violence has been rare since political reforms and peace talks. The Arakan Army, founded in 2009, is currently the largest insurgent group in Rakhine State, with around 7,000 fighters.[35]

Rohingya insurgents have been fighting local government forces and other insurgent groups in northern Rakhine State since 1948, with ongoing religious violence between the predominantly Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhines fueling the conflict. The legal and political rights of the Rohingya people have been an underlying issue in the conflict, with spontaneous bouts of violence such as the 2012 Rakhine State riots and 2013 Myanmar anti-Muslim riots periodically occurring as a result. Despite making up a majority of the population in the three northern townships of Rakhine State,[112] Rohingyas are often targets of religiously motivated attacks. Because the government does not recognise the Rohingya people as an official ethnic group in Myanmar, Rohingyas cannot apply for citizenship and few laws exist to protect their rights.[113]

On 9 October 2016, unidentified insurgents attacked three Burmese border posts along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh, starting a new armed conflict in northern Rakhine State. According to government officials in the border town of Maungdaw, the attackers looted several dozen firearms and ammunition from the border posts, and brandished knives and homemade slingshots that fired metal bolts. The attacks left nine border officers and "several insurgents" dead.[90] On 11 October 2016, four Tatmadaw soldiers were killed on the third day of fighting.[91] A newly emerged insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), claimed responsibility a week later.[114]

Members of the Myanmar Police Force patrolling in Maungdaw in September 2017.

During the early hours of 25 August 2017, ARSA insurgents launched coordinated attacks on 24 police posts and the 552nd Light Infantry Battalion army base, killing a dozen people.[92][93][94] In response, the Tatmadaw launched "clearance operations" in northern Rakhine State, which critics argued targeted Rohingya civilians rather than insurgents.[115][116][117] Following the violence, 200,000 civilians remained trapped in the region without adequate access to markets, livelihoods, services and medical care.[118][119]

On 4 January 2019, around 300 Arakan Army insurgents launched pre-dawn attacks on four border police outposts—Kyaung Taung, Nga Myin Taw, Ka Htee La and Kone Myint—in northern Buthidaung Township.[120] Thirteen members of the Border Guard Police (BGP) were killed and nine others were injured,[121][122][123] whilst 40 firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition were looted. The Arakan Army later stated that it had captured nine BGP personnel and five civilians, and that three of its fighters were also killed in the attacks.[124][125]

Following the attacks, the Office of the President of Myanmar held a high-level meeting on national security in the capital Naypyidaw on 7 January 2019, and instructed the Defense Ministry to increase troop deployments in the areas that were attacked and to use aircraft if necessary.[126] Subsequent clashes between the Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army were reported in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Rathedaung and Ponnagyun Townships, forcing out over 5,000 civilians from their homes,[127][128] hundreds of whom (mostly Rakhine and Khami) have fled across the border into Bangladesh.[129] Civilian casualties,[130][131] arbitrary beatings[132] and detentions of ethnic Rakhines,[133] forced seizures of property,[134] and blockage of food aid and medical relief by the Tatmadaw have also been reported.[135]

Shan State
UWSA troops standing at attention during a military ceremony.

The Shan people are the largest ethnic group in Shan State and the second largest in Myanmar. In 1947, the Panglong Agreement was negotiated between Aung San, a prominent founding father of Myanmar, and Shan leaders, which would have given the Shan the option to split from Myanmar a decade after independence if they were unsatisfied with the central government.[56] This was, however, not honoured by the post-independence government following Aung San's assassination.[47] During the Tatmadaw's heavy militarisation of the state in the late 1940s and early 1950s, locals accused them of mistreating, torturing, robbing, raping, unlawfully arresting and massacring villagers. As a result, on 21 May 1958, an armed resistance movement, led by Sao Noi and Saw Yanna, was started in Shan State.

One the largest Shan insurgent groups in Myanmar is the Shan State Army - South (SSA-S), which has around 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers, and was led by Yawd Serk until his resignation on 2 February 2014. The SSA-S maintains bases along the Myanmar–Thailand border, and signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on 2 December 2011.[136]

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) is a Kokang insurgent group active in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State. The group signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989, the same year it was founded, which lasted for two decades until 2009, when violence erupted between the group and government forces.[137] Violence again erupted between the MNDAA and government forces in 2015[138] and 2017.[139][140]

In late November 2016, the Northern Alliance—which consists of four insurgent groups, the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—attacked towns and border posts along the China–Myanmar border in Muse Township, northern Shan State.[141][142] The insurgents captured the town of Mong Ko on 25 November 2016[143] and maintained control of it until they withdrew from the town on 4 December 2016 to avoid civilian casualties from airstrikes by the Myanmar Air Force.[144][145]

On 15 August 2019, Northern Alliance insurgents attacked a military college in Nawnghkio Township, killing 15.[146][147][148][149] Further clashes occurred in the following days,[150][151][152][153] with Myanmar's military warning there could be a full-scale war if the Northern Alliance did not halt their attacks.[154]

Political unrest

Prior to independence, Aung San, considered a founding father of Myanmar, had convinced local Shan leaders to join him in his pursuit for independence, and with them, negotiated the Panglong Agreement in 1947. The agreement guaranteed the right to self-determination, political representation in the post-independence government and economic equality amongst the various ethnic groups. It also gave the Chin, Kachin and Shan people the option to separate from Myanmar after a decade if their states' leaders were unhappy with the central government. However, after Aung San's assassination, this was not honoured by the government, and has been one of the causes of insurgencies in those states.[47]

Whilst some groups continue to fight for full independence and for the right for self-determination of their people, groups such as the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Karen National Union (KNU) have since fought instead for regional autonomy and a federal system of government in Myanmar.[155]

During the 8888 Uprising, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a national symbol for democracy, after leading the country's largest opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military junta arranged a general election in 1990 and the NLD won a majority of the vote. However, the military junta refused to recognise the results and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 15 years.

In 2007, hundreds of thousands of monks protested against the military junta's rule, and called for free elections, minority rights and the release of political prisoners in an event now known as the Saffron Revolution.[156] The protest originally began in response to the government's removal of price subsidies for compressed natural gas.[157]

The government introduced a new constitution in 2011 and instigated a period of political reforms, with thousands of political prisoners being released, including Aung San Suu Kyi. In November 2014, the NLD attempted to make amendments to the constitution, in response to a clause that made Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible to become President of Myanmar if her party won an election. These amendments however, were rejected.[158]

Since the end of political reforms in 2015, the government has hosted a number of peace conferences in hopes of ending the conflict. However, these efforts have been criticised for not addressing the main proposals made by ceasefire groups, and for failing to reduce tensions between the government and the country's largest insurgent groups.[159][160] Critics of the government have argued that the current constitution of Myanmar grants the military too much power, and is preventing the country from achieving peace and democratic reforms.[161][162] A number of politicians and activists have been killed for voicing their opposition to the military's role in the government, such as constitutional lawyer Ko Ni, who was assassinated after he called for political reforms to reduce the military's influence.[163]

Human rights violations
Main article: Human rights in Myanmar

The government of Myanmar has been accused of using "scorched earth" tactics against civilians, most notably in Kayin State. The accusations included burning down entire villages, planting landmines, using civilians as slave labour, using civilians as minesweepers and the rape and murder of Karen women.[105] According to a report by legal firm DLA Piper, whose report was presented to the United Nations Security Council, these tactics against the Karen have been identified as ethnic cleansing.[106]

Both sides have been accused of using landmines, which have caused hundreds of accidental civilian injuries and deaths. The Karen National Union (KNU) has been accused of planting landmines in rural areas, most of which have not been disarmed. The KNU claims that its use of landmines is vital for repelling government forces, because it "discourages them from attacking civilians". However, the majority of those who fall victim to landmines which are planted by the KNU are local villagers, not government soldiers.[164] Victims of landmines must travel to the Myanmar–Thailand border to seek treatment, as local hospitals and facilities lack proper equipment and funding.[165]

Both sides have also been accused of using thousands of child soldiers, despite the fact that the government of Myanmar and seven insurgent groups signed an agreement with UNICEF in 2012, promising not to exploit children for military and political gains. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has accused both sides of continuing to use child soldiers in violation of the agreement. According to the ILO, the Tatmadaw has discharged hundreds of child soldiers since 2012; however, the ILO also estimated that at least 340 child soldiers had been recruited by the Tatmadaw between 2013 and 2014.[166] Meanwhile, insurgent groups such as the MNDAA, SSA-S, and TNLA have reportedly press-ganged minors into their armies.[167]

One of the most notable cases in which child soldiers were used in Myanmar was that of twins Johnny and Luther Htoo, the leaders of God's Army, a former rebel faction. When God's Army was formed in 1997, the pair were just ten-years-old.[168]

Refugee and internal displacement crisis
Mae La Camp in Tak, Thailand, one of the largest of nine UNHCR camps in Thailand where over 700,000 refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons have fled.[169]
Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh, home to nearly 550,000 Rohingya refugees who live in makeshift shelters.

The conflict has resulted in a large number of both civilian deaths and refugees, with many refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Thailand, China, India, and Bangladesh. The persecution of Burmese Indians and other ethnic minorities after the 1962 coup led to the expulsion of nearly 300,000 people.[170] The UN estimated that between 1996 and 2006, around 1 million people were internally displaced inside Myanmar, over 230,000 of whom remain displaced in the southeast of the country, and 128,000 refugees lived in temporary shelters on the Myanmar–Thailand border.[171][172] In August 2007, approximately 160,000 refugees fled to nine refugee camps along the Myanmar–Thailand border and the Thai border provinces of Chiang Mai and Ratchaburi. Approximately 62% of the refugee population consisted of displaced Karen people. Humanitarian organisations such as Doctors Without Borders have since sent workers and medical support to the refugees.[173]

Over the course of the conflict, government officials in Myanmar have been accused of forcefully removing civilians living in conflict areas and confiscating their property, in order to repurpose them for commercial, industrial, and military projects.[171][174][175]

In Rakhine State, there were around 75,000 internally displaced Rohingyas in 2012, according to Refugee International.[176] UNICEF has reported that living conditions in Rohingya refugee camps in Rakhine State are "wholly inadequate" and lacks access to basic services.[177] In October 2017, there were an estimated 947,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.[178] The Rohingya people have been described by the United Nations as "among the world's least wanted" and "one of the world's most persecuted minorities."[179]

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports a total of 401,000 people internally displaced in Myanmar as of 2018, owing both to man-made and natural disasters as well as conflict and violence.[102] This figure includes IDPs across the country, with 131,000 in Rakhine State, 97,000 in Kachin State, 50,000 in Kayin State, 40,000 in Tanintharyi Region, 27,000 in Karenni State, 22,000 in Bago Region, 18,000 in Mon State, 15,000 in Shan State and 1,300 in Chin State.[180] Of these total displacements, IDMC estimates that approximately 42,000 people were newly displaced in 2018 by conflict and violence.[102] Compared to 2017, the rate of new displacements was lower in Rakhine State but higher in Kachin State and northern Shan State, which together saw approximately 36,000 people displaced.[102]

The Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM) estimated in 2019 that at least 941,000 people in Myanmar were in need of humanitarian assistance, with over 128,000 people living in IDP camps in Rakhine State and over 105,000 people displaced in Kachin State and northern Shan State.[181] While many displacements last only for the duration of active fighting, protracted displacement is evidenced by camps in Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State.[102] Living situations in these camps are often overcrowded with inadequate shelter, sanitation, healthcare, food, and education.[182] In total, approximately 35 percent of IDPs in Myanmar are estimated to live in non-government controlled areas that have limited if not wholly restricted access as of November 2019, complicating relief efforts both for international and local organizations.[181]

Ceasefire attempts
Main article: Ceasefires in Myanmar

Under the new constitutional reforms in 2011, state level and union level ceasefire agreements were made with several insurgent groups. 14 out of 17 of the largest rebel factions signed a ceasefire agreement with the new reformed government. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitoring group, clashes between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), its allies, and the government, have displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and created another severe humanitarian crisis in Kachin and northern Shan State.[183] All of the 14 signatories wanted negotiations in accordance with the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which granted self-determination, a federal system of government (meaning regional autonomy), religious freedom and ethnic minority rights. However, the new constitution, only had a few clauses dedicated to minority rights, and therefore, the government discussed with rebel factions using the new constitution for reference, rather than the Panglong Agreement. There was no inclusive plan or body that represented all the factions, and as a result, in resent, the KNU backed out of the conference and complained the lack of independence for each party within the ethnic bloc.[184] However, most of the negotiations between the State Peace Deal Commission and rebel factions were formal and peaceful.[185]

On 31 March 2015, a draft of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was finalised between representatives from 15 different insurgent groups (all part of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team or NCCT) and the government of Myanmar.[186] However, only eight of the 15 insurgent groups signed the final agreement on 15 October 2015.[60] The signing was witnessed by observers and delegates from the United Nations, the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan and the United States.[76][77]

The Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong was held from 31 August to 4 September 2016 with several different organisations as representatives, in an attempt to mediate between the government and different insurgent groups. Talks ended without any agreement being reached.[187] The name of the conference was a reference to the original Panglong Conference held during British rule in 1947, which was negotiated between Aung San and ethnic leaders.[188]

International responses
Further information: International reactions to the Rohingya genocide

Since 1991, the UN General Assembly has adopted twenty-five different resolutions regarding Myanmar's government, condemning previous military juntas for their systematic violations of human rights and lack of political freedom.[189] In 2009 they urged the then ruling junta to take urgent measures to end violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws in the country.[190] The request was mostly honoured during political reforms that begun in 2011 and ended in 2015.

Reports of human rights abuses committed by the military and local paramilitaries prompted the UN Human Rights Council to launch an independent international fact-finding mission in March 2017, with which Myanmar's government failed to cooperate.[191] The mission's report (A/HRC/39/64) released in September 2018 highlighted "clear patterns" of serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State since 2011. The Tatmadaw are accused of deliberate and systematic targeting of civilians, sexual violence, discriminatory rhetoric against minorities, and impunity for its soldiers.[182]

Eyewitness testimony alleged that in Rakhine State, "clearance operations" by the Tatmadaw amounted to planned and deliberate mass killings in at least 54 locations.[182] Hundreds and perhaps thousands of Rohingya women and girls were reported to have been raped, including in mass gang rapes, and at least 392 Rohingya villages were burned to the ground.[182] The report also highlighted the conviction of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, two Reuters reporters who had exposed the military's extrajudicial killing of ten Rohingya men and were subsequently imprisoned; the journalists have since been released and awarded a 2019 Pulitzer Prize for their reporting.[192]

In addition to violence against Rohingya communities, the report noted Tatamadaw abuses against ethnic Rakhine, including forced labour, sexual violence, forced evictions, and killings. It also highlighted crimes committed by insurgent groups in Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State, including arson, extortion, destruction of property, forced labour, rape, murder, and forced disappearances.[193] The mission called for an investigation into and the prosecution of military leaders, in particular commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

The Gambia filed a lawsuit against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice on 11 November 2019. Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi defended her country's military generals against accusations of genocide in public hearings in December 2019.[194]

Foreign support

China

The People's Republic of China has long been accused of having a multifaceted role in the conflict, given its close relations with both the Myanmar government and insurgent groups active along the China–Myanmar border.[195]

China openly supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and its pursuit of Mao Zedong Thought during the 1960s and 1970s.[23][66][19][196] After the CPB's armed wing agreed to disarm in 1988, China was accused by Myanmar of continuing to support insurgent groups operating along its border, such as the United Wa State Army[197] and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the latter enjoying closer ties to China due to a common Han Chinese ethnic background.[198]

In 2016, China pledged to support Myanmar's peace process by encouraging China-friendly insurgent groups to attend peace talks with the Burmese government and by sending more soldiers to secure its border with Myanmar.[4][5][6] China also offered $3 million USD to fund the negotiations. However, the Burmese government has expressed suspicion over China's involvement in the peace process, due to China's alleged links to the Northern Alliance and the United Wa State Army.[18]

In a July 2020 interview, Myanmar's commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing claimed that "strong forces" were backing insurgent groups in the country, and asked for assistance from the international community to end the insurgency. The "strong forces" comment has been interpreted by critics of China as a reference to the Chinese government.[199]

India

India and Myanmar share a strategic military relationship due to the overlapping insurgency in northeast India. India has provided Myanmar's military with training, weapons, and tactical equipment.[200] The two countries' armies have conducted joint operations against insurgents at their border since the 1990s.[201] Myanmar has also taken an active role in finding and arresting insurgents that fled from northeast India; in May 2020 Myanmar handed over 22 insurgents, included several top commanders, to Indian authorities.[202] Similarly, India has been the only country to forcefully repatriate Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar despite global outcry.[203]

Pakistan

From 1948 to 1950, Pakistan sent aid to mujahideen in northern Arakan (present-day Rakhine State). In 1950, the Pakistani government warned their Burmese counterparts about their treatment of Muslims. In response, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu immediately sent a Muslim diplomat, Pe Khin, to negotiate a memorandum of understanding. Pakistan agreed to cease aid to the mujahideen and arrest members of the group. In 1954, mujahid leader Mir Kassem was arrested by Pakistani authorities, and many of his followers later surrendered to the Burmese government.[22]

The International Crisis Group reported on 14 December 2016 that in interviews with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), its leaders claimed to have links to private donors in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The ICG also released unconfirmed reports that Rohingya villagers had been "secretly trained" by Afghan and Pakistani fighters.[204][205] In September 2017, Bangladeshi sources stated that the possibility of cooperation between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and ARSA was "extremely high".[206]

Thailand

Thailand had been a vocal supporter of various insurgent groups in Myanmar, condemning actions done by the then ruling military juntas and allowing weapons and ammunition to be smuggled through its border through lax enforcement.[21] However, in 1995, the Thai government secured its border with Myanmar and stopped all logistical support going through Thailand after they signed a major economic deal with Myanmar.[20]

United States

Starting in 1951, the CIA began aiding Kuomintang soldiers that fled to Myanmar from China following the advance of Chinese communist forces into Yunnan Province. This included Operation Paper, which involved supplying them with non-lethal aid via Thailand until 1953, when they airlifted 7,000 soldiers to Taiwan and ended the operation.[19]

Vietnam

Vietnam has supported modernisation efforts by Myanmar's military, providing them with ammunition and military hardware.[207] Burmese military officials have likewise toured Vietnam to receive military advice from their counterparts in the People's Army of Vietnam.[208]

Foreign fighters

Dave Everett was a member of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment before leaving in 1986 and joining the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) as a mercenary. Everett fought alongside the KNLA under the alias "Steve" and trained insurgents, helping them improve their marksmanship and teaching them how to use claymore anti-personnel mines. In order to fund his time with the KNLA, Everett perpetrated several robberies in Australia with the help of accomplices and took piloting lessons so he could smuggle weapons into Myanmar. Everett returned to Australia a year later in 1987.[209]

Former members of the British green berets, French Foreign Legion, and Russian Spetsnaz have also been reported fighting alongside insurgents as recently as 2012.[29]

See also

Notes
  1. Alleged support to the Northern Alliance from 1989 onwards.[18]
  2. Support to the mujahideen only.[22]
  3. Support to the Kuomintang and the Wa National Army only.[19]
  4. Support to the Kuomintang only.[19]
  5. Support to the Communist Party of Burma from the mid-1960s to 1970s.[23]
  6. Number shown includes personnel not directly involved in the conflict.[31]

References
  1. Lintner, Bertil; Wyatt (maps prepared by), David K. (1990). The rise and fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. p. 14. ISBN 0877271232. Retrieved 15 December 2016.
  2. Kramer, Tom (July 2009). "Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of Cease-fire Agreements in Burma" (PDF). Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. Lwin, Sandar (17 February 2014). "New self-administered areas struggle to assert authority". The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 11 January 2020.
  4. "China's Xi Jinping Pledges Support for Myanmar's Peace Process". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 19 January 2017.
  5. "China offers Myanmar support to end ethnic unrest near border". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 19 January 2017.
  6. Chang, Jennifer; Spencer, Kay; Staats, Jennifer (2 September 2016). "China's Role in Myanmar's Peace Process". United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 19 January 2017.
  7. "Armies of India, Myanmar target NE militants in coordinated operation". The Economic Times. 16 June 2019. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
  8. "India and Myanmar forces coordinate to destroy NE insurgent camps across border". The Indian Express. 16 June 2019. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
  9. "Burma and Russia to Increase Military Cooperation". The Irrawaddy. 21 November 2013. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  10. Kovalev, Alexey (15 September 2017). "Putin's Surprise Myanmar Challenge from Chechnya". EurasiaNet. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  11. "Russia, Myanmar Sign Military Cooperation Agreement". www.defenseworld.net. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  12. "Israel among 7 nations faulted in UN report for arming Myanmar army". Times of Israel. 5 August 2019.
  13. "7 countries still supplying arms to Myanmar military". Anadolu Agency. 5 August 2019.
  14. Vojni leksikon [Military Lexicon] (Beograd: Vojnoizdavacki zavod, 1981), p. 71.
  15. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, p. 154.
  16. NARA, RG 59, 690B.9321/12-2253, Memorandum of Conversation between General Ne Win and the Army and Air Attachés of the U.S. Embassy in Burma, 22 December 1953.
  17. Čavoški, Jovan. Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia's Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia (1950–1955). Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010. Print.
  18. Vrieze, Paul. "Into Myanmar's Stalled Peace Process Steps China". VOA. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  19. Richard Michael Gibson (2011). The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-shek and the Drug Warlords of the Golden Triangle. John Wiley and Sons. pp. 85–90. ISBN 978-0-470-83018-5.
  20. Lintner, Bertil. "Recent Developments on Thai-Myanmar Border. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin". p. 72.
  21. Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II (2003). "The Shan Rebellion: The Road to Chaos", from The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (2003 ed.). Lawrence Hill Books. ISBN 1-55652-483-8. Archived from the original on 23 September 2011. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
  22. U Nu, U Nu: Saturday's Son, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press) 1975, p. 272.
  23. Meehan, Patrick (2011). "Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drugs trade is central to Burma's changing political order". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 42 (3): 385. ISSN 0022-4634. Retrieved 24 December 2020. From the mid-1960s until Mao's death, China's extensive support for the CPB heralded a more extensive militarisation of the state's opponents.
  24. Kumbun, Joe (2 January 2018). "Analysis: KIO Kicks Off New Year with New Leadership". The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 14 March 2018.
  25. CNN, Katie Hunt. "Myanmar Air Force helicopters fire on armed villagers in Rakhine state". CNN. Retrieved 15 November 2016.
  26. Zaw, Htet Naing (24 June 2019). "AA Naval Attack Kills 2 Tatmadaw Fighters". The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 20 July 2019.
  27. "Border Guard Force Scheme". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. Retrieved 8 May 2016.
  28. "Armed ethnic groups". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 11 January 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  29. Swain, Rob (29 December 2012). "We Don't Always Get the War We Want". VICE. Retrieved 30 June 2018.
  30. Bleming, Thomas James (2007). War in Karen Country: Armed Struggle for a Free and Independent Karen State in Southeast Asia. New York; Bloomington, Ind.: iUniverse. ISBN 978-0-595-69327-6. OCLC 609978846.
  31. International Institute for Strategic Studies; Hackett, James (ed.) (2010). The Military Balance 2010. London: Routledge, pp. 420–421. ISBN 1-85743-557-5.
  32. Heppner & Becker, 2002: 18–19
  33. Johnson, Tim (29 August 2009). China Urges Burma to Bridle Ethnic Militia Uprising at Border. The Washington Post.
  34. Davis, Anthony. "Wa army fielding new Chinese artillery, ATGMs". IHS Jane's Defence Weekly. Archived from the original on 23 July 2015. Retrieved 23 July 2015.
  35. "Myanmar's Arakan Army is Recruiting and Training to Fight Government". Voice of America. 16 October 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2020.
  36. "Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)". mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Archived from the original on 12 March 2018. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  37. "47 Govt Troops Killed, Tens of Thousands Flee Heavy Fighting in Shan State". irrawaddy.org. 13 February 2015.
  38. "PSLF/TNLA". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Archived from the original on 10 March 2018. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  39. Larsen, Niels (23 April 2015). "On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction – VICE News". VICE News (Crime and Drugs).
  40. I. Rotberg, Robert (1998). Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815791690.
  41. Burma center for Ethnic Studies, Jan. 2012, "Briefing Paper No. 1" http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/BCES-BP-01-ceasefires(en).pdf
  42. "New Mon State Party (NMSP)". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  43. "All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)". mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Archived from the original on 10 March 2018. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  44. "NDAA". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  45. Pavković, 2011: 476
  46. Lintner, Bertil (1999). Burma in revolt: opium and insurgency since 1948 (2nd ed.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. ISBN 978-974-7100-78-5.
  47. U Thant Myint (2006). The River of Lost Footsteps – Histories of Burma. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 274–289. ISBN 978-0-374-16342-6.
  48. "Modern Conflicts – Death Tolls PDF" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 July 2011.
  49. "De re militari: muertos en Guerras, Dictaduras y Genocidios". Retrieved 6 October 2014.
  50. Janie Hampton (2012). Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-54705-8.
  51. Miliband, David (12 December 2016). "How to Bring Peace to the World's Longest Civil War". TIME. Retrieved 11 March 2019.
  52. Slow, Oliver (26 April 2018). "Fighting in Kachin Highlights Myanmar Civil War Worries". VOA. Retrieved 11 March 2019.
  53. Kaicome, Jittrapon (8 February 2019). "Marking 70 Years of War in Myanmar". The Diplomat. Retrieved 11 March 2019.
  54. Hensengerth, Oliver (2005). The Burmese Communist Party and the State-to-State Relations between China and Burma (PDF). Leeds East Asia Papers. pp. 10–12, 15–16, 17.
  55. Allen, Louis (1986). Burma: the Longest War 1941–45. Great Britain: J.M. Dent and Sons. ISBN 0-460-02474-4.
  56. Maung, Zarni (19 July 2013). "Remembering the martyrs and their hopes for Burma". DVB NEWS. Retrieved 27 December 2013.
  57. Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and State Building in Burma. United States of America: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 118 – 123
  58. Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and State Building in Burma. United States of America: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 34 – 36
  59. Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993. The American Political Science Review, 89(3), 681.
  60. "Myanmar Signs Historic Cease-Fire Deal With Eight Ethnic Armies". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  61. "2 groups join Myanmar government's peace process". AP News. 13 February 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  62. "New Mon State Party and Lahu Democratic Union sign NCA". Office of the President of Myanmar. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  63. "Analysis: A Win for Peace Commission as Mon, Lahu Groups Sign NCA". The Irrawaddy. 13 February 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  64. "NCA signing ceremony for NMSP, LDU to take place on 13 Feb". Mizzima. 6 February 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  65. "About". Karen National Union. Archived from the original on 21 January 2016. Retrieved 21 August 2016.
  66. Fan, Hongwei (1 June 2012). "The 1967 Anti-Chinese Riots in Burma and Sino-Burmese Relations". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 43 (2): 234–256. doi:10.1017/S0022463412000045.
  67. Maureen Aung-Thwin (1989). "Burmese Days". Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Retrieved 27 March 2013.
  68. "The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)". Retrieved 16 May 2018.
  69. Ottawa Citizen. 24 September 1988. pg. A.16
  70. Associated Press. Chicago Tribune. 26 September 1988
  71. Ferrara (2003), pp. 313
  72. Philippa Fogarty (6 August 2008). "Was Burma's 1988 uprising worth it?". BBC News. Retrieved 27 March 2013.
  73. Wintle (2007)
  74. "The saffron revolution". The Economist. Archived from the original on 8 April 2011. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  75. COLIN., FLINT, PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY (2016). RECONSTRUCTING CONFLICT : integrating war and post war geographies. [S.l.]: ROUTLEDGE. p. 99. ISBN 978-1138277076. OCLC 982562747.
  76. "Asia Unbound » Myanmar's Cease-Fire Deal Comes up Short". Archived from the original on 9 October 2015. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  77. Ray Pagnucco and Jennifer Peters (15 October 2015). "Myanmar's National Ceasefire Agreement isn't all that national". Vice News. Retrieved 18 October 2015.
  78. Htwe, Ko (8 April 2011). "Conflict in Shan State Spreading". The Irrawaddy. Archived from the original on 15 June 2011. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
  79. "Burma Army occupies SSA core base". Shanland.org. 16 March 2011. Archived from the original on 30 September 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
  80. "SSA 'North' given ultimatum to surrender". Shanland.org. 17 March 2011. Archived from the original on 30 September 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
  81. "Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)". Shanland.org. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
  82. Hseng, Khio Fah (10 January 2011). "Mongla base shelled by Burma Army artillery". Shan Herald Agency. Archived from the original on 17 January 2011. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
  83. Hseng, Khio Fah (26 January 2011). "Mongla base shelled by Burma Army artillery". Shan Herald Agency. Archived from the original on 28 January 2011. Retrieved 16 July 2011.
  84. "All roads to Shan rebel base closed". Shanland.org. 24 February 2011. Archived from the original on 30 September 2011. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
  85. "Jade: Myanmar's "Big State Secret"". Global Witness. Retrieved 16 March 2019.
  86. Christensen, Darin; Nguyen, Mai; Sexton, Renard (12 March 2019). "Strategic Violence During Democratization". World Politics. 71 (2): 332–366. doi:10.1017/S0043887118000308. ISSN 0043-8871. S2CID 159055587.
  87. "Myanmar's Kachin Rebels Say 22 Dead in Fighting". 19 November 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2014.
  88. "Myanmar Kokang Rebels Deny Receiving Chinese Weapons". Radio Free Asia.
  89. NANG MYA NADI (10 February 2015). "Kokang enlist allies' help in fight against Burma army". dvb.no. Archived from the original on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 15 August 2016.
  90. "Myanmar policemen killed in Rakhine border attack". BBC News. 9 October 2016. Retrieved 12 October 2016.
  91. "Rakhine unrest leaves four Myanmar soldiers dead". BBC News. 12 October 2016. Retrieved 13 October 2016.
  92. "Myanmar tensions: Dozens dead in Rakhine militant attack". BBC News. 25 August 2017. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  93. Htusan, Esther (25 August 2017). "Myanmar: 71 die in militant attacks on police, border posts". AP News. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  94. Lone, Wa; Slodkowski, Antoni (24 August 2017). "At least 12 dead in Muslim insurgent attacks in northwest Myanmar". Reuters. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  95. Fuller, T. (4 April 2013). "Ethnic Rifts Strain Myanmar as It Moves Toward Democracy". The New York Times.
  96. KIA claims 211 Tatmadaw soldiers have died in two months of fighting in Hpakant, 10 October 2012, http://www.kachinnews.com/news/2418-kia-says-211-army-soldiers-die-in-two-month-fighting-in-hpakant.html Archived 31 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine
  97. 31 dead in new clashes with Kachin: Myanmar News, 5 May 2012, http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\story_5-5-2012_pg14_7 Archived 12 June 2012 at the Wayback Machine
  98. Lanjouw, S., Mortimer, G., & Bamforth, V. (2000). Internal Displacement in Burma. Disasters, 24(3), 228–239.
  99. "Kachin Women's Association Thailand – State terror in the Kachin hills". Kachinwomen.com. Archived from the original on 11 April 2013. Retrieved 19 February 2015.
  100. "Untold Miseries" (PDF). Hrw.org. Retrieved 19 February 2015.
  101. CCCM Cluster (April 2017). "Factsheet: Myanmar April 2017". data2.unhcr.org.
  102. "Myanmar: Figure Analysis - Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence" (PDF). internal displacement monitoring centre.
  103. Karenni Army (KA) (Myanmar), GROUPS – ASIA – ACTIVE, Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 13 March 2012
  104. Smith, Martin (1991). Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (2. impr. ed.). London: Zed Books. ISBN 0862328683.
  105. Phan, Zoya and Damien Lewis. Undaunted: My Struggle for Freedom and Survival in Burma. New York: Free Press, 2010.
  106. Gray Cary, Rudnick (2005). "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma" (PDF). DLA Piper. Retrieved 10 April 2016.
  107. Sandford, Steve (31 May 2018). "Conflict Resumes in Karen State After Myanmar Army Returns". Voice of America. Retrieved 3 June 2018.
  108. Sandford, Steve (31 May 2018). "Karen Return to War in Myanmar". Voice of America. Retrieved 3 June 2018.
  109. Nyein, Nyein (17 May 2018). "Tatmadaw Agrees to Halt Contentious Road Project in Karen State". The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 3 June 2018.
  110. "Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  111. "Chin National Front (CNF)". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  112. "Myanmar, Bangladesh leaders 'to discuss Rohingya'". Agence France-Presse. 29 June 2012.
  113. MclaughLin, Tim (8 July 2013). "Origin of 'most persecuted minority' statement unclear". Retrieved 17 February 2015.
  114. "Islamist fears rise in Rohingya-linked violence". Bangkok Post. Post Publishing PCL. Retrieved 5 November 2016.
  115. "Myanmar accused of laying mines after refugee injuries," 12 September 2017, Chicago Tribune retrieved 12 September 2017. Quote "Accounts from refugees show the military is also targeting civilians with shootings and wholesale burning of Rohingya villages in an apparent attempt to purge Rakhine state of Muslims."
  116. "Hundreds dead in Myanmar as the Rohingya crisis explodes again." 10 September 2017, The Washington Post in Chicago Tribune retrieved 12 September 2017
  117. "Myanmar troops open fire on civilians fleeing attacks". www.aljazeera.com.
  118. "Erasing the Rohingya: Myanmar's moves could mean refugees never return". Reuters. Retrieved 27 June 2019.
  119. "Humanitarian Assistance in Rakhine". People in Need. 2017. Retrieved 27 June 2019.
  120. Lintner, Bertil (3 January 2019). "Arakan Army clashes with government forces in Rakhine state". Asia Times. Retrieved 5 January 2019.
  121. "13 policemen die in Rakhine rebel attacks". The Straits Times. 5 January 2019. Retrieved 5 January 2019.
  122. Aung, Min Thein (4 January 2019). "Rakhine Insurgents Kill 13 Policemen, Injure Nine Others in Myanmar Outpost Attacks". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 5 January 2019.
  123. Aung, Thu Thu; Naing, Shoon (4 January 2019). "Rakhine Buddhist rebels kill 13 in Independence Day attack on..." Reuters. Retrieved 5 January 2019.
  124. Emont, Jon; Myo, Myo (4 January 2019). "Buddhist Violence Portends New Threat to Myanmar". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 5 January 2019.
  125. "AA Frees 14 Police, 4 Women Captured in Attack on Border Posts". The Irrawaddy. 5 January 2019. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
  126. "President Convenes Top-Level Security Meeting in Wake of AA Attacks". The Irrawaddy. 8 January 2019. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
  127. "UN Calls for 'Rapid and Unimpeded' Aid Access to Myanmar's Rakhine". The Irrawaddy. 15 January 2019. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
  128. "Myanmar villagers flee to Bangladesh amid Rakhine violence". www.aljazeera.com. 8 February 2019. Retrieved 8 February 2019.
  129. "203 Buddhists from Rakhine entered Bangladesh in last 5 days". Dhaka Tribune. 6 February 2019. Retrieved 8 February 2019.
  130. "Three Villagers Shot Dead in Fighting Between Gov't, AA Troops in Rakhine". The Irrawaddy. 15 January 2019. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
  131. "ေမာင္ေတာ ရန္ေအာင္ျမင္ရြာထဲကို လက္နက္ႀကီးက်လို႔ လူ၂ ဦး ဒဏ္ရာရ". Radio Free Asia (in Burmese). 16 January 2019. Retrieved 18 January 2019.
  132. "သမီးလွရြာခံ ၃ဦး ရိုက္ႏွက္ခံရတယ္လို႔ ေျပာ". Radio Free Asia (in Burmese). 28 January 2019. Retrieved 28 January 2019.
  133. "သရက္ျပင္ေက်းရြာအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးမွဴးအပါအ၀င္ ၁၅ ဦးကို တပ္မေတာ္ ဖမ္းဆီး". Radio Free Asia (in Burmese). Retrieved 17 January 2019.
  134. "လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္တာေတြ ရိွတယ္ဆုိတဲ့ စြပ္စဲြခ်က္ကို တပ္မေတာ္ျငင္းဆုိ". Radio Free Asia (in Burmese). 27 January 2019. Retrieved 28 January 2019.
  135. "Concern Mounts for IDPs in Northern Rakhine as Army Blocks Aid Shipments". The Irrawaddy. 9 January 2019. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
  136. "Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA-S)". www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Myanmar Peace Monitor. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  137. Johnston, Tim (29 August 2009). "China Urges Burma to Bridle Ethnic Militia Uprising at Border". The Washington Post.
  138. "Myanmar Kokang Rebels Deny Receiving Chinese Weapons". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 27 December 2018.
  139. "Deadly clashes hit Kokang in Myanmar's Shan state". wcww.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 9 March 2017.
  140. "Myanmar rebel clashes in Kokang leave 30 dead". BBC News. 6 March 2017. Retrieved 9 March 2017.
  141. Nadi, Nang Mya (22 November 2016). "8 killed as ethnic rebels hit Muse- DVB Multimedia Group". DVB Multimedia Group. Archived from the original on 4 May 2018. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  142. Aung, Thu Thu (21 November 2016). "Ethnic armed groups launch attack near Muse". The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  143. Weng, Lawi (28 November 2016). "Ethnic Armed Groups Claim Control of Border Town". The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  144. Aung, Thu Thu (24 November 2016). "Air strikes reported as Shan State conflict spreads". The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  145. Noreen, Naw (5 December 2016). "Burmese army recaptures Mongko- DVB Multimedia Group". DVB Multimedia Group. Archived from the original on 3 May 2018. Retrieved 3 May 2018.
  146. Aung, Thu Thu (15 August 2019). "Myanmar insurgents attack elite military college, other targets; 15..." Reuters. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  147. "Myanmar rebels kill over a dozen in attack in Shan state". Al Jazeera. 15 August 2019. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  148. Zaw, Moe; Oo, Aung Lwin (15 August 2019). "More than a Dozen People Killed in Myanmar Rebel Attacks". Voice of America. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  149. Win, Pyae Sone (15 August 2019). "Myanmar ethnic rebel alliance makes coordinated attacks". Washington Post. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  150. "Ambulance driver killed in Myanmar as army battles rebels". Al Jazeera. 17 August 2019. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  151. Shi, Yinglun (19 August 2019). "Armed attacks escalate in Myanmar northern Shan state". Xinhua. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  152. "Rebel Fighters Attack 2 Towns in Myanmar's Shan State". The Irrawaddy. 19 August 2019. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  153. "Foreigners, Migrant Workers Evacuated From Conflict Zone in Myanmar's Shan State". Radio Free Asia. 22 August 2019. Retrieved 26 August 2019.
  154. "Myanmar army warns of full-scale war in Shan State". BNI. Retrieved 24 August 2019.
  155. "Karen National Union Website – English". Archived from the original on 28 January 2016. Retrieved 28 January 2016.
  156. "Human Rights Concern". Archived from the original on 24 June 2009. Retrieved 7 April 2009.
  157. "Burma leaders double fuel prices". BBC News. Retrieved 16 May 2015.
  158. Landler, M. (14 November 2014). Obama and Aung San Suu Kyi Meet Again, With Battle Scars. Retrieved 24 November 2014, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/world/asia/obama-aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar.html?_r=0
  159. Kane, Seth (18 August 2020). "Myanmar's Upcoming 4th Union Peace Conference: Time for a Rethink". The Diplomat. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  160. "Peace process convention — 21st Century Panglong (Fourth Meeting), to move forward". Mon News Network via Burma News International. 15 January 2020. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  161. "Myanmar's army blocks constitutional reforms". The Economist. 12 March 2020. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  162. Tarabay, Jamie (6 December 2017). "Myanmar's military: The power Aung San Suu Kyi can't control". CNN. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  163. Lasseter, Tom (13 December 2018). "In a Muslim lawyer's murder, Myanmar's shattered dream". Reuters. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  164. The world's longest ongoing war. 13 August 2011 – via YouTube.
  165. Arthur Nazaryan, The Diplomat. "The Landmine Victims of Myanmar's Civil War". The Diplomat. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  166. "Burmese army releases 91 child soldiers: UNICEF". Archived from the original on 12 September 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2014.
  167. Thar, Chan (15 February 2019). "Armed ethnic groups press-gang villagers". The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 19 February 2019.
  168. Richard S. Ehrlick (27 July 2006). "Bizarre 'God's Army' Led By Young Boys Surrenders". Global Politician. Archived from the original on 18 August 2013.
  169. "2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Thailand". Retrieved 15 May 2013.
  170. Smith, Martin (1991). Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (2. impr. ed.). London and New Jersey: Zed Books. pp. 43–44. ISBN 0862328683.
  171. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 12 February 2007
  172. "Fort Wayne refugees from Myanmar worried about policy changes". 2 February 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2014.
  173. Cohen, Joanna; Fuller, Holly; Scott, Kelly. "Governance in refugee camps on the Thai/Burma border" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 June 2016. Retrieved 23 April 2016.
  174. Ethnic Nationalities of Burma. (n.d.). Retrieved 23 November 2014, from http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/ethnic-groups.html
  175. 2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Myanmar. (1 January 2014). Retrieved 8 November 2014.
  176. "About 75,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar camps: Refugee International". The Hindu (Chennai, India). 29 September 2012. Retrieved 27 March 2013.
  177. Democratic Voice of Burma: Level of suffering in Arakan 'never seen before': UN. (18 June 2014). Retrieved 10 November 2014.
  178. "Is refugee crisis 'textbook ethnic cleansing'?". BBC News. 2018. Retrieved 20 March 2018.
  179. A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in South East Asia, editor=Tan, Andrew T. H., chapter=Chapter 16, State Terrorism in Arakan, author=Islam, Syed Serajul Islam. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2007. p. 342. ISBN 978-1-84542-543-2.
  180. internal displacement monitoring centre. "Myanmar". internal displacement monitoring centre.
  181. "Myanmar". cccmcluster.org. CCCM Cluster. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  182. Human Rights Council (28 September 2018). "Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar" (PDF). United Nations General Assembly. A/HRC/39/64.
  183. "Conflicts, communal violence and IDPs". Myanmar Peace Monitor. 20 May 2013. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  184. Nai, A. (3 September 2014). Democratic Voice of Burma: UNFC opens 2 top positions for KNU. Retrieved 10 November 2014.
  185. "World Asia". BBC News. 12 January 2012. Retrieved 27 March 2013.
  186. "Myanmar government and rebels agree on ceasefire draft".
  187. Giry, Stéphanie; Moe, Wai (3 September 2016). "Myanmar Peace Talks End With No Breakthrough but Some Hope". The New York Times. Retrieved 7 September 2020.
  188. "Myanmar's Panglong Peace Conference to Include All Armed Ethnic Groups".
  189. "UN General Assembly Resolutions on Burma – ALTSEAN Burma". www.altsean.org. Alternative Asean Network on Burma. Archived from the original on 4 November 2016. Retrieved 4 September 2016.
  190. "UN General Assembly Resolution: Time for Concrete Action" (Press release). International Federation for Human Rights. 20 November 2009. Retrieved 4 January 2010.
  191. "OHCHR | Myanmar FFM Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar". www.ohchr.org. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  192. The Pulitzer Prizes (2019). "Staff of Reuters, with notable contributions from Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo". The Pulitzer Prizes.
  193. "OHCHR | Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission releases its full account of massive violations by military in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States". www.ohchr.org. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  194. "Suu Kyi rejects genocide claims at top UN court". 11 December 2019. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  195. "China's Role in Myanmar's Internal Conflicts". United States Institute of Peace. 14 September 2018. Retrieved 8 May 2020.
  196. Smith, Martin (1991). Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (2. impr. ed.). London and New Jersey: Zed Books. ISBN 0862328683.
  197. "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Myanmar (Burma)". Archived from the original on 2 January 2014. Retrieved 29 November 2014.
  198. "The MNDAA: Myanmar's crowdfunding ethnic insurgent group". Reuters. 21 March 2017. Retrieved 12 May 2020.
  199. Gupta, Shishir (2 July 2020). "Myanmar calls out China for arming terror groups, asks world to help". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 12 September 2020.
  200. Thiha, Amara (25 August 2017). "The Bumpy Relationship Between India and Myanmar". The Diplomat. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  201. Kanwal, Gurmeet (8 June 2015). "Manipur ambush: Why Army [sic?] saw the worst attack in 20 years". DailyO. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  202. "Myanmar Army hands over 22 'Most Wanted Militants' from Northeast India, including top UNLF and NDFB commanders". Northeast Now News. 15 May 2020. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  203. Kinseth, Ashley Starr (28 January 2019). "India's Rohingya shame". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  204. J, Jacob (15 December 2016). "Rohingya militants in Rakhine have Saudi, Pakistan links, think tank says". Archived from the original on 26 August 2017. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
  205. "Rohingya insurgency a 'game-changer' for Myanmar". Bangkok Post. Retrieved 15 December 2016.
  206. Sudhi Ranjan Sen. "As Rohingya deepens, Bangladesh fears Pakistan's ISI will foment trouble". India Today.
  207. "Vietnam, Myanmar expand defense relationship". People's Army Newspaper. 3 October 2017.
  208. Parameswaran, Prashanth (19 June 2018). "Vietnam-Myanmar Military Relations in Focus with Defense Visit". The Diplomat. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  209. Adshead, Gary. "Cancer kills notorious SAS man". The West Australian. Yahoo! News. Archived from the original on 14 July 2014. Retrieved 8 June 2014.

Further reading

News:

Organisations:

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.