Bank of Amsterdam

The Bank of Amsterdam (Dutch: Amsterdamsche Wisselbank, literally "Exchange Bank of Amsterdam") was an early bank, vouched for by the city of Amsterdam, and established in 1609.[1] It was the first public bank to offer accounts not directly convertible to coin. As such, it can be described as the first true central bank.[2] Unlike the Bank of England, established almost a century later, it neither managed the national currency nor acted as a lending institution (except to the government in emergencies); it was intended to defend coinage standard. The role of the exchange bank was to correctly estimate the value of coins and thus make debasement less profitable.

The old town hall in Amsterdam where the bank was founded and located. Painting by Pieter Saenredam

During the last decade of the Republic of the United Provinces, in 1790, the premium on the Bank's money disappeared, and by the end of the year it had declared itself insolvent. The City of Amsterdam assumed control of the bank in 1791. The Nederlandsche Bank was established in 1814 and took over money issue duties for the new Kingdom of the Netherlands, while the Wisselbank entered liquidation in 1820.

The Wisselbank is one of the great institutions of monetary history. "The Bank started out as a "stablecoin": it issued deposits backed by silver and gold coins, and settled payments by transfers across deposits. Over time, it performed functions of a modern central bank and its deposits took on attributes of fiat money. The economic shocks of the 1780s (Fourth Anglo-Dutch War), large-scale lending (to the Dutch East India Company) and lack of fiscal support led to its failure."[3]

Tasks

The Bank of Amsterdam, a deposito- and girobank, established on 31 January 1609, played a pivotal role in the 17th and 18th-century financial center of Amsterdam. 500 different coins - legal or illegal - from a wide variety of countries and regions circulated, but a good system to determine exchange rates did not exist. At the bank, people could exchange their coins for fully fledged and widely accepted trade currencies.[4][5]

The bank was given a fourfold task: 1. to ensure that the money entrusted by the merchants to the bank remains stable in value; 2. to solve their domestic payment problem; 3. to facilitate their international payments through an adequate supply of full-value gold and silver coins and a good book-entry transfer system; 4. to ensure that the bank's foreign exchange reserves are protected from the influx of lighter currencies.[6]

The management of the Bank of Amsterdam was in the hands of three, then four, commissarissen (commissioners), elected by the Town-Council. They were often former schepenen or members of the vroedschap, the city council.[7] Two of the commissioners must be present daily at the office: they had the oversight of four accountants, two clerks with one servant, four counter bookkeepers, three receivers together with another servant, ushers and an assayer (assay-master), who knew the secrets of trade in precious metals and minting. Each of the accountants had his own specific task: the first took the written orders for payment receipt, the second held in the journal, the third balanced the book and the fourth took care of the ledger.[8] In 1715 there were five and a year later six commissioners, the number the bank kept until the end of the eighteenth century.[6] Many of the commissioners were merchants with an account at the bank - which the other account holders trusted. Some of the commissioners had ties with the Dutch East India Company.

In 1620 the number of account holders in the Exchange Bank was estimated to be 1,202.[9] Isaac Le Maire had meanwhile become the most important account holder at the Wisselbank. The city of Amsterdam, which owned the Bank and guaranteed the deposits, derived from it a considerable revenue. Mees has calculated the total revenue of the city from this source between 1609 and 1796 at 12,256,000 guilders.[10] After the Treaty of Bärwalde in 1631, France transferred its financial support to the Swedish army with the help of Jean Hoeufft and the Wisselbank.

The bank did not or hardly supported the Dutch West India Company but sometimes the Stadsbank van Lening, Amsterdam. After the Treaty of Munster between Spain and the Dutch republic a lot of silver from Cadiz and Potosí arrived in Amsterdam. From the beginning the bank had to supply the provincial and the various local mints with silver. Formally it was not allowed to trade with silver in stock, but attractive because of the silver standard. On 17 August 17, 1657 the bank began to advance money on loan to the East India Company. Ingots and silver coins like the rijksdaalder, ducaton, and Spanish dollar were highly in demand in Old Batavia and favoured in South East Asia and exported with profit. At first, the city had to give a special permission for each loan. Later on it was taken more easily, and by decree of 5 October 1682, the East India Company could at any time have at its disposal 1,700,000 of bank guilders. (In 1698, the company had a debt of 3,200,000 bank guilders).[10]

Introduction of a system of receipts in 1683

The depositor received a "récépissé" drawn on the bearer, entitling him to take out again the money deposited, at any time within six months, upon paying one-eighth per cent, and upon redepositing in the Bank that amount of bank money which was credited to him when the deposit was made. This receipt system had been adopted in Amsterdam for a short time in 1638 and 1656; after 1683 it proved permanent. If anyone wished to have a certain kind of coin from the Bank, he had only to buy a receipt.[11] The recepis offered the bank the potential of a new means of competition in the international struggle for precious metal supplies. The recepis enabled account holders to cover themselves ... to systematically hedge against the market's volatility.[12] The Bank of Amsterdam introduced a form of fiat money that successfully competed with the coinage of the time. After 1683, the bank was able to conduct more regular and aggressive policy interventions, from a virtually nonexistent capital base.[13][14] By a decree of 16 April 1684, the Bank commissioners secured the monopoly of the trade in silver and silver coin. The export of uncoined metal was allowed only when accompanied by a certificate given by the Bank commissioners. These and many other orders were found insufficient to suppress private trade in the precious metals, or private changing at Amsterdam. Accordingly, it sanctioned by the decree of 27 June 1749, the private trade in specie, and even ordered that the regulation of the values of the coins had to be fixed by commercial agreement.[10]

"Amsterdam’s combination of steady exchange rates, absence of capital controls, and low interest rates allowed its markets to flourish, and conferred something of a 'reserve currency' status on the bank florin. Bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam were a liquid form of short-term credit readily available in most European commercial cities. The bank florin was a 'reference' unit of account for commercial transactions over much of Europe, and top-quality bills payable through the Bank were a reliable and liquid store of value".[15]

During the eighteenth century the VOC no longer obtained the required gold and silver directly from the Wisselbank, but instead obtained it through the intermediary of private assayers and mint masters. Several members of the Grill family were appointed as assayer, specialized in confusion of coins and better informed than most of the commissioners. The bank's metal stock was increased by large purchases at favorable times or by trumping the competition with higher prices.[16] The Bank of Amsterdam has for these many years past been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the receipts are very seldom allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to the bank, according to Adam Smith. One of main bankers in those days was Andries Pels, dealing with France as well as Great Britain. After the Spanish War of Succession not enough silver and gold went to France, where John Law (economist) introduced paper money and Great Britain moved towards a gold standard (and drew out silver).

Logically, this meant a flow of gold to England and a flow of silver to the Republic, where silver could be purchased relatively inexpensively for transportation to Asia. In Asia, silver fetched a higher price and thus represented there more purchasing power than in the Republic. The relative scarcity of silver in England and the silver glut in the Republic also explain why the English East India Company sought refuge in the Amsterdam market for its silver needs.[17]

From 1713 onwards, the bank reported[lower-alpha 1] on their profits.[lower-alpha 2] After the Treaty of Utrecht, it took several more years before the bank's specie supply returned to a normal level due to an increased supply of Spanish-American silver money. In 1721 there were 2,918 account holders, the highest number in two centuries of banking history. In 1722 the amount of precious metals stored in the bank had a value of 26 million florins. Old French coins, like the pistole, were melted into ingots and sold with profit. Until 1725, on average, nearly half of the bank profit was attributable to the activities of ten assayers.[18] This was followed by a sharp increase in the supply of specie from Spain in the 1730s until the impressive sum of over 15 million guilders was reached in January 1737. Unlike at the beginning of the 1720s, when French money dominated the bank's total metal supply, by the middle of the century it consisted mainly of Spanish specie. The Exchange Bank proved to be one of the most important sources for cash requirements in Asia.[19]

From 1750 Frederick the Great attracted precious metals, used for producing Reichsthaler, with a reduced silver content, Friedrich d'or and fake coins in an attempt to compete with the Dutch coins, favored in the Baltic. The silver required for the minting of inferior money was largely obtained from Amsterdam and Hamburg. The mint masters in Prussia probably imported more than 300 tons of silver (a small freighter full) throughout the Seven Years' War, which was paid for in Amsterdam mainly by bills of exchange, and in Hamburg by Kriegsgeld."[20] Part of it was used to mint 40 million new coins, which were put into circulation in Saxony, Silesia, but also in Hungary, Poland and Courland.[21]

The Bank of Amsterdam shut twice a year (January and July) for two weeks to balance its books. In 1763 from Friday 15 July - till Friday 29 July.[22]

August 1763

The financial crisis at the end of July 1763 was triggered when Leendert Pieter de Neufville had to pay his obligations to Johann Ernst Gotzkowsky.[23] De Neufville suspended payment on Monday 3 August. The shocking failure of De Neufville caused the market to contract its lending to banks, banks to stop accepting bills and creditors to stop lending on the security of bills.[24] Their reaction caused financial contagion, a "run behaviour, whereby fears of widespread financial collapse lead to the withdrawal of funding from banks and other financial institutions."[25][26] The immediate victims were a group of independent, private "cashiers". (The deposits in the Wisselbank were virtually unenforceable, but everyone was free to demand the money that he had entrusted to his cashier.) The deferrals resulted in an international banking crisis in Amsterdam (38 bankruptcies), Hamburg (90-97), Berlin (33).[27] Danzig, Leipzig, Breslau, Stockholm, and London.[28][29] The banks became unwilling to extend credit to one another,[30] so that the failure of Neufville led to a general loss of market funding.[31] Six leading Amsterdam bankers suggested on 4 August to deposit their silver and gold bars at the Wisselbank instead of coins.[32] On 5 August, the banks were closed and all bills drawn on Amsterdam were returned without acceptance or "protested". A run on the cashiers (bank tellers) followed on Saturday, 6 August.[33] The Bank of Amsterdam and the Stadsbank van Lening were open until two o'clock that night to accept gold and silver, which had never happened before. The Bank of Amsterdam's improvised solution to the crisis was for the Bank to expand its receipt window (much like a modern repo facility) to now include unminted silver bullion, a form of collateral that was in abundant supply after the Prussian demonetization. The "Wisselbank" introduced a new lending window that accepted bullion between 4–15 August. The amount of bullion went up in the next few weeks.[34] After the Seven Years' War the stock of precious metals held by the Wisselbank was never as large as in the years 1763–65, namely 31 million guilders, of which no less than 25 million were made up of Spanish specie.[35] In the course of the 18th century English and French competition on the Cadiz trade increased considerably, so that the Dutch merchants, who used to occupy the first place, were pushed back to the third rank.

Bank money
From 1660's the Bank of Amsterdam was located on the ground floor and the basement of southside of town hall, painting by Gerrit Berckheyde c. 1686

In Renaissance Europe, the currency of small states—such as Genoa, Hamburg, Venice, and Nuremberg—consisted in large part of the currencies of neighboring nations. The foreign money, clipped and worn, lowered the value of a country's currency. A country's own freshly minted money, therefore, bore an agio, being worth more than its stock currency. Furthermore, it was melted as soon as it was released, its metallic content being worth more than its nominal value.

In order to remedy this situation, a bank was founded in 1609 under the protection of the city of Amsterdam. This bank at first received both foreign and local coinage at their real, intrinsic value, deducted a small coinage and management fee, and credited clients in its book for the remainder. This credit was known as bank money. Being always in accord with mint standards, and always of the same value, bank money was worth more than real coinage. At the same time a new regulation was introduced; according to which all bills drawn at Amsterdam worth more than 600 guilders must be paid in bank money. This both removed all uncertainty from these bills and compelled all merchants to keep an account with the bank, which in turn occasioned a certain demand for bank money.

Bank money had several distinct advantages over other forms of money. It was secure from fire, robbery and other accidents; was backed by the city of Amsterdam; and could be paid or received by a simple transfer, avoiding both the costs of counting and the risks of conveyance. Furthermore, it was of a known, superior quality. Because of the above it bore an agio, being worth more than its nominal value. Consequentially, it was not often that clients asked for their money to be extracted from the bank. A shilling freshly minted would buy no more than a clipped and worn one. It was better for clients to sell the debt the bank owed them—their credit—at the market, earning a premium, which is the expression of the aforementioned agio.

Deposits of bullion and coin
Money wagon of the Amsterdam Exchange Bank
Cash box of the Amsterdamse Wisselbank

Deposits of coin constituted but a small part of bank capital. Most of the bank's capital originated with deposits of gold and silver bullion, intrinsically of higher value as bullion was not debased, unlike most of the circulating coinage.

The Bank of Amsterdam gave credit for deposits of gold and silver worth about 5 percent less than their mint price. It granted the depositor a receipt, which allowed him to claim his deposit 6 months later, upon returning to the bank the same value of bank money for which credit was given, and payment of a fee for the keeping—a warehouse rent of sorts—worth 0.25% for silver, and 0.5% for gold. This fee could, of course, be paid every 6 months, extending the period of deposit. The difference of fees has been attributed both to the difficulty of ascertaining the purity of gold and to a wish to encourage deposits of silver, it being the standard metal of the time. If a depositor did not claim his deposit back after six months, it fell to the bank, and the depositor was left with the credit he received in compensation.

The terms of deposit were such that deposits of bullion were most commonly made when the price was somewhat lower than ordinary, and taken out again when it rose. The proportions between the bank price (the credit which the bank gave for deposits of bullion), the mint price, and the market price of gold bullion were always nearly the same. A person could generally sell his receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market price. As a receipt was nearly always worth something, it was only rarely that deposits were allowed to fall to the bank through the expiration of receipts (which means the depositor neither paid additional keeping fees nor removed his deposit from the bank). This happened more frequently with regard to gold, due to its higher keeping fee.

The bank also took in coin, granting credit and receipts in exchange, and charging 0.25% for the keeping. These receipts were often of no value, however, and the deposit was allowed to fall to the bank.

The bank maintained it did not lend any of the bullion deposited in it, not even that part for which the receipts expired, and which could not generally be claimed.

Receipts

When a holder of a receipt found himself in need of coinage, he could sell his receipt. Alternatively, when a holder of bank money found himself in need of bullion, he could buy a receipt. Receipts and credit were thus freely bought and sold. When a holder of a receipt wished to take out the bullion for which it stood, he had to purchase enough bank credit to do so. The holder of a receipt, when he purchased bank money, purchased the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per cent above the bank price. The agio of five per cent therefore, which he commonly paid for it, was paid not for an imaginary but for a real value. The owner of bank money, when he purchased a receipt, purchased the power of taking out a quantity of bullion of which the market price is commonly from two to three per cent above the mint price. The price of the receipt, and the price of the bank money, made up between them the full value of the bullion.

The bank allowed no withdrawal except by means of a receipt. There was, however, more bank money available than the combined value of all receipts – because some receipts have been allowed to expire, but the bank money, or credit, remained in the bank's books. In times of peace, a client who wished to withdraw his deposit had no trouble purchasing a receipt and making a withdrawal. In times of distress, however, as during the French invasion in 1672, the price or receipts could be pushed upwards by demand.

Bank fees

While this was not its original aim, the Bank of Amsterdam proved profitable to the city which provided for it. In addition to the keeping fee mentioned above, each person, upon first opening an account, paid a fee of ten guilders; and three guilders three "stuivers" for each additional account. Two stuivers were paid for each transaction, excepting those of less than three hundred guilders, for which six stuivers were paid, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small transactions. A person who neglected to balance his account twice in the year forfeited twenty-five guilders. A person who ordered a transfer for more than was upon his account, was obliged to pay three per cent for the sum overdrawn. The bank made further profit by selling foreign coin and bullion which fell to it by the expiration of receipts, and by selling bank money at five percent agio, and buying it at four percent. These sources of revenue were more than enough to pay for the wages of bank officers, and defray the expense of management.

Ledgers

The archive of the Amsterdam Wisselbank is one of the few archives that yields data comparable over a fairly lo0ng period for a large number of merchants.[36] The current accounts of the customers were kept in the series of ledgers. Each merchant had one or more pages, the smaller merchants a part of a page. Often the same pages were kept for several years. An alphabetical list of the merchants and their current account pages can be found in the index. In the ledgers a record was kept of the amounts written in and out. The entries and exits were not always in coins, but very often in bills of exchange. The operation of this system is well illustrated in the Notarial Archives, which are also kept in the City Archives. There, bills of exchange change hands, are paid or not paid, resulting in a 'bill of exchange protest' and 'insinuations' (demands for a desired action).[37]

Failure

The bank was administered by a committee of city government officials concerned to keep its affairs secret. It initially operated on a deposit-only basis, but by 1657 it was allowing depositors to overdraw their accounts, and lending large sums to the Municipality of Amsterdam and the United East Indies Company (Dutch East India Company). Initially this was kept confidential, but it had become public knowledge by 1790. The agio on the bank money dropped from a premium at peak of around 6.25% to a discount of 2%, and by the end of the year the bank had to declare itself insolvent, offering to sell silver at a 10% discount to depositors. The City of Amsterdam took over direct control in 1791.[38] On 23 January 1795, during the Batavian Revolution, the doors of the Wisselbank were locked and the treasure sealed.

The Imperial Palace in 1811 with a new entrance to the Wisselbank from 1808.

Amsterdam had a new city council, which published the Wisselbank's unfavourable balance sheet figures. For the first time in two centuries, the bank's duty of secrecy was broken, causing a great deal of commotion. Trust in the bank was subsequently minimal. A loan was issued to raise capital to save the Wisselbank, which was still considered vital to the Amsterdam economy, but far too few candidates signed up.

The new, revolutionary representatives of the people therefore came up with another plan. They felt that the former regents were personally responsible for the large loans that had been made under their leadership. They wanted these former regents - and if they had died, their heirs - to settle the deficits out of their own pockets. An official committee examined this proposal and concluded that it was unfair and impracticable. The regents may have acted imprudently, but not criminally. Lending to the VOC was against the rules, but it was also an old tradition. The liability would have to go back a few generations and that was not feasible.

Eventually the decision was made to grant a forced loan, to be paid for by the 55 richest inhabitants of the city. They protested vehemently, but in vain. They just had to pay. Fortunately for them, with the support of the Staatsbewind, money was raised which was soon used to pay off the loan. And in 1802 the bank money was again fully covered by 'metalique spetiën', and from that moment on the commissioners were explicitly forbidden to grant credit to 'any private person, corporation or constituted auctority, by whatever name'.[39]

Between 1808 and 1811 the Wisselbank moved to Oude Turfmarkt when Louis Bonaparte decided to use the townhall as his palace. After the departure of the French in 1813, the new King Willem I of the Netherlands wanted to get rid of the Wisselbank. During his years in exile in England, he had become acquainted with the Bank of England, a central credit institution that issued a uniform medium of exchange - namely banknotes. Willem had seen how the English bank acted as a driving force for the economy and had contributed to rapid industrialisation. In the Netherlands, such an institution was lacking, and companies that wanted to attract money for investment could still only turn to private individuals. And they invested little in industry.[39]

The history of the Bank of Amsterdam is not just something for historians. From Quinn and Roberds, three lessons can be learned from it that are also useful from today's perspective for assessing the financial condition of a central bank:

  • The Bank's first mistake was to try to pursue a policy of stable money while at the same time building up high claims on debtors of questionable quality (in this specific case: the East India Company, among others).
  • The second mistake was that the municipality of Amsterdam left the bank alone with its losses for a long time, but demanded profit distributions whenever this seemed possible. If the municipality had left a larger part of the profits in the bank as reserves, the bank would have been better prepared for difficult times.
  • The third mistake was the insufficient recapitalisation of the bank by the city in 1791 and 1792. When a bank has to be recapitalised, savings must not be made if confidence in the bank is not to be lost again.

Notes
  1. In a collective item on the profit and loss accounts
  2. At first assayers were allowed to keep 5% then 10% of the profit as provision.

References
  1. Quinn, Stephen; Roberds, William (2005). "The Big Problem of Large Bills: The Bank of Amsterdam and the Origins of Central Banking" (PDF). Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2005–16.
  2. Stephen F. Quinn & William Roberds, 2006. "An economic explanation of the early Bank of Amsterdam, debasement, bills of exchange, and the emergence of the first central bank," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  3. Frost, Jon; Shin, Hyun Song; Wierts, Peter (10 November 2020). "An early stablecoin? The Bank of Amsterdam and the governance of money". Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  4. https://www.beursgeschiedenis.nl/en/moment/the-bank-of-amsterdam/
  5. Van der Wee, H. (2012) The Amsterdam Wisselbank's innovations in the monetary sphere: the role of 'bank money'. In: Money in the Pre-Industrial World: Bullion, Debasements and Coin Substitutes herausgegeben von John H. Munro
  6. Pit Dehing (2012) Geld in Amsterdam. Wisselbank en wisselkoersen, 1650-1725
  7. Amsterdam, in zyne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, voorregten ..., Band 4 by Jan Wagenaar
  8. Quinn and William Roberds, 2007
  9. J.G. van Dillen (1925) 2:985
  10. Borght, Richard van der (1896) Banking in the Netherlands. In: A History of Banking in All the Leading Nations, p. ?
  11. Borght, Richard van der (1896) A History of Banking in All the Leading Nations, p. ?
  12. P. Dehing, p. 148, 170
  13. Quinn, S. & W. Roberds (2014) How Amsterdam Got Fiat Money. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 66. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.004
  14. Stephen Quinn and William Roberds (2012) The Bank of Amsterdam through the Lens of Monetary Competition
  15. Quinn and Roberds (2018) Death of a Reserve Currency
  16. P. Dehing, p. 156
  17. P. Dehing, p. 149, 161
  18. P. Dehing 2012, pp. 185–186.
  19. P. Dehing, p. 169
  20. Schrötter, II. Band, p. 218-219
  21. Schrötter (1909) Das Preussische Münzwesen im 18. Jahrhundert, p. 9, 13, 16, 38
  22. Responding to a Shadow Banking Crisis: the Lessons of 1763 by S. Quinn & W. Roberds
  23. Crisis Chronicles: The Commercial Credit Crisis of 1763 and Today’s Tri-Party Repo Market by James Narron and David Skeie
  24. Explaining Monetary and Financial Innovation: A Historical Analysis herausgegeben von Peter Bernholz, Roland Vaubel
  25. Scott, Hal S., Interconnectedness and Contagion - Financial Panics and the Crisis of 2008, p. 4, 70-72, 77 (26 June 2014). Available at SSRN: or
  26. Liquidity and Contagion: The Crisis of 1763 by Isabel Schnabel & Hyun Song Shin, p. 3, 18, 39
  27. Jong-Keesing, E.E. de (1939), p. 210
  28. Henderson, W.O. (1962) The Berlin Commercial Crisis of 1763. In: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 89-102
  29. Sieveking, H. (1933) Die Hamburger Bank 1619-1875, p. 71
  30. Risks at Sea: Amsterdam Insurance and Maritime Europe, 1766-1780 by Frank C. Spooner
  31. DNB: Roberds & Quinn
  32. Handvesten; ofte Privilegien ende octroyen: Mitsgaders willekeuren ..., Band 5, p. 96
  33. Jong-Keesing E.E. de (1939), p. 94
  34. Responding to a Shadow Banking Crisis: the Lessons of 1763 by S. Quinn & W. Roberds Table C6. Bank of Amsterdam Metal Stock in FY 1763, by week in bank guilders, p. 63 (from week 29)
  35. J.G. van Dillen, p. 447, 597, 606
  36. Clé Lesger (2006) The Rise of the Amsterdam Market and Information Exchange, p. 279
  37. Amsterdan City Archives; from the Introduction to the Wisselbank
  38. Corant, Charles Arthur (1969). A History of Modern Banks of Issue.
  39. Het Old-Boys network van de Wisselbank by Mirjam Janssen

Further reading
  • The archive of the Wisselbank at the Amsterdam City Archives
  • Dillen, J.G. van (1925) Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken (Amsterdam, Middelburg, Delft, Rotterdam) Exchange Banks in Amsterdam, Middelburg, Delft and Rotterdam 1603-1820 (knaw.nl)
  • Dillen, J.G. van (1934) The Bank of Amsterdam. In: J.G. van Dillen: History of the principal public banks, accompanied by extensive bibliographies of the history of banking and credit in 11 European countries. Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 79–123 (Contributions to the history of banking 1, ZDB-ID 633294-8).
  • Dillen, J.G. van (1970) Van Rijkdom en Regenten. Handboek tot de Economische en Sociale Geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek.
  • Quinn, S. & W. Roberds (2009) "An Economic Explanation of the Early Bank of Amsterdam, Debasement, Bills of Exchange and the Emergence of the First Central Bank", in: The Development of Financial Markets and Institutions, edited by Jeremy Atack and Larry Neal, 32–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • W. Roberds "The Death of a Reserve Currency." Economy Matters podcast. 12 November 2015.
  • Quinn, S. & W. Roberds (2019) "A Policy Framework for the Bank of Amsterdam, 1736-1791". Journal of Economic History 79 no. 3 (September): 736–72.
  • Gillard, L. (2004) La Banque d’Amsterdam et le Florin européen au Temps de la République néerlandaise (1610-1820), Paris, Éditions de l’Ehess
  • Nieuwkerk, M. van (2009) The Bank of Amsterdam: On the Origins of Central Banking. Sonsbeek.
  • Nogues-Marco, P. (2013) "Competing bimetallic ratios: Amsterdam,London, and bullion arbitrage in mid-Eighteenth Century". Journal of Economic History 73, no. 2 (June): 445–76.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.