Negative consequentialism

Negative consequentialism is a version of consequentialism, which is "one of the major theories of normative ethics."[1] Like other versions of consequentialism, negative consequentialism holds that moral right and wrong depend only on the value of outcomes.[2] That is, for negative and other versions of consequentialism, questions such as "what should I do?" and "what kind of person should I be?" are answered only based on consequences. Negative consequentialism differs from other versions of consequentialism by giving greater weight in moral deliberations to what is bad (e.g. suffering or injustice) than what is good (e.g. happiness or justice).[3] Due to this, it can be considered an instance of what has been called "suffering-focused ethics", the view that the reduction of suffering has moral priority over any other possible duties we may think of.[4][5]

A specific type of consequentialism is utilitarianism, which says that the consequences that matter are those that affect aggregate well-being.[6] Consequentialism is broader than utilitarianism in that consequentialism can say that the value of outcomes depend on other things than well-being; for example, justice, fairness, and equality,[7] or in that it can say that the value of outcomes depend on well-being but not necessarily aggregate well-being (as it happens, for instance, with prioritarianism, which promotes achieving the higher level of happiness minus suffering but giving priority to the well-being of the worse off).[8] Negative utilitarianism is thus a form of negative consequentialism.[9] Much more has been written explicitly about negative utilitarianism than directly about negative consequentialism, although since negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism, everything that has been written about negative utilitarianism is by definition about a specific (utilitarian) version of negative consequentialism. Similarly to how there are many variations of consequentialism and negative utilitarianism, there are many versions of negative consequentialism, for example negative prioritarianism and negative consequentialist egalitarianism.[10]

G. E. Moore's ethics can be said to be a negative consequentialism (more precisely, a consequentialism with a negative utilitarian component), because he has been labeled a consequentialist,[11] and he said that "consciousness of intense pain is, by itself, a great evil"[12] whereas "the mere consciousness of pleasure, however intense, does not, by itself, appear to be a great good, even if it has some slight intrinsic value. In short, pain (if we understand by this expression, the consciousness of pain) appears to be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good."[13] Moore wrote in the first half of the 20th century before any of the terms 'consequentialism,' 'negative utilitarianism' or 'negative consequentialism' were coined, and he did not use the term 'negative consequentialism' himself.[14] Similarly to Moore, Ingemar Hedenius defended a consequentialism that could be called negative (or could be said to have a negative utilitarian component) because he assigned more importance to suffering than to happiness. Hedenius saw the worst in life, such as infernalistic suffering, as so evil that calculations of happiness versus suffering become unnecessary; he did not see that such evil could be counterbalanced by any good, such as happiness.[15]

Philosophy professor Clark Wolf defends "negative consequentialism as a component of a larger theory of justice."[16] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong interprets Bernard Gert's moral system as a "sophisticated form of negative objective universal public rule consequentialism."[17] Jamie Mayerfeld argues for a strong duty to relieve suffering, which can be consequentialist in form.[18] He says that "suffering is more bad than happiness is good,"[19] and that "the lifelong bliss of many people, no matter how many, cannot justify our allowing the lifelong torture of one."[20] Accordingly to this, the ultimate goal of negative consequentialism would then be the eradication of suffering[21]

Negative consequentialism has also been defended by claiming that it is the best solution to the asymmetry in population ethics, which consists in the fact that most of us have the intuition that it is wrong to create an unhappy life but not necessarily wrong not to create a happy life.[22]

See also

Citations
  1. Peterson 2013, p. vii: "Consequentialism is one of the major theories of normative ethics."
  2. Bykvist 2009, p. 19: "The whole family of utilitarian theories is captured by the equation: Utilitarianism = Consequentialism (nothing but the values of outcomes matter for the rightness of actions) + Welfarism (nothing but well-being matters for the value of outcomes)."
  3. Arrhenius & Bykvist 1995, p. 115: “Our point of departure was the firm intuition that unhappiness and suffering have greater weight than happiness. By taking this stand we revealed ourselves as members of the negative utilitarian family.” Ord 2013: “NU [negative utilitarianism] comes in several flavours, which I will outline later, but the basic thrust is that an act is morally right if and only if it leads to less suffering than any available alternative. Unlike Classical Utilitarianism, positive experiences such as pleasure or happiness are either given no weight, or at least a lot less weight. (In what follows, I use the word 'happiness' to stand in for whatever aspects of life might be thought to have positive value).”
  4. Gloor, L. (2019) "The case for suffering-focused ethics", Center on Long-Term Risk.
  5. Vinding, Magnus (2020). Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications. Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica.
  6. Bykvist 2009, p. 19.
  7. Hooker, Mason & Miller 2000, p. 2: “Other consequentialist theories take other things to be valuable, for example justice, fairness, and equality.”
  8. Parfit 1995, p. 19–22
  9. “One form of negative consequentialism is negative utilitarianism”. Animal Ethics (2014) "Negative Consequentialism", Ethics and Animals
  10. “According to negative consequentialism such as negative prioritarianism, negative utilitarianism, and negative consequentialist egalitarianism...”Animal Ethics (2014) "Negative Consequentialism", Ethics and Animals
  11. Shaw 1995, p. 46: “Moore is indeed a consequentialist.”
  12. Moore 1951, p. 213.
  13. Moore 1951, p. 212.
  14. Moore died in 1958; the same year that both of the terms 'consequentialism' and 'negative utilitarianism' seem to have been coined. According to Spielthenner 2005, p. 231, "It seems that the term 'consequentialism' has been coined by E. Anscombe in her influential article 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958)." Smart 1958 is widely considered to have coined the term 'negative utilitarianism.'
  15. Petersson 2009.
  16. Wolf 2009, p. 360: "For a defence of a negative consequentialism as a component of a larger theory of justice, see Wolf (1999)." That is, see Wolf 1999.
  17. Sinnott-Armstrong 2002, p. 147.
  18. Mayerfeld 1999, p. 116: "The duty to relieve suffering, I have suggested, arises from the badness of suffering." Mayerfeld 1999, p. 117: "The duty to relieve suffering is consequentialist in form."
  19. Mayerfeld 1999, p. 136.
  20. Mayerfeld 1999, p. 178.
  21. Pearce, David (2017). Can Biotechnology Abolish Suffering? North Carolina: The Neuroethics Foundation. ISBN 9781386842149.
  22. McMahan, Jeff (2009). "Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist". In Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman, eds., Harming Future Persons. Netherlands: Springer. pp. 49–68.

References
  • Animal Ethics (2014). "Negative Consequentialism, Ethical Theories".
  • Arrhenius, Gustaf; Bykvist, Krister (1995). "Future Generations and Interpersonal Compensations Moral Aspects of Energy Use". Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy. 21. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.227.8371.
  • Bykvist, Krister (2009). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. Bloomsbury Publishing.
  • Hooker, Brad; Mason, Elinor; Miller, Dale E. (2000). Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Moore, G. E. (1951). Principia Ethica. First edition, originally published 1903. Cambridge: at the University Press.
  • Ord, Toby (2013). "Why I'm Not a Negative Utilitarian".
  • Parfit, Derek (1995). Equality or Priority. Kansas: at the University Press.
  • Peterson, Martin (2013). The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk. Cambridge University Press.
  • Petersson, Bo (2009). "Ingemar Hedenius Moralfilosofi: Normativ Etik". Filosofisk Tidskrift. 30 (2): 57–76.
  • Shaw, William H. (1995). Moore on right and wrong: The normative ethics of G.E. Moore. Dordrecht: Kluwer, cop.
  • Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2002). "Gert contra Consequentialism". In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds., Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 145–63.
  • Smart, R. N. (1958). "Negative Utilitarianism". Mind. 67 (268): 542–43. doi:10.1093/mind/lxvii.268.542. JSTOR 2251207.
  • Spielthenner, Georg (2005). "Consequentialism or deontology?". Philosophia. 33 (1): 217–235. doi:10.1007/BF02652653. S2CID 144914637.
  • Wolf, Clark (1999). "Health Care Access, Population Ageing, and Intergenerational Justice" (PDF). In H. Lesser, ed., Ageing, Autonomy, and Resources. new York: Ashgate Publishers. pp. 212–45.
  • Wolf, Clark (2009). "Intergenerational Justice, Human Needs, and Climate Policy" (PDF). In Axel Gosseries and Lukas H. Meyer, eds., Intergenerational Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 349–78.

Further reading
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