Mellismo

Mellismo (Spanish: [meˈʎizmo]) was a political practice of Spanish ultra-Right of the early 20th century. Born within Carlism, it was designed and championed by Juan Vázquez de Mella, who became its independent political leader after the 1919 breakup. The strategy consisted of an attempt to build a grand ultra-Right party, which in turn would ensure transition from liberal democracy of Restauración to corporative Traditionalist monarchy. Following secession from Carlism Mellismo assumed formal shape of Partido Católico-Tradicionalista, but it failed as an amalgamating force and decomposed shortly afterwards. Theoretical vision of Mella is usually considered part of the Carlist concept and does not count as Mellismo; the strategy to achieve it does. In historiography its followers are usually referred to as Mellistas, though initially the term Mellados seemed to prevail. Occasionally they are also named Tradicionalistas, but the term is extremely ambiguous and might denote also other concepts.

Juan Vázquez de Mella

Mellismo nascent (1900–1912)
Bartolomé Feliú

Generally historiographical works do not refer to Mellismo or to Mellistas prior to 1910;[1] press of the era started to use this term as late as 1919.[2] When discussing internal groupings within Carlism in the early years of the 20th century, scholars refer to the faction more inclined towards alliances with other parties as "posibilistas",[3] while those tending to side with a deposed leader marqués de Cerralbo are dubbed "cerralbistas"; this is also how Vázquez de Mella preferred to refer to himself.[4] However, he started to gain supporters and admirers of his own already in the 1890s, initially lured by his charismatic oratory skills rather than by his theoretical vision or specific political strategy. In fact, his stand might have seemed puzzling: he declared himself enemy of the Restoration system[5] but advocated political alliances with established parties,[6] enthusiastically took part in electoral game[7] but was engaged in conspiracy to stage military coup in 1898–1900,[8] supported minimalist electoral coalitions[9] but preached maximalist objectives,[10] claimed doctrinal Traditionalist orthodoxy[11] but remained in uneasy relationship with the king[12] and revealed cautious penchant towards non-dynastical solutions.[13]

After "La Octubrada", a series of minor Carlist 1900 revolts, Mella sought refuge in Portugal and remained there for a few years,[14] estranged also by the claimant who officially dubbed those involved traitors.[15] Having obtained royal pardon in 1903[16] he resumed parliamentarian career in 1905.[17] As Carlist leaders were usually in their 60s or older,[18] Vázquez de Mella emerged as the most dynamic representative of mid-age generation and most charismatic Carlist politician at all,[19] as a theorist presiding over general overhaul of Carlism.[20] His position consolidated mostly thanks to harangues delivered both in the Cortes and at public gatherings;[21] he did not hold official party positions except in its press tribune, El Correo Español. His personal prestige soon became sort of a problem for both the claimant[22] and the then political leader, Matías Barrio y Mier, appointed to keep the Cerralbistas in check.[23] On orders of Carlos VII Barrio pursued cautious policy of electoral alliances, confronting possibilist vision of malmenorismo-guided coalitions[24] and trying to curb Vázquez de Mella's influence in Correo. As one of his last political decisions in 1909 the claimant appointed a relatively unknown academic, Bartolomé Feliú y Pérez, as successor of the ailing Barrio; the decision came as a blow to supporters of de Mella, considering him obvious candidate for leadership.[25]

marqués de Cerralbo

Following death of Carlos VII his son as the new Carlist king Jaime III found himself pressed by the Cerralbistas to dismiss Feliú;[26] he opted for a compromise, confirming the nomination but appointing Mella as his own personal secretary.[27] After few months the two spent together in 1910 Vázquez de Mella ceased, disillusioned – rather mutually – with his new monarch.[28] During the Cortes campaign of 1910 Mellismo first emerged as a strategy: while Feliú authorized local accords strictly conditioned by dynastic claims, Vázquez de Mella mounted an anti-revolutionary, ultra-conservative, Catholic coalition with Antonio Maura and his faction of the Conservatives.[29] During the next 2 years the group already dubbed Mellistas[30] sabotaged Jefe Delegado,[31] their campaign directed against Feliú as incompetent leader and steering clear of the alliance question.[32] In 1912 Mella accused Feliú of illegitimately holding the jefatura[33] and demanded his deposition, threatening the claimant with rejecting his rule as deprived of "legitimacy of execution".[34] Don Jaime gave in and by the end of 1912 he re-appointed de Cerralbo as president of Junta Superior.[35]

In full swing (1912–1919)
de Mella speaking, 1912

Some scholars claim that with de Cerralbo increasingly fascinated by Vázquez de Mella[36] though also aging, tired of conflict and irresolute, the latter assumed actual command of party structures,[37] while Carlist policy was increasingly formed by Mellismo. The parliamentarian contingent was clearly dominated by Vázquez de Mella's personality; nearly half of its members were Mellistas anyway,[38] the other ones mostly vacillating and only Feliú and Llorens prepared to take a decisive stand. In the 30-member party top body, Junta Superior, around one third were leaning towards Mellismo,[39] including regional jefes of Vascongadas, Catalonia and Valencia.[40] As de Cerralbo re-organized the national executive forming 10 dedicated sections, Mella monopolized the ones of propaganda and press while other Mellistas dominated in electoral and organization ones.[41] El Correo Español kept having been a battlefield with Don Jaime struggling to retain his influence,[42] but it was getting increasingly dominated by Mellistas, especially Peñaflor.[43]

With Don Jaime hardly contactable in Austria following outbreak of the Great War, the Mellistas took almost full control of the party;[44] the Carlist Cortes campaigns of 1914, 1916 and 1918 were visibly marked by Mellista-nurtured long-term strategy. With dramatically declining turnover at the polls[45] and growing fragmentation of two partidos turnistas, it was becoming evident that political system of Restauración was crumbling. Mella nurtured a plan for minimalist alliance of the Right,[46] leading in turn to emergence of a maximalist ultra-Right party, possibly a new incarnation of Traditionalism.[47] That formation was supposed to do away with liberal democracy – a strategy dubbed by some scholars as "catastrofismo"[48] – and ensure passage to Traditionalist, corporative system, with dynastical question parked in obscurity.[49] Though in 1914 provincial jefes were largely left free to conclude any electoral alliances that might produce best possible results,[50] Vázquez de Mella and Maura kept working that they took form of Carlist-Maurist accords.[51] During the 1916 campaign Vázquez de Mella for the first time explicitly referred to a future union of extrema derecha,[52] new terms like "mauro-mellistas",[53] "mauro-jaimistas" or "carlomauristas" entered into circulation[54] and Maura started to make vague anti-system references of altering "ambiente de la vida pública".[55] The strategy, however, demonstrated its limitations. Alliances did not outlive electoral campaigns;[56] Jaimist candidates kept winning around 10 mandates, hardly an impressive improvement compared to the 1890s or 1900s;[57] finally, in regions with strong local identity some party militants grumbled that fuerismo might suffer in a hypothetical ultra-Right alliance.[58]

famous de Mella's pro-German address, Zarzuela theatre, 1915

Following outbreak of the Great War[59] earlier demonstrated pro-German Mellist sympathies[60] turned into a full-blown campaign.[61] Though booklets[62] or lectures[63] technically supported Spanish neutrality,[64] they raised sentiment favoring Central Powers and aimed against Britain.[65] After 1916, when pro-Entente feelings were gaining strength, the focus of Mellistas shifted to preventing a would-be Spanish joining the Allies.[66] The claimant, during most of the war unreachable in his Austrian residence, remained ambiguous; officially he supported neutrality, in private leaning towards Entente[67] and sending notes not disavowing pro-German tones of the Mellistas.[68] Scholars differ as to how the World War One issue related to Mellismo. Very few consider it central and even reduce the outlook to pro-German stance.[69] Most suggest that it stemmed from ideological Mellista vision, quote passages praising anti-Liberal German regime and lambasting Masonic, democratic, parliamentarian British and French systems. Some comments suggest that victory of the Central Powers was expected to facilitate takeover of Spanish political scene by extreme Right,[70] while there are students who suggest that the war issue was of no relevance at all.[71]

1919 breakup
Carlist standard

In 1918 Mellismo seemed to have been losing ground: electoral alliances failed to produce major gains, course of the Great War made pro-German attitude pointless and undermined position of its advocates, some regional jefaturas kept voicing dissent and de Cerralbo, increasingly tired of his own double-loyalty, finally managed to get his resignation accepted, temporarily replaced by another Mellista, Cesáreo Sanz Escartín.[72] In early 1919 the claimant was released from his house arrest in Austria, arrived in Paris and after 2 years of almost total silence came out with 2 manifestos.[73] In somewhat unclear circumstances published in early February in Correo Español, they explicitly denounced disobedience of unnamed Carlist leaders failing to sustain neutral policy[74] and indicated that command structures of the party would be re-organized.[75]

The Mellistas concluded that the strategy employed previously in struggle for domination in the party – cornering the claimant to elicit his conformity – would no longer work and that an ultimate all-out confrontation was imminent.[76] They mounted a media counter-offensive, going public with charges disseminated privately in 1912 and presenting Don Jaime as a ruler who lost his legitimacy: for years he remained passive and inactive, pursued hypocritical policy declaring neutrality but in fact supporting Entente, departed from Catholic orthodoxy, ignored traditional Carlist collegial bodies embarking on Cesarist policy, toyed with the party and – clear reference to his lack of offspring – behaved irresponsibly; all in all, his latest moves were nothing but a "Jaimada", a coup within and against Traditionalism.[77] None of the conflicting parties referred to the question of political strategy as to the point of contention.[78]

Though initially it might have appeared that the strengths of both sides were comparable, Don Jaime soon tilted the balance in his favor. His men reclaimed control over El Correo Español[79] and he replaced San Escartín with former germanophile politicians who seemed pro-Mellistas but turned loyal to the royal house, first Pascual Comín and then Luis Hernando de Larramendi.[80] When Alfonsist and Liberal press cheered anticipated demise of conflict-ridden Carlism, many party members earlier demonstrating unease about Don Jaime started to have second thoughts.[81] Vázquez de Mella, conscious of his strong position among MPs and local jefes, responded with a call to stage a grand assembly. Though he explicitly referred to Carlism and Traditionalism, some scholars claim that at that point he already acknowledged that the struggle to control Jaimist structures was pointless; they interpret this appeal as decision to walk out and build a new party.[82] The showdown lasted no longer than two weeks. By the end of February 1919 the Mellistas opted for an own organization, setting Centro de Acción Tradicionalista as their temporary headquarters in Madrid.[83]

Jaime de Borbón

Many Carlist deputies and senators of the early 20th century turned Mellados:[84] apart from Vázquez de Mella also Luis Garcia Guijarro, Dalmacio Iglesias Garcia, José Ampuero y del Rio, Cesáreo Sanz Escartín, Ignacio Gonzales de Careaga and Víctor Pradera Larumbe; among regional leaders the key to be mentioned were Tirso de Olazábal, José María Juaristi, marqués de Valde-Espina[85] and Luis Lezama Leguizamón (Vascongadas), Antonio Mazarrasa (Alava), Doña Marina and Florida (New Castile),[86] Teodoro de Mas, Miguel Salellas Ferrer, Mariano Fortuny Portell, Tomas Boada Borrell and duque de Solferino[87] (Catalonia), Manuel Simó Marín and Jaime Chicharro Sánchez-Guió (Valencia) and José Díez de la Cortina (Andalusia);[88] the group was completed by two prolific journalists, Miguel Fernández (Peñaflor) and Claro Abanades Lopez.[89] Most of the breakaways came from 2 regions: Vascongadas (especially Gipuzkoa) and Catalonia.[90] Some of regional Jaimist dailies adhered to Mella,[91] though the most important ones, El Correo Español, El Pensamiento Navarro and El Correo Catalán, stood by the claimant.[92] The impact on the rank-and-file was far less material. In regions where Carlism was a minor force, like Old Castile or Valencia, the breakup added to confusion and further marginalisation of the movement, but in Vascongadas, Navarre and Catalonia the rural social base of Carlism remained mostly intact.[93]

Reformatting and crisis (1919–1922)
Antonio Maura

During 1919 the Mellistas were busy institutionalizing the movement. Its backbone were local Centros de Acción Tradicionalista, emergent throughout the country; in Madrid El Pensamiento Español was set up as the national press tribune[94] and there were also attempts to build an affiliated youth and shirt organization, Juventudes y Requetés Tradicionalistas.[95] Though Mella rejected a ministerial post in a new government of national unity, claiming he could never align himself with the 1876 constitution and its system,[96] in May Mellismo assumed shape of Centro Católico Tradicionalista, set up before the 1919 elections and intended as a stepping stone towards an ultra-Right alliance dominated by the Traditionalists.[97] Not constrained by dynastic Carlist bounds any more though rejecting also the Alfonsist monarchy as corrupted by Liberalism, CCT was an attempt to use Catholic platform to lure right-wing offshoots from the Conservative Party, mostly the Mauristas and the Ciervistas. Other potential alliances reported were those with the Integrists and Unión Monárquica Nacional.[98] The elections produced 4 mandates;[99] Mella himself failed to gain a ticket.

Since the summer of 1919 the Mellistas started to gear up for a grand Asamblea Nacional, supposed to launch a new party and set its political course; though "Católico Nacional" was considered as the party name,[100] it eventually materialized as Partido Católico-Tradicionalista.[101] Regional Mellista gatherings were staged in the Biscay Archanda (August 1919)[102] and in the Catalan Badalona (April 1920).[103] However, as the new 1920 electoral campaign unfolded it was getting evident that like before, different groupings of the Right were ready to conclude circumstantial deals, but none was willing to enter integration path towards a new party of ultra derecha. Different Mellista personalities were getting inclined to pursue alliance talks on their own, usually purely pragmatic basis: some like Pradera negotiated with the Mauristas,[104] some like Chicharro talked to the Ciervistas,[105] some were approaching the social-Catholic initiative of former Vázquez de Mella sympathizers Aznar and Minguijón[106] and some neared a monarchist Catholic idea advocated by El Debate.[107] The elections produced mere 2 Mellista mandates;[108] Vázquez de Mella, who lost again, soon launched his bid for seat in Tribunal Supremo, but failed to mount sufficient support among conservative parties and suffered prestigious defeat.[109]

Mella speaking at Barcelona's teatro Goya (1921)

In late 1920 it was already clear that Mellismo is stalled, failing to gain ground on national political scene and getting increasingly paralyzed by two competing strategies. While Vázquez de Mella stuck to his plan of grand extreme-Right federation, at least partially committed to maximalist Traditionalist vision, Pradera emerged as champion of another concept, namely that alliance should be concluded on a minimalist basis, the lowest common denominator having been conservative anti-revolutionary Catholicism.[110] Furthermore, Vázquez de Mella pursued an anti-system and non-dynastical strategy, at best ready to support an acceptable government from the outside, while Pradera was prepared to work within the Restoration Alfonsist framework and to accept jobs in governmental structures. Mellismo suffered another blow when many of its followers joined Partido Social Popular.[111] In 1921 Vázquez de Mella was already in doubt as to launching an own party and seemed pondering upon his role of an ideological pundit providing guidance from the back seat.[112]

Demise (1922 and after)
Victor Pradera

The long overdue grand Mellist assembly eventually materialized in October 1922 in Zaragoza, though it was anything but what Vázquez de Mella had originally intended. Many Mellistas who broke with Don Jaime almost 4 years earlier had departed for other political initiatives in the meantime, others lost enthusiasm following 2 unsuccessful electoral campaigns and disillusioned by the movement having been stuck with apparent loss of direction, little progress on path towards a Rightist alliance and Vázquez de Mella increasingly withdrawing into long periods of inactivity. The gathering was dominated by the Praderistas[113] and Vázquez de Mella himself did not attend; instead he sent a letter, boiling down to his political last will. Once again reasserting his anti-system views he confirmed Traditionalist monarchy as an ultimate goal and declared himself committed to work towards it as theorist and ideologue, though not as a politician any more.[114] Members of the presidency acknowledged the letter and politely declared themselves looking forward to reversal of Vázquez de Mella's decision; the assembly ended in favor of setting up a new Catholic party.[115]

The Zaragoza assembly was effectively the funeral of Mellismo, even though in the last Restauración elections of 1923 there were two candidates successfully running on the Catholic-Traditionalist ticket.[116] During almost a year following the Zaragoza meeting further Vázquez de Mella followers joined other political initiatives. In 1923 national party life came to a standstill once Primo de Rivera dictatorship was declared and all political organizations were dissolved; likewise, Partido Católico-Tradicionalista ceased to exist. Some Mellistas engaged in primoderiverista structures: few of them assumed high administrative positions[117] and Pradera emerged even as dictatorship's iconic figure, but scholars do not agree whether that activity had anything to do with Mellismo. There are students who claim that Mellistas "headed by Pradera"[118] engaged in Unión Patriotica and reconciled with the Alfonsine monarchy,[119] pointing to gradual demise of the group only after the Vázquez de Mella's death.[120] Other authors consider Mellismo defunct as political grouping[121] and at best refer to "seudotradicionalismo" or "mellistas praderistas",[122] underlining only loose association with original "mellismo ortodoxo".[123] Some dub the co-operative strategy “Praderismo”[124] and note that co-operation with the Primo regime, deprived of any ideological backbone let alone a Traditionalist one, had little to do with Mellism.[125]

de Mella, 1928

Vázquez de Mella withdrew into privacy; his last public appearance was in 1924 and he died in 1928. In 1931-1932 many former Vázquez de Mella followers re-united with mainstream Carlism joining Comunión Tradicionalista; this is probably the last moment to which some historians apply the term Mellists,[126] though others are more cautious and prefer to refer to post-mellistas.[127] Within the Comunión structures the former Mellists did not form any visible grouping or faction, though there are scholars who claim that during the Second Spanish Republic and the Spanish Civil War some of the Mellist-Jaimist divisions got reproduced as a pattern.[128] In non-scholarly public dispute the term "mellistas" is at times used in most arbitrary and whimsical circumstances, e.g. to denote pro-Nazi Spaniards of the Second World War.[129]

Reception and legacy
Mella monument, Madrid

Theoretical work of Mella served as point of reference for generations[130] and was studied far beyond Spain, from Chile[131] or the United States[132] to Poland.[133] However, it is universally approached as intrinsic part of Traditionalist doctrine, not infrequently presented as its most refined, in-depth, and systematic component, in fact the climax of Traditionalist political philosophy.[134] The term "Mellismo" is not applied to it, used only as reference to political strategy pursued by Vázquez de Mella and his followers; as such, it generated far lesser interest.

In historiography until the late 20th century the Mellistas were acknowledged mostly in works dealing with different dimensions of Carlism. The authors tended to focus on the 1919 breakup, sometimes portrayed as another one in long history of ruptures in the movement;[135] the secession was presented as resulting either from clash of personalities or from conflicting views on Spanish stand during the First World War. It was the first major monograph, published in 2000, which systematically re-defined Mellismo as a strategy to build an ultra-Right formation leading the transition from liberal democracy of late Restauración to corporative Traditionalist monarchy.[136] According to this theory, the grouping envisaged was supposed to consist of three tiers: complete amalgamation based on common program, federation with those who accepted it partially,[137] and circumstantial co-operation with other groups.[138]

Apart from origins of the 1919 rupture, there are questions pertaining to other issues which remain unanswered. It is not clear whether Mella intended to take over Carlism by reducing the claimant to a decorative role or whether he consciously aimed at a secession.[139] It remains to be traced how a question of foreign policy, usually of secondary importance for most political parties, managed to trigger a schism, especially given in 1919 the war was over and Carlism has always demonstrated little interest, if not indeed contempt, for anything beyond the borders of Spain.[140] One may ask how come that Mellism was potent enough to devastate one of the oldest European political movements but it proved entirely ineffective as a project on its own.[141] There are questions pertaining to the time frame, namely whether Vázquez de Mella's grip on Carlism prior to 1919 and co-operation with primoderiverista institutions after 1923 count as Mellismo.[142] Explanation is yet to be provided as to motives of personalities who were iconic for their loyalty to Carlist kings, but decided to join the Mellistas, like it was the case of Tirso Olazábal.[143]

some key Mellists (listed if picture available)
Abánades López Chicharro Sanchez Doña Marina Garcia Guijarro Iglesias García Luis Lezama Cortina Olazábal Lardizábal (M) Oreja Florida Pradera Larumbe Simó Marín Solferino Valde-Espina Sanz Escartín

See also

Footnotes
  1. there are exceptions, though. Some authors mention "carlismo mellista" when discusing the first decade of the 20th century, compare Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, Orígenes, desarrollo y mutaciones del nacionalismo gallego (1840-1982), [in:] Francisco Campuzano Carvajal, Les nationalismes en Espagne, Montpellier 2002, ISBN 9782842695279, p. 334, available here
  2. the first and rather isolated occurrence identified is España 04.05.16, available here. Starting June 1919 the terms enters wide usage, compare La Correspondencia de España 21.05.19, ABC 21.05.19, La Acción 26.05.19, La Epoca 02.06.19, El Imparcial 02.06.19, La Vanguardia 06.06.19, El Sol 08.06.19 and so on
  3. before it was named "sector possibilista", "sector promellista", or "posibilistas promellistas", Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín El cisma mellista. Historia de una ambición política, Madrid 2000, ISBN 9788487863820, pp. 50, 51, 57
  4. Agustín Fernández Escudero, El marqués de Cerralbo (1845-1922): biografía politica [PhD thesis], Madrid 2012, p. 453; the two remained on excellent terms; de Mella effusively hailed de Cerralbo as great leader, while de Cerralbo was promoting de Mella in the party, Jordi Canal, El carlismo, Madrid 2000, ISBN 8420639478, p. 236
  5. when listening to one of his first Cortes interventions the Conservative leader Antonio Cánovas asked: "quién es ese monstruo?" Andrés Martín 2000, p. 31. In the mid-1890s, during the height of Alfonsine liberal democracy, de Mella gained reputation of its most outspoken opponent. Though the conservatives intended to tame him by offering ministerial jobs, de Mella remained convinced that the system should be dismantled rather than stabilised and rejected Conservative proposals, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 31
  6. some scholars summarise it as "utilización de los métodos y reglas del sistema democtático para dinamitarlo desde dentro", Javier Real Cuesta, El Carlismo Vasco 1876-1900, Madrid 1985, ISBN 9788432305108, p. 308
  7. first time running and losing in 1891, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 31, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 240
  8. as the crisis unfolded into war against the United States, de Mella maintained his involvement in what developed into a largely Carlist conspiracy, exploring the option of staging a coup jointly with rebellious generals and other Right-wing politicians, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 32-7, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 337-9; in September 1898 on order of Carlos VII and like all Carlist deputies he withdrew from Cortes; as the same happened in 1871 shortly before outbreak of the Third Carlist War, the public widely anticipated another Carlist uprising, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 350, 385, Canal 2000, p. 254
  9. especially Catholic alliances advanced by the Church. The first phase (until 1903) consisted of assembling Congresos Catolicos (pp. 241-245), the second phase (1903-1905) consisted of launching Ligas Católicas (pp. 245-248), Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret, ¡A las urnas. En defensa de la Fe! La movilización política Católica en la España de comienzos del siglo XX, [in:] Pasado y Memoria. Revista de Historia Contemporánea 7 (2008), pp. 240-241
  10. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 40, some call it "distinctive dialectics", Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 9780521207294, p. 43
  11. de Mella was among Carlist pundits summoned to the claimant's residence in Venice to produce a new programmatic document, released in 1897 and known as Acta de Loredan, Canal 2000, p. 248, José Luis Orella Martínez, El origen del primer catolicismo social español, [PhD thesis] Madrid 2012, p. 26
  12. especially following La Octubrada, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 37-8; Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 398
  13. in wake of the Cuban de Mella engaged in a plot, sponsored by archbishop of Valladolid Antonio Cascajares and aiming to install a military-supported government of national unity, possibly on assumption of some dynastic reconciliation, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 31, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 312-3
  14. exact duration of his Portuguese exile is unclear; some authors claim he remained beyond Spain until 1905, compare Luis Aguirre Prado, Vázquez de Mella, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid, 1959, p. 26, others suggest he might have returned earlier, quoting repeated press reports on his presence in various Spanish locations, see Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 377-8. Having spent 3 terms in the Cortes (1893-1896, 1896-1898, 1898) and in line with official Carlist policy of abstaining in 1899 elections, de Mella was not reported in the press as running in the 1901 elections
  15. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 37-8; Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 398, Canal 2000, p. 255, Real Cuesta 1985, p. 144
  16. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 416
  17. de Mella intended to re-launch his Cortes career in 1903 but lost, La Correspondencia de España 28.04.03, available here
  18. with most notable exceptions of Llorens and Tamarit, both in their 50s
  19. some authors claim he might have been one of the most popular Spanish politicians at all, Real Cuesta 1985, p. 137
  20. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 31
  21. Canal 2000, p. 260
  22. some author claim the opposite, namely that Carlos VII displayed "qualities of patience and common sense" by making "the best of a difficult situation by presiding not only over Mella's intellectual overhaul but also the creation for the first time of a recognisable party organisation, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 31
  23. Eduardo González Calleja, La razón de la fuerza: orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1875-1917), Madrid 1998, ISBN 8400077784, 9788400077785, p. 206
  24. Already in the early campaigns of the 20th century de Mella supported the idea of Catholic alliances, e.g. against Ley de Jurisdicciones and Ley de Asociaciones, see Gutiérrez Lloret 2008, p. 257; malmenorismo strategy generated enormous controversies within realm of Spanish Catholic politicians and was officially endorsed by Vatican in Inter Catholicos Hispaniae; the Pope Pius X felt obliged to step in and support the lesser evil strategy. The document came as heavy blow especially to the Integrists and to Ramón Nocedal personally
  25. triggering a number of protests, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 421, Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El caso Feliú y el dominio de Mella en el partido carlista en el período 1909–1912, [in:] Historia contemporánea 10 (1997), pp. 99-116, p. 100
  26. Don Jaime has already been suspected of Liberal penchant, see Andrés Martín 2000, p. 48; de Mella described him as educated in "una Academia [the Austrian Military Academy] de ateos y escépticos y corrompidos" and somewhat light on his Catholic practices
  27. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 425, Canal 2000, p. 264
  28. according to de Mella, "mientras no desaparezcan de la escena política Feliú, Olazábal [Tirso], Forner y Polo nada podía hacerse de provecho"; also the question of no successor to Don jaime was causing growing concern. It is not clear what exactly produced an apparently irreparable rift between de Mella and Don Jaime during the secretaryship episode of 1909-1910. No political projects that might have produced differences are known to have been discussed and no single event which might have triggered hostility is quoted, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 50-52, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 42
  29. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 58-9; the strategy produced first expulsions in 1910. The Vascongadas regional jefe, Tirso de Olázabal (9 years later himself leaving his king and joining de Mella), expulsed Pradera for mounting an electoral alliance with a Maurista candidate on his own; Don Jaime approved of the decision, which helped to "mantener enérgicamente disciplina", Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, Precedentes del proyecto ultraderechista mellista en el periodo 1900-1912, [in:] Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 202/1 (2005), pp. 124-125; Pradera was re-admitted 3 years later
  30. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 439
  31. de Mella referred to Feliú as "imbécil", Andrés Martín 2005, p. 121; The two clashed continuously competing to control El Correo Español, when de Mella and Sánchez Márquez, acting on behalf of Feliú, claimed its ownership; the dispute spilled over and reached official administration, Andrés Martín 1997, p. 100, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 62-6, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 441-443
  32. detailed discussion in Andrés Martín 1997
  33. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 67, Andrés Martín 1997, p. 104, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 439
  34. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 68. According to the Carlist theoretical toolset, the king must be legitimate in terms of origin, i.e. he must be heir to legitimate king, and must hold also "legitimidad de ejercicio", i.e. he must rule in accordance with Traditionalist principles, compare Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 440-442. Ignoring the opinion of traditional Carlist bodies – in that case Junta Superior, dominated by Cerralbistas and Mellistas – would have been the proof of cesarism, incompatible with legitimidad de ejercicio, Andrés Martín 1997, pp. 104-105. Initially Mella did not consider such an escalation, but he was provoked by his enemy conde de Melgar, who hoped that with Mella exposed as a rebel, Don Jaime would not hesitate to expulse him. The plot backfired, Andrés Martín 1997, pp. 108-9. Another thread was alleged Don Jaime's wavering on orthodox Catholicism and his pro-Liberal sympathies, combined with emerging rumors of civil suit before Paris court from a woman claiming to have born Don Jaime's son, Andrés Martín 1997, pp. 110-113
  35. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 72; shortly afterwards he dismissed Feliú, Andrés Martín 1997, p. 114; Don Jaime could have also envisaged the decision (or illuded himself so) as means of re-integration of the party
  36. some claim that it was not Mella loyal to Cerralbo, but rather Cerralbo loyal to de Mella, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 452
  37. though apart from managing Correo and forming (as MP) Junta Superior, he did not held official positions; the jefe of Asturia, native de Mella's region, was Cipriano Rodriguez Monte, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 443
  38. Iglesias García, Mazarrasa Quintanilla and de Mella (out of 9) in 1910-1914, Simó Marín and de Mella (out of 6) in 1914-1916, Garcia Guijarro, Ampuero del Rio and de Mella (out of 9) in 1916-1918, Garcia Guijarro, Gonzalez Careaga, Pradera and Batlle y Baro (out of 9) in 1918-1919
  39. Cerralbo, de Mella, Manzarassa, Olazabal, Solferino, Ampuero, Comín and Iglesias
  40. respectively Olazabal, Solferino and Simó
  41. in comisión de propaganda he was one of 3 members, the 2 others, Iglesias and Simó, also were clear Mellistas. In comisión de prensa he was also one of 3 members, with Joaquín Llorens his opponent and marqués de Torres Cabrera in-between, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 458
  42. Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 467-471
  43. he rejected the olive branch offered by some of his opponents at El Correo Español, and confronted an idea of balanced editorial board, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 74-6
  44. Martin Blinkhorn, Cisma en Tradicionalismo (1876-1931), [in:] Historia 16 (1977), p. 77
  45. especially when combining data with cases where no electoral competition took place according to notorious Article 29, declaring victorious a single candidate running; while for the 1890s and 1900s abstention is estimated at 30-35%, in the 1910s it exceeded 60%, Albert Carreras, Xavier Tafunell (eds.), Estadísticas históricas de España, vol. 1, Madrid 2005, ISBN 849651501X, pp. 1093-4
  46. scholars advance differing theories and names related to Carlist alliance strategies of the time. Author of most detailed work keeps referring to Mellist strategy as "minimalist" but aiming at "maximalist" objectives, compare , Andrés Martín 2000. Author of a synthetic work on Carlism reserves the term "minimismo" to social-Catholic amalgamation activities of Salvador Minguijón as actually opposed to "catastrophic" - meaning aimed at removal of the Restoration system – vision of de Mella, Canal 2000, p. 267
  47. including Jaimists, Integrists, Nationalists (i.e. representatives of right-wing Catholic peripheral nationalisms) and hardcore Conservatives, Jacek Bartyzel, Synteza doktrynalna: Vázquez de Mella, [in:] Jacek Bartyzel, Umierać ale powoli, Kraków 2002, p. 285; others claim he favored union of groups whose program overlapped with Traditionalism to appropriate extent, Orella 2012, p. 227f
  48. Canal 2000, p. 267
  49. in 1914 de Mella published his program for united Right, with declared objectives transition from liberal democracy to corporative, regionalist monarchy, Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, El pensamiento socio-político de la derecha maurista, [in:] Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 190/3 (1993), p. 410
  50. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 73
  51. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 87-91, Jesús Millán, Popular y de orden: la pervivencia de la contrarrevolución carlista, [in:] Ayer 38 (2000), p. 33; some authors refer to "pacto Mella-Maura", Ignacio Olábarri Gortázar, Notas sobre la implantación, la estructura organizative y el ideario de los partidos de turno en Navarra, 1901-1923, [in:] Principe de Viana 5 (1986), p. 323
  52. though applying the term to religious and social, but not political realm; Andrés Martín 2000, p. 117; in 1916 he co-organized Asamblea Magna in Covadonga, intended as a launchpad for local Asturian Maurist-Jaimist alliance, Carolyn P. Boyd, Covadonga y el regionalismo asturiano, [in:] Ayer 64 (2006), p. 166
  53. El Motín, 06.07.16, available here
  54. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 110
  55. though it is unlikely that at any point they shared the Mellist vision of amalgamation within a new Traditionalist party and introduction of some authoritarian corporative system; Andrés Martín 2000, p. 118; Maura remained a constitutionalist despite authoritarian sympathies among many of his street followers, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 37
  56. once elected, Jaimista and Maurista deputies formed separate minorities in the Cortes
  57. immediately after hostilities commenced the Carlist jefatura declared strict neutrality, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 133-136
  58. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 119. 141-2
  59. for impact of the war on Spanish politics compare José Luis Orella, Consecuencias de la Gran Guerra Mundial en al abanico político español, [in:] Aportes 84 (2014), pp. 105-134
  60. as early as 1902 de Mella commenced a campaign advocating the German cause. The arguments used were multifold: he pointed to Kaiser as protector of Catholic religion, praised the German political system of strong governments responsible before the emperor rather than before the parliament (in comparison lambasted the British system as born out of liberalism and masonry), quoted geo-politics and complementary Spanish and German interests in Tanger (underlining Anglo-Spanish conflict in Gibraltar and Franco-Spanish one in Morocco), noted glorious Spanish historical record under the Habsburgs and a miserable one under the Borbóns. Some of de Mella's activities assumed a provocative turn, like a lecture delivered in Madrid during a visit of the French president Poincaré, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 41, 60. Don Jaime remained ambiguous; though he did not conceal his preference for neutral Spanish stand in a would-be European conflict, he also did not rebuff de Mella and in private used to send him congratulation letters, declaring de Mella's theories "fiel interpretación de mi pensamiento, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 58-62, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 429-438
  61. with booklets, public lectures and El Correo turning into a pro-German tribune. Most of these activities were supported financially by the German ambassador in Madrid, Maximilian von Ratibor, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 95-101. General overview in Jens Albes, Worte wie Waffen. Die deutsche Propaganda in Spanien während des Ersten Weltkriegs, Essen 1996, ISBN 9783884744949. Vázquez de Mella emerged, along Pio Baroja and Jacinto Benavente, as one of 3 most outspoken advocates of the German cause in Spain, Jesús de la Hera Martínez, La política cultural de Alemania en España en el período de entreguerras, Madrid 2002, ISBN 9788400080228, p. 16
  62. in 1915 de Mella, Claro Abánades and Manuel Abelló published El año germanófilo, dubbed “perfect manual of a germanophile”; in the campaign germanophilia kept competing with anglophobia, e.g. when presenting Germany as the nation persecuted by the greedy English, "England trying to snatch away German commerce and industry, as it has done with ours. Today Germany is a giant nation gallantly flying its colors; it keeps fighting the most formidable duel of the centuries. We do not intend to intervene in the struggle of two peoples, taking place in the centre of the world. Longing for peace, we want to establish sympathy between the Spaniards and the Germans; inspired by reasons put forward by our great man, Juan Vázquez de Mella, we want to set up an alliance with Germany to make sure that in the times to come unredeemed territories come back to the Spanish nation”, full text available here.
  63. the campaign climaxed in address delivered by de Mella in Teatro de la Zarzuela in May 1915, standing out for his oratory mastery. Some authors claim that it was the most evident ever Mellista advocacy of pro-German claims, see Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 109-112, while others note that it was fairly neutral in terms of World War One alliances, though embarked on vehemently anti-British course and pursued almost unveiled designs on Tanger and Gibraltar, see Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 487
  64. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 96, Orella Martínez 2014, p. 129
  65. as Britain was fundamentally hostile to 3 key aims of Spanish foreign policy: control of the straits, federation with Portugal and Hispanic commonwealth in Latin America, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 111. Other sources claim that it was France, not Britain, de Mella’s primary enemy and that he was a gallophobe, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 131
  66. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 127
  67. though the claimant himself did not display a pro-German penchant, he tended to share de Mella's views on the English; he publicly dismissed as fabricated a 1905 press interview with his son Don Jaime, then serving as a Russian cavalry colonel, who confessed that "mi ideal es una monarquía como la de Inglaterra", Andrés Martín 2000, p. 42
  68. though apparently aware of the party command taken over by the Mellistas, he refrained from decisive declarations and confirmed to de Cerralbo his full powers as political party leader in Spain, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 101-105, 115-117, 131, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 485. The claimant also kept inviting de Mella to join him in Frohsdorf to try “el pan de guerra”, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 486; Regional Carlist leaders seemed disoriented, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 481. Some believed that Don Jaime held no firm views and preferred to keep all options opened until it becomes clear who emerges victorious: "el Rey no es germanófilo, ni francófilo, suno cucófilo, y espera el final de la guerra para dar la razón a Vd. o a ellos, según sea quien triunfe", quoted after Andrés Martín 2000, p. 11
  69. "la escisión mellista, que dio origen al partido tradicionalista, se había producido a consecuencia de la condena por don Jaime de la germanofilia de los líderes carlistas durante la Gran Guerra. No fueron cuestiones ideológicas las causantes de la ruptura", Manuel Ferrer Munoz, Los frustrados intentos de colaborar entre el Partido Nacionalista Vasco y la derecha navarra durante la II Republica, [in:] Principe de Viana 5 (1986), p. 131
  70. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 132. That attitude was by no means unusual, as Spanish politicians of the Left supported Entente hoping the Anglo-French victory would facilitate their domination of political scene in Spain, compare Manuel Suárez Cortina, La España Liberal (1868-1917). Política y sociedad, Madrid 2002, ISBN 8497564154, p 187: "los partidarios de los aliados eran los regionalistas, los republicanos, los socialistas, los profesionales de clase media y los intelectuales, que vieron en la guerra un instrumento para forzar en España una transición hacia una verdadera democracia"
  71. "las diferencias entre tradicionalistas [e.g. supporters of de Mella] y carlistas se reducian a cuestiones personales y no ideológicas", Blinkhorn 1977, p. 77; less categorical but similar approach in José Luis Orella Martínez, El origen del primer católicismo social español [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2012, p. 184, "la escisión mellista tiene más de problemas personales que diferencias doctrinales"
  72. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 136-144
  73. at least one of them written by Melgar, Melchor Ferrer, Historia del tradicionalismo español, vol. XXIX, Sevilla 1960, pp. 102-105, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 504
  74. noting that at the outbreak of the war he ordered his followers to adhere to "absoluta neutralidad", which unfortunately "no fui obedecido [...] una parte de nuestra Prensa, equivocadamente y contra mi voluntad, emprendió una desdichada campaña en favor de uno de los bandos belligerantes. Para arrastrar en este sentir a nuestras nobles y honradas masas [...] se les ha pintado con colores embusteros mis sentimientos, haciéndoles creer, contra toda verdad, mis simpatías prusianas; fingiendo intimidades con el Káiser, a quien jamás he visto y de quien sólo he recibido desatenciones y agravios, falsificando noticias y hasta documentos tan odiosos como ridículos. Contra esta campaña de mentiras y falsedades, de la que ahora me estoy enterando, protesto con todas mis fuerzas. Espero que me rindan cuentas los que tienen el deber de hacerlo, para depurar responsabilidades", quoted after Andrés Martín 2000, p. 9
  75. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 146-7, Fernández Escudero 2012, pp. 501-502
  76. initially de Mella and his supporters intended to show up in Paris and present their cause before the claimant; however, they were denied French visas, a measure attributed to manipulations of chief francophile and anti-Mellista, Francisco Melgar, Melchor Ferrer, Breve historia del legitimismo español, Madrid 1958, p. 102, José Luis Orella Martínez, El origen del primer catolicismo social español [PhD thesis at Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], Madrid 2012. p. 181, Román Oyarzun, La historia del carlismo, Madrid 1965, p. 494
  77. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 149, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 505
  78. though Andres Ramón presents differences on strategy as fundamental and recurring motive of growing dissent between Mellistas and Jaimistas. Another author lists a number of reasons: weberian clash of different leadership styles with traditional authority pitted against new-style charismatic leadership, autonomist question, issue of wide Rightist alliance and dynastical problem; breakup of Carlism and overall demise of the Restoration system are presented as victims of the same change, replacing 19th-century model with new, 20th-century patterns, Canal 2000, pp. 271-2
  79. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 146
  80. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 146, Canal 2000, pp. 274-5
  81. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 158-9
  82. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 156
  83. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 163
  84. the term used initially, Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 161-2
  85. José María de Orbe y Gaytán de Ayala
  86. José Pascual de Liñán y Eguizábal
  87. Manuel de Llanza y de Pignatelli
  88. Díez de la Cortina was the Andalusian regional jefe until 1915; in 1919 residing in Madrid, he still retained some influence in his native region
  89. initial press reports claimed that the rebels included almost all major Jaimist politicians, including conde Rodezno, Llorens, Junyent and de Cerralbo, see El Dia 24.02.19, available here
  90. Orella 2012, p. 183
  91. e.g. the Pamplona-based Diario de Navarra
  92. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 161
  93. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 160-1
  94. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 165-6, 179-180, Josep Carles Clemente, Seis estudios sobre el carlismo, Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788483741528, p. 21
  95. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 163
  96. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 164
  97. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 168
  98. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 171-3
  99. Juaristi (Vergara), Gonzalez Careaga (Tolosa), Garcia Guijarro (Valencia) and Chicharro (Nulles), though the last one finally joined the Ciervista minority in the Cortes; the Mellist senators elected were Ampuero (Gipuzkoa) and Mazarrasa (Alava), Andrés Martín 2000, p. 175
  100. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 182
  101. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 511, Canal 2000, p. 276
  102. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 176-180
  103. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 197-199
  104. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 199-200
  105. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 200-201
  106. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 202-204
  107. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 205-6
  108. Garcia Guijarro renews his ticket from Valencia and Ricardo Oreja Elósegui got elected from Tolosa; the senators elected were Ampuero (Gipuzkoa) and Lezama Leguizamon (Biscay), Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 211, 214
  109. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 212-3
  110. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 215
  111. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 231-234, Canal 2000, p. 279, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 36. For detailed analysis see Orella 2012, esp. pp. 189-194
  112. when responding to a query from Maura, who asked whether de Mella would object to his followers assuming governmental roles, de Mella responded that „no era jefe político” and provided rather „cierta dirección espiritual”, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 216
  113. its presidency was composed of Víctor Pradera (Navarre), Teodoro de Más (Catalonia) and Pascual Santapan (Aragón), Orella 2012, p. 268
  114. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 237-239
  115. political guidelines adopted were based on principles of Spanish integrity, regionalism, monarchism and Catholic teaching, also applied to social questions, see Orella 2012, pp. 268-9
  116. Oreja (Valencia) and Garcia Guijarro (Azpeitia), Andrés Martín 2000, p. 242
  117. like Mazarasa, Careaga and R. Oreja, who became gobernadores civiles, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 243
  118. Josep Carles Clemente, Breve historia de las guerras carlistas, Madrid 2011, ISBN 9788499671697, p. 311
  119. "entran en las filas del alfonsismo", Clemente 2011, p. 145
  120. Clemente 1999, pp. 21-22
  121. a 1925 article published in El Pensamiento Navarro and titled El mellismo guipuzcoano claimed that Mellism led "vida raquítica, lánguida, completamente artificial y expuesta a desaparecer al primer soplo", quoted after Andrés Martín 2000, p. 244
  122. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 242-3
  123. how Praderismo related to Mellismo remains a controversial question, charged with old and new political bias. Traditionalist scholars active during Francoism (Elias de Tejada, Gambra) hailed de Mella as possibly the greatest Carlist theorist ever and until the 1970s tended to ignore Pradera, promoted by the regime as one of its founding fathers, Manuel Martorell Pérez, La continuidad ideológica del carlismo tras la Guerra Civil [PhD thesis], Valencia 2009, pp. 354-376, 397-409. Progressist ideologues from the hugocarlista faction (Massó) shared the same view, Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 400. A present-day scholar when approvingly discussing progressist trends of Partido Carlista presents them not as rupture but as continuity to works of Mella as predecessor of progressist Carlism, see Martorell Pérez2000, and in contrast dubs Pradera’s views as “magma”, see Manuel Martorell-Pérez, Nuevas aportaciones históricas sobre la evolución ideológica del carlismo, [in:] Gerónimo de Uztariz 16 (2000) , pp. 103-104. Author of most detailed work on the Mellista breakup claims that Praderismo and Mellismo had little in common, the former distinguished by its rapprochement towards Alfonsism, minimalist alliances, ideological reductionism and trading Traditionalism for vague authoritarian-Right concept, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 255-6. There is a group of scholars advancing an opposite view. Some consider Pradera the most talented disciple of de Mella, see Bartyzel 2002, pp. 276-285. Yet another one seems to agree, naming Pradera "discipulo y sistematizador" of de Mella's thought, Canal 2000, p. 269, opinion shared by Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, El pensamiento político de la derecha española en el siglo XX, Madrid 2005, ISBN 8430942238. Similar approach in Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 145-7, where Pradera is named "more rigid" and "better integrated" "prophet of a Traditionalism similar to Mella's", The author applies the "Mellist" denomination even to Carlist politicians who have never sided with de Mella but followed Pradera during primoderiverista period, like Esteban Bilbao, see Blinkhorn 2008, p. 72. Real Cuesta 1985, p. 157 names Pradera "muy influenciado por la doctrina mellista". For most balanced and detailed account see José Luis Orella Martínez, Víctor Pradera: Un católico en la vida pública de principios de siglo, Madrid 2000, ISBN 8479145579
  124. Manuel Ferre Muñoz, Elecciones y partidos políticos en Navarra durante la Segunda República, Pamplona 1992, p. 325, Ángel García-Sanz Marcotegui, Memoria histórica e identidad: en torno a Cataluña, Aragón y Navarra, Pamplona 2004, ISBN 8497690613, p. 280
  125. the Primo dictatorship initially seemed to have followed some Mellist threads: appearing as a long overdue manifestation of regeneracionismo it did away with political system, dismantled parliamentarian democracy, lambasted party politics, assumed counter-revolutionary tone, tended towards corporative representation and pursued energetic policy abroad, especially in Morocco; Primo seemed another person in the gallery of generals Traditionalism had courted earlier, like Weyler, Moore, Polavieja and Sacanell (or later, as Sanjurjo, Mola and Franco). However, it soon became evident that some features of the regime were not compatible with Mellismo: conservation of Alfonsist monarchy, arbitrarily appointed quasi-parliament, emergence of a state party, courting the socialists, centralisation, praetorianism and above all apparent lack of direction
  126. compare Ángel Luis López Villaverde, Cuenca durante la II República: elecciones, partidos y vida política, 1931-1936, Madrid 1997, ISBN 9788487319198, p. 78, Javier Dronda Martínez, Con Cristo o contra Cristo: religión y movilización antirrepublicana en Navarra (1931-1936), Tafalla 2013, ISBN 9788415313311, p. 91, Leandro Alvarez Rey, La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931-1936, Seville 1993, ISBN 9788447201525, p. 142, Canal 2000, p. 292
  127. Maximiliano Garcia Venero, Historia de la Unificacion, Madrid 1970, p. 64
  128. compare Josep Carles Clemente, Historia del Carlismo contemporaneo, Barcelona 1977, ISBN 9788425307591, pp. 13-14, p. 23, José Carlos Clemente, Breve historia de las guerras carlistas, Madrid 2011, ISBN 9788499671697, p. 150; the theory was elaborated further on into more detail, see Josep Carles Clemente, Los días fugaces. El Carlismo. De las guerras civiles a la transición democratica, Cuenca 2013, ISBN 9788495414243, p. 28
  129. "Vázquez de Mella, Cerralbo, Víctor Pradera y otros líderes carlistas después germanófilos o pronazis, conocidos como mellistas", Alots Gezuraga, El carlismo en el siglo XX, [in:] Nabarralde service, available here
  130. those born in the late 19th century, like Claro Abanades, carried the memory of de Mella into the 1930s; the generation born in the early 20th century, like Elias de Tejada or Gambra, studied his works during early Francoism; Carlists born later like Ramón Massó referred to de Mella when building their own political vision during late Francoism and transición years
  131. compare writings of Osvaldo Lira
  132. compare writings of Frederick and Alexandra Wilhelmsen
  133. compare writings of Jacek Bartyzel
  134. elevated to this position by works of Elias de Tejada and Gambra, published in the 1950s. It is still held as such, compare Bartyzel 2002
  135. Jaime Lluis Navas, Las divisones internas del carlismo a través de su historia: ensayo sobre su razón de ser (1814-1936), [in:] Juan Maluquer de Motes y Nicolau (ed.), Homenajes a Jaime Vicens Vives, vol. 2, Barcelona 1967, pp. 307-345, Martin Blinkhorn, Ideology and Schism in Spanish Traditionalism 1876-1931, [in:] Iberian Studies 1 (1972), pp. 16-24, Martin Blinkhorn, Cisma en Tradicionalismo (1876-1931), [in:] Historia 16 (1977), p. 77
  136. "el mellismo se puede considerar como una especial práctica política de tipo possibilista que desarrolló Vázquez de Mella en el seno del carlismo como medio para conseguir que, éste mismo precisamente, tuviera mayores posibilidades políticas de desarollo y triunfó en medio de la política parlamentaria de la Restauración", Andrés Martín 2000, p. 23
  137. e.g. on Catholic or regionalist basis
  138. Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 24-5
  139. and the resulting question, namely whether the 1919 breakup was de Mella's success or failure. It remains striking that following a decade of efforts to dominate the party, in February 1919 the Mellistas decided to walk out following only a week of open confrontation
  140. Andrés Martín argues that the breakup was caused primarily by efforts to build a non-dynastical ultra-Right union and that the World War One issue served simply as the last straw. If that was the case indeed massive usage of related arguments in ensuing propaganda war between the two parties remains puzzling
  141. there is a number of reason quoted for prompt decomposition of Mellism after 1919: de Mella's character of theorist and orator, but not of systematic organizer (already noticed by Tamarit in 1911: "los pueblos no se gobiernan por abstracciones filosóficas"); reliance on de Mella and lack of other figures of comparable format; lack of social base; inaccurate political diagnosis of existing high demand for an ultra-Right party; heterogeneity of Mellistas (social-Catholics, christian democrats, authoritarian corporativists, ultra-conservatives, nationalists, monarchists), who were looking for a platform to walk out of Carlism rather than for a new party; impossible case of monarchists deprived of a king (and a dynasty)
  142. in classical Carlist historiography (Oyarzun, Ferrer) the term Mellistas was simply applied to the 1919 secessionists. Recent scholarly works generally prefer the term "promellistas" or "promellismo" when referring to pre-1919 period, compare Andrés Martín 2000, pp. 84, 130, and cease to apply the term to the post-1922 period. Single scholars, usually not specialising in Carlism, rather incidentally refer to "mellistas" when discussing the first decade of the 20th century, see Núñez Seixas 2002, p. 334. Ideologues and Partido Carlista militants like Clemente use the term interchangeably with "Traditionalists" as distinct from genuine Carlists, and apply it to large part of the 20th century history, starting as early as 1902, see José Carlos Clemente Muñoz, El carlismo en el novecientos español (1876-1936), Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788483741535, p. 54 – and keep using it until the Francoist era. Sometimes even more original names are applied to de Mella and his followers, see e.g. "neocarlistas" in Miguel Cabo Villaverde, Solidaridad Gallega y el desafio al sistema, [in:] Ayer 64 (2006), p. 238
  143. "la posición de los notables no fue tan clara, Tirso Olazábal que se encontraba retirado de la vida pública, fue un ejemplo de notable local fiel al rey; sin embargo, su actitud le llevó esta vez a secundar a Vázquez de Mella. Guipuzcoanos, Vizcaínos y Catalanes fueron los que en mayoría formaron las huestes mellistas", Orella Martínez 2012, pp. 182–3

Further reading
  • Francisco Javier Alonso Vázquez, El siglo futuro, El correo español y Vázquez de Mella en sus invectivas a la masonería ante el desastre del 98, [in:] J. A. Ferrer Benimeli (ed.), La masonería española y la crisis colonial del 98, vol. 2, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 503–525
  • Luis Aguirre Prado, Vázquez de Mella, Madrid 1959
  • Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El caso Feliú y el dominio de Mella en el partido carlista en el período 1909–1912, [in:] Historia contemporánea 10 (1997), pp. 99–116
  • Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El cisma mellista. Historia de una ambición política, Madrid 2000, ISBN 9788487863820
  • Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El control mellista del órgano carlista oficial. "El Correo Español" antes de la Gran Guerra, [in:] Aportes 40/2 (1999), pp. 67–78
  • Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, Precedentes del proyecto ultraderechista mellista en el periodo 1900-1912, [in:] Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 202/1 (2005), pp. 119–134
  • Jacek Bartyzel, Synteza doktrynalna: Vázquez de Mella, [in:] Jacek Bartyzel, Umierać ale powoli, Kraków 2002, ISBN 8386225742, pp. 276–285
  • Jacek Bartyzel, Tradycjonalistyczna wizja regionalizmu Juana Vazqueza de Melli, [in:] Jacek Bartyzel, Nic bez Boga, nic wbrew tradycji, Radzymin 2015, ISBN 9788360748732, pp. 189–201
  • Boyd D. Cathey, Juan Vázquez de Mella and the Transformation of Spanish Carlism, 1885-1936, [in:] Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, John Radzilowski (eds.), Spanish Carlism and Polish Nationalism: The Borderlands of Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Charlottesville 2003, ISBN 9781412834933
  • Agustín Fernández Escudero, El marqués de Cerralbo (1845-1922): biografía politica [PhD thesis], Madrid 2012
  • Agustín Fernández Escudero, El marqués de Cerralbo. Una vida entre el carlismo y la arqueología, Madrid 2015, ISBN 9788416242108
  • José María García Escudero, El pensamiento de El Debate: un diario católico en la crisis de España (1911-1936), Madrid 1983, ISBN 8422010879
  • Pedro Carlos Gonzales Cuevas, El pensamiento socio-político de la derecha maurista, [in:] Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 190/3 (1993), pp. 365–426
  • Juan María Guasch Borrat, El Debate y la crisis de la Restauración 1910-1923, Pamplona 1986, ISBN 9788431309572
  • José Javier López Antón, Trayectoria ideológica del carlismo bajo don Jaime III, 1909-1931, [in:] Aportes 15 (1990), pp. 36–50
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