Korean People's Army Ground Force

The Korean People's Army Ground Force (KPAGF; Korean: 조선인민군 륙군; Hanja: 朝鮮人民軍 陸軍; lit. Korean People's Military Land Group) is the main branch of the Korean People's Army, responsible for land-based military operations.

Korean People's Army Ground Force
조선인민군 륙군 朝鮮人民軍 陸軍
Arm patch of the KPAGF
Founded	August 20, 1947
Country	North Korea
Allegiance	Kim Jong-un[1]
Type	Army
Size	950,000 active; 7,620,000 reserve[2]
Part of	Korean People's Army
March	Song of the Korean People's Army
Equipment	4,300 tanks approx 2,500 infantry fighting vehicles 8,600 artillery pieces approx 5,500 multiple rocket launcher systems[3][2]
Engagements	Korean War
Commanders
Commander-in-chief	Kim Jong-un
First deputy chief	Ri Yong-gil
Notable commanders	Choi Yong-kun, Kim Chaek
Flag

History

The Korean People's Army Ground Force was formed on August 20, 1947. It outnumbered and outgunned the South Korean army on the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. North Korean ground forces formations which fought in the Korean War included the I Corps, the II and III Corps. The IV Corps and V Corps, VI and VII Corps were formed after the outbreak of war. Divisions included the 105th Armored Division, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 19th, and 43rd Infantry Divisions. During the Korean War, it also contained a number of independent units such as the 766th Infantry Regiment.

A military parade in Pyongyang, 2015

In 1960, the KPAGF may have totaled fewer than 400,000 personnel and probably did not rise much above that figure before 1972. The force then massively expanded over the next two decades. In 1992, there were 950,000 personnel.[4] Before this expansion of the North Korean ground forces, the South Korean army outnumbered the KPAGF. From the 1970s on, South Korea started exceeding North Korea in terms of economics. Thus, South Korea could modernize its forces, which in turn alerted North Korea and resulted in the expansion of the North Korean armed forces. The weaker of the two Koreas has maintained the larger armed force. The size, organization, disposition, and combat capabilities of the Ground Force give Pyongyang military, albeit technologically inferior, possible options both for limited offensive operations to assault the lower half of the peninsula or for limited defensive operations against any perceived threat from South Korea.

Scalapino and Lee's Communism in Korea: The Society gave an organisation chart in 1972 that showed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Army Groups (p. 940). The 1st, 2nd (five divs), and 5th had four divisions plus a brigade or regiment; the 3rd had four divisions, and the 7th three divisions and three brigades. Scalapino and Lee drew upon the South Korean-published The North Korean Yearbook. A declassified 1971 CIA document referring to a 1970 DIA assessment[5] appear to indicate that the 1st Army Group included the 13th and 47th Infantry Divisions.

Yossef Bodansky's Crisis in Korea gives an account of the North Korean order of battle in 1984–88.[6] The 1st, 2nd (five divs, one brigade), and 5th Army Groups, each with four divisions and one independent brigade, covered the eastern, Western, and central sectors of the DMZ. The III, VI, and VII Corps were deployed around Wonsan and the coastal regions, with the IV Corps, recently converted from the 4th Army Group, around Pyongyang. All the corps had the virtually-standard four divisions and an independent brigade under command, apart from the VII Corps with three divisions and three brigades. The army groups were described as striking forces while the corps also had ground-holding responsibilities. The III, VI, and VII Corps began forming armoured and mechanised units in 1985.

Over time, this organization has adjusted to the unique circumstances of the military problem the KPA faces and to the evolution of North Korean military doctrine and thought.

In 1996, a significant portion of the staff, along with local government officials of the VI Corps was arrested and convicted of bribery and corruption.[7] The VI Corps HQ, which was in Chongjin, was in charge of military activities in the whole of North Hamgyong Province. It consisted of three infantry divisions, four rocket brigades and one artillery division. Joseph F. Bermudez reports in Shield of the Great Leader that the incident was not a coup, but it is often reported as such.[8] In any event, the corps was disbanded, and its units reallocated elsewhere, some to the IX Corps in North Hamgyong Province. The IX Corps now includes the 24th Division and the 42nd Division.

Twenty-first century

In 2003 it was reported that the overwhelming majority of active ground forces were deployed in three echelons — a forward operational echelon of four infantry corps; supported by a second operational echelon of two mechanized corps, the armor corps, and an artillery corps; and a strategic reserve of the two remaining mechanized corps and the other artillery corps.[9] These forces include the 806th and 815th Mechanised Corps and the 820th Armoured Corps. These forces were garrisoned along major north-south lines of communication that provide rapid, easy access to avenues of approach into South Korea. The KPAGF has positioned massive numbers of artillery pieces, including some fakes, especially its longer-range systems, close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas.

North Korean soldiers at the DMZ

As of 2013, the US Department of Defense reported the ground forces in number totals 950,000 in strength.[10]

The IISS Military Balance 2017 listed the KPA GF as comprising an estimated 1,020,000 personnel; two mechanised corps headquarters (HQs); 9 infantry corps HQ; the Capital Defence Corps HQ; one armoured division [the 105th]; fifteen armoured brigades; four mechanised divisions; 27 infantry divisions; 14 infantry brigades; two surface-to-surface missile brigades; one artillery division; 21 artillery brigades; 9 multiple rocket launcher brigades; one engineer river crossing brigade; and 5-8 engineer river crossing regiments (p.304). Kyle Mizokami wrote in February 2020 that the 820th Armoured Corps was made up of two armoured brigades and five mechanised brigades, and likely only to be "partially equipped" with the Pokpung-ho tank.

Equipment

The Ground Forces have a mix of domestic and imported equipment in their inventory. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, most of these items were Soviet made and later, from China.[11][12][13]

The annual report of North Korea's military capabilities by the U.S. Department of Defense, released in early 2014, identified the North Korean Army's strength at 950,000 personnel, 4,200 tanks, 2,200 armored vehicles, 8,600 artillery guns, and over 4,800 multiple rocket launchers.[14]

The bi-annual report of North Korea's military capabilities by the ROK's Ministry of National Defense, released in 2018, identified the North Korean Army's strength at 7,620,000 reserves troops, 4,300 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 8,600 artillery guns, 5,500 multiple rocket launchers.[2]

Crucially, the North Korean Army has large numbers of heavy artillery in positions close to the DMZ and near Seoul, the capital of South Korea, a city having a population of approximately 25 million people, around 50% of the total population of South Korea. These artillery pieces can reach the northern parts of Seoul, and are often considered to be a more significant threat than North Korea's nuclear weapons.[15] North Korea's threat of a 'sea of fire' upon Seoul is usually taken to refer to the use of this artillery.[16]

Studies have differed over the number of casualties these artillery can inflict; one 2011 study suggests that the North Korean artillery, firing so as to cause maximum civilian casualties instead of for military effect, could inflict "only" about 3,000 – 30,000 casualties in the first day of a conflict, after which the population would evacuate or find shelter and the North Korean artillery pieces were themselves substantially destroyed.[17]

In South Korea, many of North Korean small arms are showcased in many war museums, such as War Memorial of Korea, tourist sites of North Korean infiltration tunnels, or for the purpose of inspiring patriotism to citizens. The Korean Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) displays North Korean equipment (most of them used by Special Forces) on an exhibition van in various military-related events place such as military units or public establishments.[18]

Ranks and uniforms

Ranks

Korean People's Army Ground Forces has six categories of ranks; marshals (-Su), general officers (-Jang), senior officers (-Jwa, "Commanders"), junior officers (-Wī, "Leaders"), Non-commissioned Officers (-Sa), and Soldiers (-Pyŏngsa, "Soldier" and -Chŏnsa, "Warrior).

Enlisted

Equivalent NATO code	OR-9						OR-8		OR-7		OR-6						OR-5						OR-4				OR-3		OR-2						OR-1
Korean People's Army Ground Force																																			No equivalent
	T'ŭkmu-sangsa 특무상사						Sangsa 상사		Chungsa 중사		Hasa 하사						Sanggŭp-pyŏngsa 상급병사						Chungŭp-pyŏngsa 중급병사				Hagŭp-pyŏngsa 하급병사		Chŏnsa 전사
	Sergeant major						Master sergeant		Sergeant first class		Staff sergeant						Sergeant						Corporal				Lance corporal		Private

Officers

Equivalent NATO code	OF-10		OF-9		OF-8		OF-7		OF-6		OF-5		OF-4		OF-3		OF-2		OF-1						OF(D) and student officer
Korean People's Army Ground Force																									Unknown
	Marshal of the KPA (인민군원수)	Vice marshal (차수)	Army general (대장)		Colonel general (상장)		Lieutenant general (중장)		Major general (소장)		Senior Colonel (Brigadier) (대좌)	Colonel (상좌)	Lieutenant colonel (중좌)		Major (소좌)		Captain (대위)		Senior lieutenant (상위)		Lieutenant (중위)		Junior lieutenant (소위)

Uniform

KPA officers and soldiers are most often seen wearing a mix of olive green or tan uniforms. The basic dress uniform consists of a tunic and pants (white tunics for general officers in special occasions); female soldiers wear knee length skirts but can sometimes wear pants.

Caps or peaked caps, especially for officers (and sometimes berets for women) are worn in spring and summer months and a Russian style fur hat (the Ushanka hats) in winter. A variant of the Disruptive Pattern Material, the Disruptive Pattern Combat Uniform (green), the ERDL pattern, the M81 Woodland and the Tigerstripe is also being worn by a few and rare images of North Korean army officers and service personnel. In Non-Dress uniforms, a steel helmet (The DPRK produced Type 40 helmet, a copy of the Soviet SSH40, see Soviet helmets during World War II) seems to be the most common headgear, and is sometimes worn with a camouflage covering.

Standard military boots are worn for combat, women wear low heel shoes or heel boots for formal parades.

Camouflage uniforms are slowly becoming more common in the KPA. During the April 15, 2012 parade, Kevlar helmets were displayed in certain KPA units and similar helmets are currently used by KPA special operations forces.

During the parade on 10 October 2020, a range of at least 5 new pixelated camouflage patterns and new soldiers’ combat gear of all branches, including the North Korea People’s Ground Forces were shown for the first time. Even though it was difficult to tell the patterns apart from each other, two different green based designs, an arid camouflage design, blue camouflage design, and a two-color pixelated camouflage pattern for mountain and winter warfare were all observed. Also, the use of Multicam pattern uniforms by North Korean military personnel was first documented in 2020 during the same parade, although uniforms in this design may well have appeared in the armed forces inventory much earlier.

See also

• Republic of Korea Army
• Korean People's Army
• Korean People's Navy
• Korean People's Army Air and Anti-Air Force
• Korean People's Army Special Operation Force
• Korean People's Army Strategic Force
• Worker-Peasant Red Guards

References

1. "North Korean military takes oath of loyalty". www.enca.com.
2. http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201901160236460390.pdf
3. http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf
4. "Korean People's Army". Archived from the original on 2008-04-15. Retrieved 2008-02-14.
5. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78t05162a000200010035-1
6. Yossef., Bodansky (1994). Crisis in, Korea. New York, N.Y.: S.P.I. Books. pp. 87–88. ISBN 9781561713325. OCLC 30641772.
7. Joseph F. Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 2001, 59.
8. "Remembering the Coup d'etat in 1996". Daily NK. Retrieved 2017-01-12.
9. Hodge, Homer T., "North Korea's Military Strategy", Hodge: 2003.
10. "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-03-07. Retrieved 2014-03-07.
11. John Pike. "Equipment Holdings – Korean People's Army". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2017-01-12.
12. "About this Collection – Country Studies | Digital Collections | Library of Congress" (PDF). Lcweb2.loc.gov. Retrieved 2017-01-12.
13. "NORTH KOREA COUNTRY HANDBOOK" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2015-09-03.
14. "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Defense.gov. Retrieved 2017-01-12.
15. Mizokami, Kyle. "North Korea's Ultimate Weapon Isn't Nuclear Weapons (Think 'Big Guns')". The National Interest. Retrieved 29 September 2017.
16. CNN Wire Staff. "North Korea threatens 'a sea of fire' upon South Korea". CNN. Retrieved 29 September 2017.
17. Cavazos, Roger. "Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality". The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. Retrieved 29 September 2017.
18. "N. Korean special operation forces infiltration van showcased for 19th ESC senior leader development". DVIDS – Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System. 4 Aug 2014.

• Robert A. Scalapino, Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The society, University of California Press, 1972 – Political Science

External links

• Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2012
• Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2013