Dutton v Poole (1678)

Dutton v Poole (1678) is a landmark decision in the Court of Chancery.[1][2]

Dutton v Poole (1678)
CourtCourt of King's Bench
Decided1678
Citation(s)2 Lev 211
Case history
Subsequent action(s)Dutton v Poole CEC (1679) T Raym 302, 83 ER 156 (Chancery Division)
Court membership
Judge(s) sittingSir William Scroggs C.J.
Keywords
Privity, third parties, consideration, specific performance

It established the rule that privity of contract[3] coupled with lack of consideration preclude third-party suit for breach of a contract and an exception to the rule in appropriate close family relationships. The exception it stated was, having been shunned in run-of-the-mill contract cases for around a century, in 1999 reinstatated and broadened by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.

Facts

In this case a son contracted with his father not to fell and sell the timber from their oak wood which the son would then inherit, and in exchange, he would pay £1000 to his sister on her marriage. The sister married after the father's death, and the son refused to make good the promised sum (equivalent to £156,000 in 2019).

Decision of court of law and of the court of equity

In this case Scroggs C.J. with strong reasons permitted the sister to appeal from the decision of a more junior judge of his court despite the legal prohibition caused by her not being a party to the contract (privity of contract), on the basis that she was a close family member. Scroggs held that "apparent consideration of love and affection from the father to his children [means] the consideration and promise to the father may well extend to the children."

An appeal by the son to the Court of Chancery (i.e. in the then sometimes conflicting domain of the law, the courts of equity) reinforced the determination for his sister.[4] The decision was confirmed in Martyn v Hind[5] and cited in Drive Yourself Hire Co v Strutt.[6]

Exception to privity of contract

This exception was for almost a century from 1884 considered not part of the common law,[7] and was directly refuted in Tweddle v Atkinson (1861).[8]

The legal and equitable narrow exemptions of Dutton v Poole (to the same effect) were in 1967 in a very limited way re-endorsed. The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords case Beswick v Beswick confirmed their application to Executor-claimants seeking equity's assistance to enforce promises to pay them indirectly contained in contracts between third parties and the deceased. The leading judges expressed a great deal of regret in the statutory law not having loosened the doctrine still further (which took place 32 years later in 1999).[9]

See also

References
  1. Vernon V. Palmer, The Paths to Privity: The History of the Third Party Beneficiary Contracts. (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1992) p75.
  2. Roy Kreitner, Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modern American Contract Doctrine (Stanford University Press, 2006) p. 30.
  3. Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 210]]
  4. Dutton v Poole CEC (1679) T Raym 302, 83 ER 156.
  5. Martyn v Hind (1776) 2 Cowp 437, 98 ER 1174)
  6. Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt CA ([1954] 1 QB 250)
  7. Thomas A. Street, The History and Theory of English Contract Law. (Beard Books, 1999) p. 153.
  8. Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) I B&S 393, 101 ECL393.
  9. Beswick v Beswick [1967] UKHL 2.
  10. Sprat v Agar (1658) 2 Sid 115. (Gray's Inn Library Manuscript H-1792.
  11. 1 Vent 6.
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