Dhola Post

Dhola Post was a border post set up by the Indian Army in June 1962, in the Namka Chu river valley area disputed by China and India, north of the McMahon Line (as drawn on the treaty map of 1914) and south of the Thagla Ridge.[1][2] On 20 September, the post was attacked by Chinese forces from the Thagla Ridge to the north, and sporadic fighting continued till 20 October when an all-out attack was launched by China leading to the Sino-Indian War. Facing an overwhelming force, the Indian Army evacuated the Dhola Post as well as the entire area of Tawang, retreating to Sela and Bomdila.[3]

Dhola post
Border post
Dhola post
Dhola post
Coordinates: 27°49′05″N 91°40′25″E
CountryChina (claimed by India)
ProvinceTibet Autonomous Region (claimed by India as Arunachal Pradesh)

Location and background
The McMahon Line in the Tawang sector

The disputed territory is the area adjacent to the Nyamjang Chu river, which originates in Tibet and flows into Indian-controlled Assam Himalayan region (North-East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal Pradesh).

The map attached to the 1914 Simla Convention, displaying the border between Tibet and the Assam Himalayan region (called the McMahon Line), showed a straight line border running east–west in the vicinity of the Nyamjang Chu river, cutting across a ridge called Tsangdhar. Immediately to the north of Tsangdhar ridge is a higher Thagla Ridge (or Tang La Ridge or Che Dong in Chinese nomenclature). The Namka Chu river, 16 miles (26 km) long,[4] flows in the valley between the two ridges, west to east, joining Nyamjang Chu at the bottom.

At the foot of the Thagla Ridge in the Nyamjang Chu valley, about 2.5 km north from the mouth of Namkha Chu, is a grazing ground called Khinzemane.[5] At the northeastern tip of the ridge is located the Tibetan village of Le (also spelt Lei or Lai). The villagers of Le as well as those of the village Lumpo to the south are said to have traditionally used the Khinzemane grazing ground. The Indian government claimed that the grazing ground belonged to Lumpo and the villagers of Le had to pay rent to Lumpo for its use.[lower-alpha 1]

The Indians held that the boundary was supposed to follow the Himalayan watershed, which was clearly on the Thagla Ridge. They believed that the 1914 map incorrectly depicted the border due to inadequate exploration at that time and that the correct border was on the Thagla Ridge.[7] In 1959, India had placed a post at Khinzemane at the foot of the Thagla Ridge. The Chinese forces attacked it and forced it to retreat.[8] After some exchanges in the diplomatic channels,[lower-alpha 2] India reinstated the post. During the officials' level border negotiations between the India and China in 1960, the issue was thoroughly discussed, even though it did not result in any agreement.[12] China continued to maintain that Khinzemane was Chinese territory.

Establishment
Dhola Post and environs[13][lower-alpha 3][lower-alpha 4]

In late 1961, India settled on what came to be called a 'forward policy' to circumvent the Chinese expansion into the disputed areas, asking its Army to "go as far as practicable ... and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier".[14] In the northeast frontier, Assam Rifles was tasked with setting up posts all along the McMahon Line.[15] The Dhola Post came into being as part of this effort.[8]

The Dhola Post was located on the northern slopes of the Tsangdhar ridge, close to the Namkha Chu valley, at about 300 metres above the level of the river. The Indian official history of the war states that the post was able to dominate the Namkha Chu valley, but it was itself dominated by the Thagla Ridge to the north.[16] The terrain was extremely difficult: thickly wooded mountain slopes led to the area via walking tracks in narrow gorges. The closest inhabitable place was the village of Lumpo at a distance of 24 kilometres (15 mi).[16] The posts had to be supplied by air and the nearest air drop location was on top of the Tsangdhar ridge.[16]

A walking track was established along the mountain slope facing the Namjyang Chu valley, leading from Lumpo to a depression called Hatung La on the Tangdhar ridge. At an intermediate location called Zirkhim (or Serkhim) a helipad was constructed.[16] The villages of Lumpo and Zemithang also had helipads, the latter able to take MI-4 Russian helicopters.[17]

The army officer who commanded the Assam Rifles platoon, Captain Mahabir Prasad, questioned the siting of the post immediately after returning to base. He informed the Divisional Headquarters that, according to the local Intelligence Bureau sources, the Chinese knew about the Dhola Post and regarded the location as Chinese territory. They would be ready to occupy it as soon as they received orders.[8] The Divisional Commander, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, queried the higher officers whether the territory was properly Indian, but did not receive a response. His superior, Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh commanding the XXXIII Corps, expressed his own doubts about the legality of the territory, which were also greeted with no response.[18] Eventually the matter was referred to Sarvepalli Gopal heading the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, who answered in the affirmative, citing the Officials' Report.[12] But before the information trickled down to the commanders, matters came to a head.[19]

Indian hesitations

When General Prasad, the divisional commander, did not receive a reply to his query about the boundary, he assessed that it made tactical sense to occupy the Thagla Ridge preemptively. He sought permission from the Army headquarters to do so. Before the headquarters made up its mind, the Chinese occupied the Thagla Ridge on 8 September 1962.[20][21] Scholars find the inefficiencies of the Army command responsible for the Indian inaction, but at the same time the lack of clarity on where the border lay and indecision on how far to go in confronting the Chinese seem to have played a role. In contrast, the Chinese moved decisively.[22]

Having occupied the Thagla Ridge, the Chinese entered the Namka Chu valley on the southwestern side of the ridge and threatened the Dhola Post.[23] The Indian Army high command saw the Chinese action as an attempt to replicate in Assam Himalaya the kind of encroachments they were already conducting in Aksai Chin. It was felt that a show of determination was called for to forestall any further encroachments; a 'no alternative' situation, in the words of scholar Steven Hoffmann.[23][24] Indeed, the opposition parties were vying for blood. The Swatantra Party led by Rajagopalachari asked for Nehru's resignation.[24] In a meeting chaired by defence minister Krishna Menon, it was decided that India would use force "to expel the Chinese from the south of the Thagla [Ridge]".[25]

The Army headquarters ordered 7th Infantry Brigade to move to Dhola to deal with the Chinese investment of the post.[24] The local commanders thought the operation to be utterly infeasible. Umrao Singh argued that the Chinese could easily outstrip any effort by India to induct new troops into the area since they had a roadhead leading to their positions. He recommended withdrawing the Dhola Post to the south of the map-marked McMahon Line. He was overruled by General L. P. Sen, in charge of the Eastern Command. In Sen's view any intrusion into Indian territory was unacceptable to the Indian government and the intrusion must be thrown out by force.[2]

Fighting broke out on 20 September and continued for ten days.[26] L. P. Sen asked for plans for dislodging the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge. The corps commander, who thought it infeasible, produced logistical requirements that were impossible to meet. Sen asked the high command for Umrao Singh to be replaced.[27] The high command divested Umrao Singh's XXXIII Corps of responsibility for Assam Himalaya, and gave it to IV Corps. The Chief of General Staff B. M. Kaul was asked to head the new formation. IV Corps' troops in the area were inadequate and Kaul is said to have lacked combat experience.[28]

Skirmishes

Kaul toured Dhola Post and nearby locations on 6, 7 and 8 October.[29] Despite the obvious difficulties Kaul perceived, Kaul remained determined to execute the plan of evicting the Chinese. His orders were to complete the operation by 10 October.[30] The few days he had been there, Kaul knew that Thagla was tactically out of reach, so on the 9 October, he sent soldiers of 9 Punjab to Thagla Ridge and establish themselves anywhere on it towards Yumtso La which was adjacent to Thagla. The soldiers came face to face with the Chinese and a brief skirmish took place at Tseng Jong.[31][32]

Clash at Tseng Jong

The clash at Tseng Jong resulted in Indian casualties of 6 dead and 11 wounded; Chinese media announced their casualties as 77 dead. Both sides had numerous injures.[33]

Following the clash at Tseng Jong it was clear to General Kaul that the Chinese meant to confront Indian actions. Leaving Brigadier Dalvi incharge, Gen Kaul went to Delhi to explain the situation. Arriving in Delhi on 11 he unsuccessfully tried to convince the leadership to pull back the troops to a defensible position. Gen Kaul went back to the front, but on 17 October Kaul fell ill and returned to Delhi. Brigadier Dalvi had not been informed of Kaul's departure for Delhi. Further, Brigadier Dalvi was at Zimithang, and when the attack on Namka Chu did start, he could not give out clear instructions due to cut communication lines as well as the lack of staff at Zimithang. On 20 October, when the Chinese attacked, there was no one in command of IV Corps.[31][34]

Massacre at Namka Chu

The battle[lower-alpha 5] of Namka Chu started at 5:14 am on 20 October 1962 with Chinese artillery bombardment on Indian positions in Namka Chu and Tsangdhar. After an hour, the Chinese infantry assault began. Indian defences at Namka Chu were attacked from both the front and rear. Positions of the 2 Rajputs and 1/9 Gorkhas were soon overrun with rear positions also being infiltrated by the Chinese. In one hour 7 Infantry Brigade was dismantled. By 8 am some "stragglers" from 1/9 Gorkha reached Brigade HQ. Brigadier Dalvi got permission to withdraw to Tsangdhar but since it had been overrun, he moved to Serkhim. However, on 22 October they were also captured by a Chinese patrol. 9 Punjab and Grenadiers managed to escape through Bhutan after receiving orders for the same. It took them 17 days, ending the battle of Namka Chu. 2 Rajput had consisted of 513 of all ranks out of which 282 killed in the morning and many were captured while 60 men escaped. The Gorkhas lost 80 with 102 captured. 7 Infantry Brigade lost 493 men in the morning of 20 October.[31][38]

Notes
  1. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 26 September 1959:[6] "[Villages] within Chinese territory’s [on] the other side of the Thangla ridge have been allowed to utilise these grazing pastures and for this privilege the Tibetan village of Le is paying rent in kind to the Indian village of Lumpo. In any case it is not uncommon for border villages on one side to use by mutual agreement pastures lying on the other side of the international boundary and the exercise of this privilege cannot be regarded as evidence in support of a territorial claim."
  2. Examples:
    • Government of India: 11 August 1959:[9] "On 7th August armed Chinese patrol strength approximately 200 committed violation of our border at Khinzemane longitude 91.46'E, latitude 27.46’N [spherical coordinates]. When encountered by our own patrol who requested the Chinese Patrol to withdraw to their territory, our patrol was pushed back to the bridge at Drokung Samba longitude 91.47'E, latitude 27.46'N. These places are admittedly within Indian territory and we have been in continuous possession of it. Traditionally as well as according to Treaty Map the boundary runs along Thagla Ridge north of Mankha Chuthangmu valley [Namkha Chu valley] and this position has been accepted in the past."
    • Government of China: 1 September 1949:[10] "But starting from August 9, Indian armed personnel again unlawfully intruded many times into Shatze and Khinzemane, both within Chinese territory... These Indian armed personnel however did not heed the solemn warnings of the Chinese frontier guards; they not only failed to withdraw from Chinese territory promptly, but even camped there and deployed forces to control the surrounding important positions to prevent the Chinese frontier guards from entering, in an attempt to seize by force the above-said Chinese territory."
    • Government of India, 10 September 1959:[11] "The circumstances in which the McMahon Line was fixed as the boundary are given in detail in para 4 of the Prime Minister's letter of the 22nd March 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai. This line is by and large in accordance with the geographical features in that area and also with long-established usage. The McMahon Line however departs from well-recognised geographical features at a few places. For example,... In regard to the specific dispute raised by the Chinese Government about Khinzemane, the Government of India would like to point out that the boundary line in the particular area follows the crest of the highest mountain range. Khinzemane is south of this range and is obviously part of Indian territory.... However the Government of India are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government the exact alignment of the so-called McMahon Line at Khinzemane, the Longju area and the Tamaden area."
  3. The border shown between Bhutan and India was agreed during 1973–1984, but was not demarcated in 1962. The border between India and Tibet is OpenStreetMap's representation of "on-the-ground" situation.
  4. The location of the Khinzemane post is 1.5 miles northeast of the mouth of Namka Chu.
  5. Katoch writes "The term 'battle' is grossly misleading, for what was essentially a massacre."[35] Kler writes "Brigadier Dalvi expresses a doubt as to whether the 'massacre' that occurred on the morning can be 'dignified' by the title battle."[36] Verma writes "Since the odds were too asymmetrical, the battle could hardly be called one as such."[37]

References
  1. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 108–110.
  2. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 295.
  3. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 296–305.
  4. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 139.
  5. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 105.
  6. India, Ministry of External Affairs (1959b), p. 15.
  7. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 293–294.
  8. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 110.
  9. India, Ministry of External Affairs (1959a), p. 46.
  10. India, Ministry of External Affairs 1959b, p. 5.
  11. India, Ministry of External Affairs 1959b, pp. 14–15.
  12. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 111: "[Indian] Army Headquarters had been sent the minutes of the officials' talks of 1960, as well as the final Officials' Report, in which this issue had been addressed. During the officials' talks the Chinese had also been told of the Indian view on correcting a map-drawn line; that is, the need to correlate it with the actual features on the ground. If a feature such as Thagla Ridge had not been explored when the map was issued, and if the map-drawn boundary was supposed to be set by the watershed ridge, then the line lay on the watershed ridge despite the error on the map."
  13. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), Map 8, p. 139.
  14. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 275–276.
  15. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 108.
  16. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 106.
  17. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 107.
  18. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 110-111.
  19. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 111.
  20. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 293–294: "Prasad thought that if the area did belong to India it made better tactical sense to occupy the Thagla ridge itself. He sought permission for a pre-emptive occupation of the ridge. By the time the army headquarters obtained a clarification from the MEA’s historical division and passed it on, the PLA had occupied the Thagla ridge on 8 September."
  21. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 110: "The division commander referred the question of whether the territory was properly Indian to higher echelons in the army command chain, and two weeks later... asked for permission to occupy the Thagla Ridge preemptively. Before any reply was received, he learned that the Chinese had recently carried out military exercises in the Dhola area and had already constructed brigade-strength (but not permanently occupied) defensive positions on Thagla Ridge. To Prasad this news precluded Indian occupation of the ridge, since the Chinese could now move onto it at short notice."
  22. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 111: "Therefore, the unresponsiveness of higher echelons to the questions raised by Prasad..., the need for personal intervention by Palit, the referral to the MEA..., and the fact that Army Headquarters did not respond to Gopal's information with a clear decision...—all served to prevent a preemptive Indian move. The Chinese were allowed to occupy Thagla Ridge first, starting on 8 September."
  23. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 127.
  24. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 294.
  25. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 294–295.
  26. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 296.
  27. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 297.
  28. Deepak, India and China (2016), p. 116: "Lt. General Kaul, who had no combat experience, was made Commander of the IV Corps, a newly raised Corps."
  29. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 150.
  30. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 150, 151, 156.
  31. Katoch 2013, p. 74–96.
  32. Kler 1995, p. 127.
  33. Sanjay Sethi (Autumn 2013). Confrontation at Thag La: Indo China War 1962. pp 120–123. Scholar Warrior, CLAWS.
  34. Kler 1995, p. 139.
  35. Katoch 2013, p. 74-96.
  36. Kler 1995, p. 138.
  37. Verma 1998, p. 73.
  38. Sandhu 2015, p. 78–81.

Bibliography
  • Deepak, B. R. (2016), India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches and Responses, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-85563-46-1
  • Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
  • Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
  • Sinha, P.B.; Athale, A.A.; Prasad, S. N. (1992), History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (PDF), History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
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Primary sources
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